Professor Antoni Kukliński points to the necessity to seek a new paradigm, or pattern of thinking, that would be well-suited to the requirements of the new civilization. He refers to three theoretical and methodological inspirations that he has found in the works of three authors: Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Thomas Kuhn. Drawing on the intellectual legacy of these eminent thinkers and economists, Antoni Kukliński formulates an innovative proposal to the effect that that legacy should be integrated by the economic community and used for developing new patterns of thinking about the future. He emphasizes Myrdal’s conclusion that “theory in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material.” This corresponds both to Galbraith’s critique of conventional wisdom and to Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions.

Professor Elżbieta Maczyńska

The careful selection of recent works of unfatigued Professor Antoni Kukliński provides a precious opportunity to get acquainted with his research accomplishments in analysing the present against the background of the past for the sake of generating – and sharing with us – his insight into future. It deserves careful reading and reflection by students, academia, statesmen and all interested in the fate of Poland, Europe - and the world. A paradigmatic approach adopted by the Author makes the lecture punctuated and intellectually revealing. It offers an enviable cognitive value insofar as key challenges of the XXI century that will affect our destinies are concerned.

Professor Jan Woroniecki

The title of the volume stresses that the author has attempted to find new approaches to issues for which we have yet to find satisfactory solutions. Kukliński uses the term “paradigm” in the plural, which is intended to reflect new conceptual frameworks, new questions, and new methods. Although Kukliński refers to Thomas Kuhn, who introduced this term to the philosophy of science, he offers his own definition. Therefore, although Kuhn’s “paradigm” was applied to the problems of the development of science, Kukliński’s extension of its applicability to radical turns in human thinking in diverse areas seems to be eminently practical. In this way the term “paradigm” has become a part of Antoni Kukliński’s idiosyncratic language, one which is characterized by a number of other terms which together offer a set of reference points in his discourse. Among them are “megaspace”, “turning points”, “wisdom”, “globalization”, “Gordian knots” and “Alexandrian solutions”, along with the metaphor of the Titanic disaster. Of course, the uniqueness of Kukliński’s discourse does not stem only from his use of key terms – after all, they also appear in the works of other authors. Rather, his discourse is defined by the use of these terms in a sui generis network of concepts, in an individual style of writing which demonstrates a unique dramaturgy amplified by the use of Latin phrases. Nor does the author avoid hyperbole or strikingly bold metaphors like the above “Gordian knots” to name ostensibly unsolvable problems and “Alexandrian solutions”, which describe radical decisions for untying. Indeed severing such knots, Kukliński uses the concept of Mezzogiorno, particularly in the variant of “Triple Mezzogiorno”, to compare the south of Italy, eastern Germany, and eastern Poland.

Professor Kozef Niżnik

IN SEARCH
OF NEW PARADIGMS
Antoni Kukliński

IN SEARCH
OF NEW PARADIGMS
(Selected papers 2001–2011)

Polish Economic Society
Warsaw 2013
The book was reviewed by:
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A Well Interpreted Future: The Contribution of Antoni Kukliński

The Polish Economic Society (PTE) gives Readers a book “In Search of New Paradigms” that is a synthesis of the studies, analyses, and reflections of Professor Antoni Kukliński on the subject of shaping the future.¹ The book has been published by the PTE on the occasion of the eighty-fifth birthday of its Author. This anniversary edition is primarily focused on the culture of strategic thinking due to the fact that Professor Kukliński has devoted a considerable part of his academic life to this issue, which is reflected in the research work of this distinguished scholar, who has rendered great service to futurology.

Antoni Kukliński points to the necessity to seek a new paradigm, or pattern of thinking, that would be well-suited to the requirements of the new civilization. If the point of departure for developing a new paradigm, and indeed, its essence, consists of sets of questions directed at exploring the future, as well as of patterns of thinking and tools aimed at answering these questions, then the very process of formulating the questions may be treated as an important factor conducive to strategic reflection.

¹ The papers presented in the volume “In Search of New Paradigms” were originally published in nine volumes sponsored by several major institutions, and especially by the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, the Polish Association for the Club of Rome, and the Lower Silesian Foundation for Regional Development. The list of sources is given in this book on page 291.

The Polish Economic Society would like to extend its gratitude for the permission to reproduce these papers by Antoni Kukliński in the present volume.
Thus, it is no accident that the title of Antoni Kukliński’s work reads “In Search of New Paradigms.” Discussing the dysfunctions of the contemporary world, Kukliński indicates the need to move from a knowledge-based economic model to a wisdom-based one, and expresses criticism of so-called “conventional thinking” and “conventional wisdom.”

Antoni Kukliński refers to three theoretical and methodological inspirations that he has found in the works of three authors: Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Thomas Kuhn. Drawing on the intellectual legacy of these eminent thinkers and economists, Kukliński formulates an innovative proposal to the effect that that legacy should be integrated by the economic community and used for developing new patterns of thinking about the future.

Antoni Kukliński emphasizes Myrdal’s conclusion that “theory in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material.” This corresponds both to Galbraith’s critique of conventional wisdom and to Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions.

Antoni Kukliński’s novel proposal constitutes a challenge for researchers and the economic community, and especially for the Polish Economic Society. It should be an inspiration for developing a new international and interdisciplinary research program devoted to “the role of paradigmatic thinking in the development of social sciences.”

Kukliński’s work delineates the function of strategic research institutions and teams, strategic advisory teams, and strategic

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3 Appreciating the need for strategic thinking, several years ago the Polish Economic Society (PTE) founded the Forum of Strategic Thinking to prevent the dangerous process of its marginalization. With that goal in mind, the PTE has released numerous publications devoted to strategic thinking, including a book by Antoni Kukliński, who is the initiator and cofounder of the Forum of Strategic Thinking.
think-tanks. In Poland, the role they play is certainly insufficient. While to some extent this is the effect of aversion to planning (associated with the previous political system), given the time that has elapsed this may also be linked to an uncritical belief in market infallibility. And if the market is taken to be infallible, forecasts are irrelevant. However, such an approach itself has turned out to be quite fallible, which has been spectacularly demonstrated by the global financial crisis.

History provides considerable evidence that nothing works so well for the present as a well thought-out future. Although detractors will say that the only sure thing about forecasts is that they do not come true, the importance of strategic thinking and the need for it are unquestionable. Anticipatory reflection about the future helps to optimize day-to-day decisions and current actions, which always augurs well for the future. One should not be discouraged by the proverb “when man makes plans, God laughs.” Perhaps God is actually content?

From the presented work by Antoni Kukliński it follows that the need for long-term strategies increases with the degree of uncertainty of action and the risk of making mistakes. When the world is unpredictable, the fundamental function of strategic reflection is warning and anticipatory identification of potential development trends, and most of all, drawing attention to the least predictable threats and risk areas.

It is not by accident that Antoni Kukliński cautions that the trajectory ‘information – knowledge – ability to predict the future’ is not functioning effectively. Despite the ongoing IT revolution with the dramatically expanding information and knowledge resources, recent years have seen intensified connivance – a cognitive and pragmatic attitude which purposefully ignores information about the actual state of affairs in the decision-making process. The European Commission has had full knowledge of the condition of Greek public finance and the way it functioned for 10 years. However, this information and knowledge of the actual state of things was not part of the EU’s decision making process.
Marginalization of strategic thinking has also to some extent affected the European Union and, in general, the Western world. In contrast to this, the Asians, and especially the Chinese, attach great importance to forecasts and scientific predictions. An excellent case in point is “The New Asian Hemisphere” by Kishore Mahbubani, the Asian guru of new ideas, who predicts the end of the absolute dominance of the West and Asia’s gradual assumption of the role of the world’s leader in the 21st century. A similar message is conveyed by the 40-year forecast presented by Jorgen Randers in the latest report of the Club of Rome “2052 – A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years.”

By analogy to the concept of invented tradition, which is found in the world literature, Professor Antoni Kukliński has formulated the term invented future. He writes that “invented future in the perspective of 2020 or 2050 is not as preposterous a task as it would at first seem. Invented future is a future with new structures and new driving forces for development processes which would be difficult to imagine or unimaginable here and now.”

The responsibility to care for the future rests with politicians, members of parliament, governments, and economists. As it was emphasized many decades ago by a representative of the Austrian school, Henry Hazlitt, the art of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups. Nonetheless, there is plentiful evidence that the above responsibility is often ignored by those in power, as they are subjected to the terror of the election cycle. Thus, one could argue that politicians are more concerned with the fate of future elections than with the fate of future generations.

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The need for strategic thinking is compelling also today, especially in the context of the last crisis and its causes. One of them is short-sightedness in economics and politics and the disappearance of strategic thinking in the Western world. Ample evidence for the above is given in Antoni Kukliński’s book, which I highly recommend.

Let me here express my wishes for the distinguished Author of this book to publish many more equally inspiring and important works.

_Elżbieta Mączyńska_
INTRODUCTION

Fragestellung is the greatest fascination of my academic activity\(^1\). I am convinced that the art of Fragestellung is the most important challenge for our mind and imagination. The title of this volume is not accidental.

In Search of New Paradigms. In the volume I am presenting a selection of papers testing the following definition of the concept of paradigm. “The paradigm is a set of questions exploring the empirical and prospective reality and a set of methodologies creating the philosophical and instrumental framework how to answer those questions”\(^2\). In the interpretations of this definition – in the development of my capacities in the field of paradigmatic thinking – I have found three theoretical and methodological inspirations. The Myrdalian Inspiration, the Galbraithian Inspiration and the Khunian Inspiration.

The first inspiration is the Myrdalian methodological triangle theories – questions – empirical materials. I share the point of view expressed by G. Myrdal\(^3\) stating that “Theory in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material”.

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In my outline of paradigmatic thinking an important role is allocated to the critique of “conventional wisdom” following the opera omnia of John Kenneth Galbraith and especially his path-breaking volume – *The Affluent Society*.

The third inspiration for my paradigmatic thinking is the famous contribution by Thomas Kuhn – *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* published in Chicago in 1962.

* * *

The contents of the volume *In Search of New Paradigms* may be seen as an inspiration for the Polish Economic Society to establish and promote a new international Research Programme: The role of paradigmatic thinking in the development of social sciences. In this Programme we could try to integrate the Myrdalian, Galbraithian and Khunian theories, approaches and interpretations as an instrument to create a new model of paradigmatic thinking.

To my mind this is an innovative proposal to consider the integration of the grand intellectual traditions established by Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith and Thomas Khun. The contribution of this volume – *In Search of New Paradigms* – is *per se* very modest, but the creative destruction of this volume could be seen as a more important general instrument to promote a new approach in the development of social sciences.

* * *

In the interpretation of this volume – *In Search of New Paradigms* – we can consider a second general perspective, related


5 T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, University of Chicago Press 1962. Compare the Polish translation, Fundacja Alethneia, please note 2012 is the 50th anniversary of this publication.

6 I have a great admiration for the scholarship and renaissance personalities of Gunnar Myrdal and John Kenneth Galbraith, who incorporated the best intellectual traditions of the social sciences of the XX century. It was a great privilege of my academic life to have warm encounters with both gentlemen.
to the challenge of discovering new paradigms for the XXI century. We may concentrate our attention on three problem-oriented studies:

**Primo** – a new paradigm for the interpretation of the global scene of the XXI century;

**Secundo** – a new paradigm for the interpretation of the drama of Europe of the XXI century;

**Tertio** – a new paradigm for the interpretation of Polonia Quo Vadis of the XXI century.

The Polish Economic Society could perform an especially important role in the search for the triple paradigm of the XXI century (the global paradigm, the European paradigm, the Polish paradigm).

* * *

I will not try to present the content of the sixteen selected papers included in the volume *In Search of New Paradigms*. However, the content of the volume could be seen as a source of four evaluations:

**primo** – the evaluation of the scholarship of Antoni Kukliński, his capacities to interpret the historical experiences and the capacities to “discover” the future;

**secundo** – the evaluation of the Volume as a laboratory to test the concept of *Fragestellung* and the concept of paradigmatic thinking;

**tertio** – the evaluation of the Volume as a starting point for an international programme integrating the intellectual traditions of Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith and Thomas Khun;

**Quarto** – the evaluation of the Volume as a starting point for the discovery of the three interrelated new paradigms of the XXI century:

- The paradigm of a new global reality

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7 Compare Part I and IV of the Volume *In Search* ...
Introduction

- The paradigm of the drama of Europe
- The paradigm of Polonia Quo Vadis

It is difficult to write de suo ipso. Therefore in this introduction the personal perspective of the Author is somehow kept in the shadow of more general perspectives presented as proposals for future research programmes which might be considered by the Polish Economic Society.

Antoni Kukliński
Part I

THE PARADIGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF THE GLOBAL REALITY
Megaspaces of the XXI century.
A problem oriented study*

Introduction

The original assumptions of the Regio Futures Programme were formulated four years ago¹. In this problem oriented study we will outline a vision of a deeply reconstructed Regio Futures Programme² adapted to the new realities of the XXI century. These new realities are created by the greatest transformation of the global space which *hinc et nunc* is creating a new global environment for the field of regional development, regional policies and regional studies³.

Some features of this transformation are indirectly emerging from a set of the four volumes which were published in the years 2009–2010:

*Primo* – The Report of the World Bank titled *Reshaping economic geography*⁴

*Secundo* – The Report of OECD titled *Perspectives on global development 2010 Shifting wealth*⁵

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⁵ OECD. Development Centre, Paris 2010.

Quarto – The Report of the Polish Ministry of Regional Development – *Krajowa Strategia Rozwoju Regionalnego 2010–2020*. *Regiony, miasta, obszary wiejskie* [Poland’s Regional Development Strategy 2010–2020. Regions, cities rural areas]. **These four Reports are important contributions related to our knowledge of historical experiences and prospects for the future in the field of global and regional development.** I think, however, that these four Reports indirectly support the thesis that the development of the Future will be a *sui generis* extrapolation of historical experiences. **The drama of the greatest transformation of the global space has not found a sufficiently strong expression in the four Reports.**

The concept of Turning Points – a rapid change in the structures and driving forces in the processes of development has not emerged in the four Reports\(^8\). The weakness of our knowledge and imagination facing the enigma of the XXI century was not formulated explicitly in the four Reports.

We have to create a new intellectual and pragmatic climate for the discussion of global and regional development of the XXI century as a new phenomenon, incorporating new structures and new driving forces in comparison with the experiences of the XX century. In this spirit I would like to prepare this *Problem oriented study The Megaspaces of the XXI century*. The study will be composed of 12 chapters.

**Part A**

Chapter I – The great turning points in the transformation of the global reality

Chapter II – The geostrategic reconfigurations of the global scene

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\(^8\) Compare A. Kukliński, B. Skuza (eds) *Turning points in the transformation of the global scene*, Warsaw 2006.
Chapter III – The concept of megaspaces as a methodological and pragmatic instrument in the interpretation of the new global scene

Part B
Chapter IV – The transformation of the megaspace of Europe
Chapter V – The transformation of the megaspace of the USA
Chapter VI – The transformation of the megaspace of China
Chapter VII – The transformation of the megaspace of India
Chapter VIII – The transformation of the megaspace of Brazil
Chapter IX – The transformation of the megaspace of Russia

Part C
Chapter X – Europe and the European regions facing the transformation of the global scene
Chapter XI – Poland and the Polish regions facing the transformations of the global scene
Chapter XII – Megaspaces and regions. A new stage in the development of the Regio Future Programme.

Part A

Chapter I – The great turning point in the transformation of the global reality

We are now in the middle of one of the greatest turning points in human history. The present pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2012 has deep roots and consequences. It is a holistic crisis involving not only financial and economic dimensions. It is also a crisis of the global order, the crisis of the Atlantic Civilization and a crisis of the neoliberal ideology. In this context we are defining the present crisis as a pentagonal holistic crisis incorporating all important dimensions of the global reality.
This crisis is the real end of the XX century. To my mind the conventional wisdom comparing the “long” XIX century of 1814–1914 and the “short” XX century of 1914–1990 is wrong. The XX century is also a “long” century covering the period between 1914 and 2012 (?). The two decades 1990–2010 are a logical conclusion of the XX century and not an opening of the XXI century. The present pentagonal crisis was created by the historical mistakes of the global governance in the blossoming time of the neoliberal miracle of the years 1990–2008.

The present pentagonal crisis is a deep turning point in human history\(^9\), the real end of the XX century. It is also a real end of the neoliberal ideology as an ideology organizing the global economy and indirectly the global society and culture. It is not an end of liberalism as one of the most splendid chapters of human history. It is only an end of neoliberalism as perhaps a pathological expression of the great liberal traditions.

The present pentagonal crisis is also a closing chapter of the global order created in the forties and fifties of the XX century by the victorious coalition of liberal democracies. It was the innovative time of the establishment of a new global framework of institutions and ideologies which were the foundations of the new global order performing \textit{de facto} the role of a \textit{sui generis} substitute for the global governance.

In this context we should mention the creation of the United Nations Organization, of the Washington Financial Institutions, of OECD and the European Union.

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\(^9\) Compare a quite different point of view expressed in the OECD Report, \textit{Shifting Wealth}, p. 33:

“The year 1990 proved to be the midpoint of a cluster of major events that would reshape the world both politically and economically. First and foremost was the collapse of the Soviet Union, beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and culminating in the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Second, elections in India in 1991 brought the pro-reform P. V. Narasimha Rao to power. From then on, the Indian economy was to take quite a different tack, with its tightly controlled and inward-looking economy being gradually deregulated and opened up. Third, in the 1990s, China began to hasten the pace of economic reforms begun in 1978, speeding up its transition towards a market economy. Finally, the end of apartheid, signaled by the 1990 release of Nelson Mandela, opened South Africa’s siege economy to global markets.”
Unfortunately the victorious liberal democracies have missed the historical opportunity to reconstruct this global order after the collapse of the Soviet Empire\(^\text{10}\).

The global order was not reconstructed after 1990 and is kept by the power of inertia to the present day. But now it is too late for the reconstruction – a new global order will emerge in the next decade. In this new global order there will be no prominent place for PAX Americana – naturally there will be a place for the USA as an important but not dominating superpower. It will be a new global order incorporating a diminishing role of the Atlantic Community\(^\text{11}\) and a growing role of China and India. We are now in the middle of the great turning point in the transformation of the global reality. We see very clearly the closing chapters of the real end of the XXI century. It is however much more difficult to face now the enigma of the XXI century. In the context of this study we can formulate a few dramatic questions:

1. Will we find a way out of the labyrinth of the pentagonal crisis?
2. Will the human mind invent a new ideology capable of organizing the global economy and the global society of the XXI century? We need a new ideology reaching beyond the limits of the two ideologies which have organized the XX century, i.e. Keynesism and neoliberalism.
3. Will the new global elite of the XXI century have the capacity to design a new global order promoting the spirit of cooperation and diminishing the dangers of the clashes of civilizations and other great actors of the global scene (international organizations, nations, corporations and regions)?
4. Will it be possible to create a new perception of the great historical hour we are living in? The perception that there is a great gap\(^\text{12}\) separating the old global reality of the XX centu-

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\(^\text{12}\) This is a new application of the concept of the gap in the Framework of historical reflection. The classical formulation of the gap is related to analyses of regional disparities, see *Gaponomics. Regional disparities*, The Economist, March 12 2001 p. 13.
Part I. The paradigmatic interpretation...

ry and the new emerging of the global reality of the XXI century. This question has a very strong regional dimension. The regions which are now preparing documents outlining the strategies of development should answer this fundamental question concerning the validity of this gap in the scale of the region. Maybe this gap is less important at the regional level than at the national, continental or global levels.

In other words, the power of the long duration and continuity at the regional level is creating certain autonomy of the region in relation of the global scene.

* * *

These brainstorming questions could be discussed in an alternative and at the same time comparative framework of thinking presented by R. Galar in his brilliant paper Thinking about regions for the next generation.

Chapter II – The geostrategic reconfigurations of the global scene

There are two interpretations of the concept of the reconfiguration of the global scene.

Primo – the geometric interpretation of the reconfiguration – in this interpretation there is a new shape of a new map of the global scene.

Secundo – the substantial interpretation – reconfiguration is a structural change in the geometry of the global allocation of hard and soft power, the hard political, economic and military power and the soft power of education, science and culture.

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This structural change in the global allocation of power has found an innovative and comprehensive interpretation in the OECD Report *Perspectives on global development 2010 shifting wealth*.\(^{16}\) This Report will be analyzed in the Annex one of my *Problem oriented study*. In this context let me mention only four observations basing on this Report:

1. **The emergence of Asian Giants** and especially China and India as new engines of global economic growth.

2. **The labour supply shock**\(^{17}\)

   The opening of formerly closed large economies brought a supply shock to the global labour market, the scale of which can be compared to the increase in the western world’s access to land and natural resources following the opening of routes to the Americas five centuries ago. In the first years of the 1990s, the integration of China, India and the former Soviet Union brought the world economy new labour forces of 750 million, 450 million and 300 million respectively. The arrival of these 1.5 billion workers doubled the number of people working in open, market-oriented economies and so halved the capital/labour ratio.

3. **The new emerging importance of South–South trade**\(^{18}\)

   Trade is one of the key channels through which shifting wealth manifests itself. From the 1950s onwards international trade was predominantly a story of intense exchange between high-income countries, particularly between the triad of Europe, the United States and Japan (Grimwade, 2000). But over the last two decades that picture has changed substantially.

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\(^{16}\) OECD Report op.cit.

\(^{17}\) OECD Report op.cit p. 20.

\(^{18}\) OECD Report p. 71.
A new geography of trade has emerged in the years 1990–2008 (see table 1)

Table 1. Exports by regions. Trillions USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin and destination of exports</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North–North</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North–South</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South–North</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South–South</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The OECD Report p. 71–72

4. The new architecture of global governance\(^{19}\)

The new configuration of global economic and political power means that the affluent countries can no longer set the agenda alone. The world’s problems are becoming increasingly global, and if they are to be solved, then responsibility and solutions must be shared. A new architecture for global governance is emerging to reflect changing economic realities. The post-crisis role for the G20 shows how converging powers are becoming increasingly important protagonists in global governance. This is a positive development. Efforts towards making all institutions of global governance more inclusive and representative should be sustained.

The OECD Report is an important contribution increasing our knowledge and imagination related to the reconfiguration of the global scene. The new engines of global economic growth, the labour supply shock, the South–South trade and the new architecture of global governance are valuable elements of the Report which will be incorporated in the framework of my

\(^{19}\) OECD Report p. 20.
study. As already mentioned I will prepare a special Annex to enter more deeply in the “problematique” of the Report. **Already in this context I would like to mention two notes of disagreement:**

*Primo* – the Report is defining 1990 as a break with the past\(^{20}\). The Report is not accepting the point of view, that 1990 was a shallow turning point in global history and that the great pentagonal crisis is a real deep turning point. The OECD is a grand international organization representing the highest levels of competence. It is however an organization of restricted scope of attention limited to economic development and institutional change.

The holistic analysis leading to the distinction between shallow and deep turning points is outside the scope of OECD’s attention.

*Secundo* – the second note of disagreement is related to the scale of the labour supply shock\(^{21}\). The scale of 1500 million is vastly overestimated and should be reduced to the order of 750 million which is anyway a very large scale changing the structural proportions of the global labour market.

**The Atlantic Community – the Titanic of the XXI century?**

The beginning of the XXI century is a very dramatic or even tragic time in human history. We are overwhelmed by the perspective of the intellectual climate of neospenglerism. We are inclined to believe in *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*\(^{22}\). The decline of Western Civilization is a fatalistic verdict of history. In this spirit we are inclined to believe that the leading role of Western Civilization is a closed chapter in the human history of the years 1500–2000.

The XXI century will be an age of Asia and especially an age of Chindia – China and India. The Gordian Knots paralyzing the Atlantic Community at the beginning of the XXI century are

\(^{20}\) OECD Report p. 33.

\(^{21}\) OECD Report p. 47.

destroying our hope and will to power, to be a very important actor of the global scene of the XXI century. We need wisdom, imagination and courage to analyze the experience of the Atlantic Community at the beginning of the XXI century using the conceptual framework of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions\textsuperscript{23}.

The dramatic Gordian Knot of the Atlantic Community at the beginning of the XXI century is the destruction of the unity of Western Civilization, the unity of the European Union and the USA as an integrated actor of the global scene.

We need mega-historical Alexandrian Solutions to establish the unity of the Atlantic Community as an integrated and powerful actor of the global scene of the XXI century.

Nobody – China, India, Russia, the Islamic powers, the power of oil – can challenge the integrated power of the Atlantic Community of the XXI century. This optimistic message is emerging from the brilliant book of Timothy Garton Ash\textsuperscript{24} *Free World – America, Europe and the surprising future of the West*.

The Atlantic Community is a very grand and powerful Community – a Community of Western Civilization, a Community of Liberal Democracies, a Community of Innovative Culture, a Community of Academic Freedom, a Community of dynamic capitalistic enterprises.

This power and grandeur is paralyzed by the political and ideological disintegration – a dramatic or even tragic Gordian Knot. \textbf{If the Atlantic Community does not find an Alexandrian Solution for this Gordian Knot, then the Atlantic Community will really transform itself into the Titanic of the XXI century.}

The power of the survival and development of the Atlantic Community as an important but not dominating actor of the global scene is one of the crucial problems in the reconfiguration of the global scene of the XXI century.


The configuration of BRIC\textsuperscript{25}

The BRIC metaphor is a new phenomenon of the global scene. This is a club of four countries China, India, Brazil and Russia. These four countries have two common features.

\textit{Primo} – a strong and promising developmental potential

\textit{Secundo} – an ambition to assume the role of real global powers creating a countervailing pattern in relation to the classical domination of the Atlantic Community. But the illusions of BRIC are stronger than the realities. The cohesion of BRIC is very low. Each member of the Club has divergent interests inside and outside the Club.

The idea to transform BRIC into G4 is not realistic. \textbf{We should however observe and analyze the development of BRIC as a phenomenon of global importance.}

This phenomenon is noticed by the European Commission. The BRIC has entered the scope of attention of the European Commission, which can be seen on pages 5 and 6 of the fifth cohesion Report\textsuperscript{26}.

The Chimerica Configuration

If we like it or not Chimerica will probably be the most important feature of the XXI century. By Chimerica we understand a bipolar world dominated by the USA and China. I would like to present three quotations which may be useful in the interpretation of the Chimerica of the XXI century. The first quotation is from H.A. Kissinger\textsuperscript{27}:

\textit{As a new century begins, the relations between China and the United States may well determine whether our children will live in turmoil even worse than the 20\textsuperscript{th} century or whether

\textsuperscript{25} Compare A. Kukliński, K. Pawlowski, \textit{The Atlantic Community} op.cit.

\textsuperscript{26} Compare \textit{Investing in Europe’s future}, European Union, op.cit.

they will witness a new world order compatible with universal aspirations for peace and progress.

The second quotation – W. Lam\textsuperscript{28}:

*Hongkong* while no breakthroughs came out of the Barack Obama-Hu Jintao summit meeting, the U.S. president ma-

iden trip to China will go down in history as a pivotal event in the relations between the two most powerful countries of the 21st century.

The third quotation – T.L. Friedman\textsuperscript{29}:

*Let’s today step out off the normal boundaries of analysis of our economic crisis and ask a radical question: What if the crisis of 2008 represents something much more fundamental than a deep recession? What if it’s telling us that the whole growth model we created over the last 50 years is simply unsustainable economically and ecologically and that 2008 was when we hit the wall – when Mother Nature and the mar-

ket both said: “No more.”*

*We have created a system for growth that depended on our bu-

ilding more and more stores to sell more and more stuff made in more and more factories in China, powered by more and more coal that would cause more and more climate change but earn China more and more dollars to buy more and more U.S. T-bills so America would have more and more money to build more and more stores and sell more and more stuff that would employ more and more Chinese... We can’t do this anymore.*

\textsuperscript{28} W. Lam, *Equals et last for better or worse*, IHT, November 19 2009; compare also Zhang Wei-Wei, *Eight ideas behind China’s success*, IHT October 1 2009.

\textsuperscript{29} T.L. Friedmann, *The great disruption*, IHT March 9 2009.
Chimerica is a triple paradox\textsuperscript{30}:
1. The encounter of a declining and a rising superpower
2. The encounter of a democratic and an autocratic system
3. The encounter of an open and not open society and civilization.

* * *

The global scene is a phenomenon of long duration which is a process of permanent interaction of stability and structural change. The present holistic pentagonal crisis is a dramatic time of rapid reconfiguration of the global scene. The old scene dominated by the Atlantic Civilization will be replaced by a new scene created by new allocation of hard and soft global power in the framework of a changing system of actors who are strong enough to participate in the processes of the creation of a new global order and new global governance. The dilemma “global chaos” versus “global order” is equally important as the dilemma of economic crisis versus economic growth. The Gordian Knot of the global reality of the XXI century must find a simultaneous solution for both of the dilemmas which are mutually interdependent.

This interdependence is not noticed by OECD which is concentrating too much attention on the economic dilemma and too little attention on the dilemma of the global order. This debate has direct implications for discussions related to the future of regions in the XXI century. The experiences of the regional scene are not isolated from the global context facing the two interdependent dilemmas.

Chapter III – The concept of megaspaces as a methodological and pragmatic instrument in the interpretation of the new global scene

The space of the European Union of the XXI century is a megaspace *in statu nascendi*.

“A megaspace is a grand geographical area representing a big demographic, political, economic, scientific, cultural and military potential recognized very clearly in the global scale. The megaspace is a regionally differentiated area with no barriers limiting the free flows of persons, commodities, information and capital. Megaspace is an area having a comprehensive and valid statistical documentation creating an empirical foundation for the inquiry into the nature and dynamics of the internal spatial differentiations of the megaspace. **The megaspace is a phenomenon of a higher order in relation to classical macro spaces – countries – mezzo spaces – regions and micro spaces – localities.**”

In this definition we find five elements:

*Primo* – the grand territory

*Secundno* – the multidimensional potential

*Tertio* – a minimum level of integration expressed in a *grosso modo* free movement of persons, commodities, information and capital

*Quarto* – valid statistical information

*Quinto* – emerging perception of the megaspace as a phenomenon of higher order in relation to classical macro spaces, mezzo spaces and micro spaces.

**The megaspace of the European Union is a phenomenon in statu nascendi.** The European megaspace will be a reflection of a new stage of European economic, political, social and cultural integration. **The grand pentagonal crisis is indirectly paralyzing the processes of European integration, including the processes of the creation of the European megaspace.** If the present trend
of the declining power of the European Union and the prospects of the declining power of regional and cohesion policies of the Union reverse the original logic of the development of the European Union, then the European megaspace will never emerge as a new phenomenon of the global scene of the XXI century.

We hope, however, that the dark scenario of the de facto dissolution of the European Union will be never changed into reality. We hope that the Union will be able to overcome the paralysis of the present pentagonal crisis and create a new strategy of European integration including the creation of a new European megaspace as an important element of the global scene.

In the intellectual and pragmatic climate of a new stage of European integration we may consider a system of six megaspaces incorporating the European experiences into a comprehensive global comparative framework. It is interesting to note that this comparative framework the EU-the USA-BRIC has already emerged in the fifth cohesion Report.\(^3\)

An integrated analysis of the six megaspaces may create new inspirations and inducements for the processes of institutional cooperation linking and interpreting the experiences of the six megaspaces. In this process the “mentality” of the European Union will absorb the systematic knowledge about the five megaspaces. This absorption of knowledge and experiences of the five megaspaces will extend the comparative horizons not only of the European Union but also of the European society in toto. At the same time the European Union promoting the system of six megaspaces will create a vast territory for the diffusion of the achievements in the field of regional policies as developed by the European Union.

According to my knowledge, processes of absorption of the European experiences were already started in China\(^3\) and Brazil. In this spirit we may be inclined to analyze the fundamental data incorporated in table 2.

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\(^3\) The European Union, Fifth Cohesion Report.\cite{fifth_cohesion_report}

Part I. The paradigmatic interpretation...

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area millions km²</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population millions</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>1123</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density persons per km²</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The analyses of the six megaspaces could be designed in different ways. In this context let us start these analyses as a set of three duos:
The Duo of the USA and the European Union
The Duo of Brazil and Russia
The Duo of India and China.

**The duo of the USA and the European Union**
– *The Atlantic Community*

The megaspace of the USA and the megaspace of the European Union are jointly forming the megaspace of the Atlantic Community which was discussed in the earlier chapter of this study outlining the dramatic dilemma of the Atlantic Community of the XXI century. The crisis of the megaspace of the Atlantic Community and the expansion of the power of the megaspace of India and China are creating the background of the geostrategic reconfiguration of the global scene. This verdict of history is questioned in the already quoted book by T.G. Ash\(^3\). The Ashian philosophy is getting a new powerful interpretation by John Kornblum who served as the USA ambassador to Germany

\(^3\) T.G. Ash, *Free World* op.cit.
in the years 1997–2001. Let us quote his thought-provoking point of view\textsuperscript{34}:

*Uniting Europe and North America is the most audacious project ever conceived. If it works, the United States will be joined by nearly 500 million Europeans to form a democratic space, within which modern democratic values will harness more energy than in any single nation on earth. Democracy's future as the operating system for a globalized world will be assured.*

The future of the Atlantic Community including the future of the American and European megaspaces will be discussed in the next chapters of our study. At the present moment let us concentrate attention on the individualities of the American and European megaspaces.

**The megaspace of the USA**

Our definition of the megaspace has full application in the case of the USA. All elements of this definition can be tested in the framework of the American experience. The grand geographical area, the multidimensional potential visible in the global scene, the open flows of persons, commodities, information and capital. The American megaspace is a consolidated and highly integrated megaspace.

It is a megaspace represented by the best long-term comprehensive statistical documentation covering the period of 200 years. It is represented also by a well established academic community, which is the most efficient community creating knowledge about the transformation of the American Space. Since 1945 this knowledge is the leading knowledge in the global scale. The American regional studies have created many inputs recognized as original in the global scale. The American megaspace was the leading element of

\textsuperscript{34} J. Kornblum, *Germany. In need of a dream*, IHT, April 23 2010.
the global space and the most efficient testing field for pioneering innovations.

California was a symbol of the innovative American megaspace of the XX century. The present crisis of the Californian space may be seen as a symbol of the crisis of the American megaspace.

The megaspace of the European Union

The megaspace of the European Union is a phenomenon in statu nascendi. We have a long way to go until we reach the stage of maturity of the European megaspace. We have to notice, however, that the stages of maturity of the American and European megaspaces are phenomena representing different perceptions and realities. The European megaspace will never achieve a very high level of homogeneity, which is the peculiar feature of the American megaspace. Europe in the future will continue to be a deeply differentiated continent in terms of natural environment and in terms of richness of the monuments of art and architecture.

The concept of the American megaspace is deeply internalized in the minds of the American Society. In Europe the concepts of megaspace is not internalized in the minds of the European society.

This is an extremely difficult problem since the existence of the concept and reality of the European society is in a very early stage of development. There is no doubt, however, that the European Union has created a quite efficient institutional reality of a new PAX Romana covering the whole territory of the Union. This new PAX Romana is the institutional foundation of the megaspace of the European Union. The European Union has also eliminated the barriers limiting the free flows of persons, commodities, information and capital. This free movement has however a different conditionality in the US and in Europe. The Eurostat is a well organized agency of the European Union which is creating a rich statistical documentation which opens the field of empirical studies related to the European Megaspace in statu nascendi.

35 Compare Europa Quo Vadis, op.cit.
Eurostat is, however, a young agency in comparison with the US Census Bureau and by definition is not able to produce an integrated statistical documentation covering the experiences of 200 years.

The European Union is definitely an important factor accelerating the growth of a strong academic community involved in the transdisciplinary field of regional studies which is highly competitive in relation to regional studies developed in the USA.

Last but not least, we should mention the institutional machinery for the design and implementation of regional and cohesion policies. In this field the megaspace of the European Union is the leading global actor. The other five megaspaces can learn a lot from the evaluation of successes and failures of the European Union in this field.

The megaspaces of Russia and Brazil

**Prima facie** Russia and Brazil are two great but not comparable countries. The differences in the natural environment and cultural heritage are just striking. And yet since my first visit to Brazil in 1968 and a sequence of my visits to Russia I have been arguing that there are patterns of similarities linking the experiences of Russia and Brazil.

**Both countries represent vast, sparsely populated territories where the psychology of proximity and distance is quite different than in Europe.** Both countries have deeply polarized societies expressed in a pronounced gap separating the small elite from the broad strata of the society. In both countries the military complex has a long and established historical tradition. Both countries have important part of their territory dominated by extreme conditions of natural environment (too warm in Amazonia, too cold in Siberia). Both countries have the experience of a growing disequilibrium between the dynamic super-metropolitan regions and the remaining part of the country (compare hypertrophy of Sao Paulo and the hypertrophy of Moscow).
Both countries use the instrument of their Federal States to manage their vast and deeply differentiated territories. In both countries we will find institutions responsible for the development of regions and for the development of *sui generis* cohesion policies defined as policies trying to integrate the vast territory of the state.

In this comparative analyzes we should note two differences between the megaspace of Brazil and the megaspace of Russia.

*Primo* – the *grosso modo* democratic megaspace of Brazil versus *grosso modo* autocratic megaspace of Russia

*Secundo* – the demographically expanding megaspace of Brazil versus the demographically shrinking megaspace of Russia.

*  *  *

There is no doubt in my mind that comparative studies related to the experiences of the Russian and Brazilian megaspaces will be a fascinating field of inquiry.

**The megaspace of China**, **the megaspace of India**

China and India are the emerging superpowers of the XXI century and the main engines of the reconfiguration of the global scene. The megaspaces of China and India are the most dynamic in the system of six megaspaces analyzed in our study. The megaspaces of China and India are a field of greatest regional transformations in human history. New regional economies and new regional societies are creating the grand transformation of the India and China megaspaces. This is opening new chapters in the history of global space. It is a valid question if this new experience of the Indian and Chinese megaspaces will also open new chapters in the history of regional development, regional polices and regional studies. These new chapters incorporate two innovations:

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1. The background of Indian and Chinese civilizations in comparison with the background of the Atlantic Civilization which was the foundation of so far prevailing theories and methodologies of regional development, regional polices and regional studies;

2. The dynamics and scale of regional transformation of the megaspaces of India and China which is much greater than the dynamics and scale of regional transformations which were the result of the consecutive industrial revolutions developed in the framework of the Atlantic Civilization.

3. In this condition we can expect that the Indian and Chinese megaspaces of the XXI century will develop new original features not known in the history of the Atlantic Civilization.

This is the innovative scenario. We might consider also the imitative scenario where the megaspaces of India and China will not develop new original features in relation to the experiences of the Atlantic Community. The only differentia specifica of the transformation of the Indian and Chinese megaspaces in relation to the experiences of the Atlantic Community will be expressed in the new dynamics and new scale of regional transformation.

In this reflection we have concentrated our attention on outlining similarities linking the Indian and Chinese megaspaces, introducing some comparative remarks related to the megaspaces of the Atlantic Community. It is now time to outline the differences in the processes which shape the development of the two megaspaces:

- **Primo** – the Indian megaspace is *grosso modo* a democratic megaspace – the Chinese megaspace is the megaspace created by an authoritarian state;
- **Secundo** – the Indian megaspace will be dominated by dynamic demographic change, the Chinese space will be less dynamic in demographic terms. China must face the impact of long-term demographic policies;
- **Tertio** – India and China have different approaches to the processes of spontaneous and guided change. The mechanisms of guided change are much weaker in India than in China. China is...
also one of the most prominent centers of long-term strategic thinking and planning;

Quarto – China is designing and implementing a revolutionary change in the scale and quality of technical infrastructure (roads, railways, airports). This new technologically advanced infrastructure is changing the quality and the level of integration of the Chinese megaspace. In this field the Indian megaspace is very weak, with no prospective of rapid improvement in the future;

Quinto – it would be extremely interesting to compare the democratic megaspace of the information society in India and the autocratic megaspace of the information society in China

Sexto – Both China and India are deeply involved in the globalization processes. But this involvement has special features in the Indian and in the Chinese case.

Especially important are the trajectories of the expansion of transnational corporations in China and in India and the trajectories of the global expansion of the Chinese and Indian corporations.

Conclusions of Chapter III

In this chapter we have demonstrated that it is possible to develop patterns of comparative analyzes of the triple duo: EU–USA
Brazil–Russia
China–India.

In the next chapters of our study we will develop the pattern of comparative analysis in a field of multidimensional thinking incorporating the holistic approaches in to the system of the six megaspaces. Table 3 is outlining two trajectories of thinking in this field:

1. The trajectory of absorption of the experiences of each megaspace in relation to the experiences of the remaining five megaspaces.
2. The trajectory of the diffusion of experiences of each megaspace into the field of experience of the remaining five megaspaces.
I am convinced that in the comparative analysis of the six megaspaces, the patterns of absorption of their experiences and the pattern of the diffusion of their experiences are an efficient methodological approach.

Table 3.
The experiences of six megaspaces. The patterns of absorption and diffusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experiences Absorption from</th>
<th>Experiences Diffusion to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td><strong>EU</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td><strong>USA</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The comparative analysis of the six megaspaces will open new perspectives in our reflection related to the regional development, regional polices and regional studies. The analysis of six megaspaces as a pattern of absorption and diffusion will create an incentive to develop new fields of academic and pragmatic cooperation linking the six megaspaces.

Warsaw, March 26 2011
Knowledge based economy versus wisdom based economy.
The dilemma of the XXI century?

Introduction

The last two decades of 1990–2010 have created the conventional paradigm of knowledge based economy\(^1\). The paradigm was shaped in a multidimensional theoretical, methodological and empirical documentation, developed by the global academic community, by grand international organizations, by transnational corporations and by scientific policies promoted in the most innovative countries of the world.

In this paper I would like to formulate a controversial thesis related to the destruction of the old paradigm of knowledge based economy and the creation of a new paradigm of wisdom based economy. The paper will accept the following thematic sequence:

A. Nine theses related to the old paradigm of knowledge based economy
B. The great pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2011 as an epitaph for the old paradigm
C. The trajectories of the development of Wisdom Based Economy

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\(^*\) The Polish version of this paper was published in the “Biuletyn” of the Polish Economic Society, Warsaw April 2011.

A. NINE THESIS RELATED TO THE OLD PARADIGM OF KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY

1. The KBE paradigm was created in the conditions of the years 1990–2010, which are the real end of the long XX century incorporating the years 1914–2010. It would be interesting to promote studies comparing the Keynesian decades 1950–1970 and the neoliberal decades 1990–2010. We have to analyze the real glory and misery of the Keynesian and neoliberal decades.

2. An important role in the creation of the KBE paradigm was performed by the grand international organizations and especially by OECD, the World Bank and the European Union.

3. The information society has created the technological, social and cultural conditions for the development of KBE. In this context we should mention the eminent role of the creative class.

4. An important role in the creation of KBE was performed by leading countries shaping new innovative patterns of economic and scientific policies promoting KBE.

5. The world of enterprises and transnational corporations was an effective laboratory in the processes creating KBE.

6. The academic community and the R&D institutions were important actors in the creation of the theoretical foundations and methodologies related to KBE. This community has also promoted empirical studies analyzing the development of KBE in different conditions of time and space.

7. The world of education and especially of higher education induced the new generations of students to develop intellectual

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capacities and pragmatic abilities necessary for the promotion of KBE.

8. In the global scale we can find a network of innovative regions, which have created a stimulating environment for the development of KBE

9. The processes of the creation of KBE were a global process visible in all continents. We have however to recognize that the leading role in the development of KBE was performed by the dominating civilization of the Atlantic Community\(^5\). The most important centers of the KBE of the XX century have emerged in the USA and in Europe.

* * *

Naturally, we can have different visions of the global communities of persons, institutions, enterprises, corporations, societies, regions, states and international organizations, which in different dimensions have participated in the processes of the creation and development of KBE.

Formulating the thesis of the creative destruction of the old paradigm we are not trying to dismiss the grand achievement of KBE in the years 1990–2010.

These achievements are creating one of the necessary conditions of the development of a new incarnation of KBE of the XXI century. But this is not the sufficient condition to meet the Enigma of the XXI century.

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We are facing now the greatest crisis in world history of the last 500 years. This is a pentagonal crisis of the global finances, global economy, global order, global elites and the Atlantic Community.

This pentagonal crisis is formulating a triple epitaph for the old paradigm.
1. The first element of this epitaph is the destruction of the grand illusion that KBE is a turning point innovation eliminating the danger of a deep crisis of the capitalistic economy in the scale of the crisis of 1929–33.
2. The magnificent construction and practice of the old paradigm was not able to envisage the dramatic or may be even tragic pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2011. The KBE was blinded by the illusion of the neoliberal world as a reality of an “eternal boom”. The KBE has lost the ability of long term strategic thinking.
3. The third element of this epitaph is the paralyzing inability of KBE in the process of discovering of a new face of the XXI century. In this process a new vision of the XXI century is not emerging. We do not see a solution to the dilemma neoliberalism versus neokeynsism. We do not have the intellectual and moral capacity to prepare a bold diagnosis of the processes, which have led to the pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2011. We must have the courage to design a list of institutions and maybe persons which are responsible for the creation of conditions leading to the present state of the collapse of the Atlantic Community and the global order.

* * *

The epitaph to the old paradigm should be an object of a controversial academic discussion, leading to innovative inspirations facing the enigma of the XXI century. In this epitaph we should propose a new interpretation of the observation by Albert Einstein, „Imagination is more important than knowledge”. The old paradigm was de facto a paradigm of knowledge without imagination.

C. The trajectories of the development of Wisdom Based Economy (WBE)

The glory and misery of the old paradigm should be an inspiration in the development of the new paradigm of the XXI century: the Wisdom Based Economy. In this context we are accepting the definition of wisdom presented in Wikipedia “Wisdom is the ability developed through experience, insight and reflection to discern truth and exercise good judgment.”7 In our interpretation wisdom is the integration of knowledge, imagination, experience and internalization of a canon of good and evil.

In this definition we find the continuation of the old paradigm.

This is the permanent role of knowledge as one of the main sources of human progress. This definition is introducing three new elements, which are outside the main stream of the old paradigm. The first is imagination as a trajectory of strategic thinking8.

The second element is a new interpretation of experience as a source of wisdom of the XXI century. The experience is a valuable resource for the future. The experience could be also a barrier paralyzing our innovative thinking related to the future.

The third element is the introduction of the canon of ethics into the main stream of reflection about the future of global economy

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and the future of the mankind. The main source of the potential success of the Wisdom Based Economy is a new interpretation of the canon of good and evil as a foundation of efficient management of the new global economy and the new global order. The future of the XXI century will be not dominated by the Atlantic Community. The new Wisdom Based Economy will be developed in the framework of the coexistence and cooperation facing the deep transformations of the global scene.

In these conditions it is very difficult to face the new enigma of the XXI century. But we have no choice, we must face this enigma. Maybe the concept of Wisdom Based Economy is a useful idea in this context.

* * *

I hope that this note will be recognized as a brainstorming note formulating a real dilemma Knowledge Based Economy versus Wisdom Based Economy. Is the content of this note opening a new field of theoretical and pragmatic reflection?

Now the judgment is yours – Ladies and Gentlemen. The field for creative destruction of this note is open.

Warsaw, January 2011

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9 In the evaluation of the neoliberal ideology, the links linking the world of economy and the world of ethics were lost. This link was very firmly pronounced in the genial contributions of Adam Smith, including not only An inquiry into the Nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (1771), but also an earlier contribution (1759) titled The Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is necessary to look upon the opera omnia of Adam Smith from this point of view.

Globalization in the XXI century.
In quest of a new paradigm
(A discussion paper)*

“Only by helping the least fortunate ... can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people. Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the Peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against Their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies – hunger, misery, and despair... Our allies are the millions who hunger and thirst after righteousness.”

Harry S. Truman
Quoted from the Rand Corporation Calendar 2002

Introduction

Over the last decades of the 20th century, what may be called ‘the classical paradigm of globalization’ emerged1. The impression made in those years was that the classical paradigm would continue

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to be relevant to the vision of the world set to take shape in the 21st century.

The tragedy of September 11, 2001, however, has disrupted this evolutionary scheme of thinking. Indeed, to a large extent the classical paradigm of the 20th century has lost its force as a concept explaining and organizing the processes of globalization in the 20th century.

Today we must embark upon a quest for a new paradigm. This paper accepts the basic definition of a paradigm as “a set of questions addressed to the objective reality and a set of answers formulated in response to those questions”.

Table 1
The boundary between the Old and New Paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Old</td>
<td>1 OLD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New</td>
<td>3 OLD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A paradigm which supports our inclination to provide old answers to old questions must be rejected, or at least deeply transformed. We have to look for a new paradigm, one which demands: 1) new answers to old questions, 2) new answers to new questions.

Within just such an intellectual framework, the present discussion paper pursues the following thematic sequence: I. The Tragedy of September 11, 2001 as a New Chapter in Global History. II. The Underlying Causes of the Tragedy. III. The Classical Paradigm of Globalization Developed in the Last Decades of the 20th century.
IV. The Trajectories Leading to a New Paradigm. V. Pax Triadica, Pax Americana, Pax Dei.

**I. THE TRAGEDY OF SEPTEMBER 11th 2001 AS A NEW CHAPTER IN GLOBAL HISTORY**

In its historical significance the tragedy of September 11th 2001 may well be compared with the tragedy of June 28, 1914 – the assassination in Sarajevo. Both tragedies closed two symbolic chapters of world history, i.e., that of 19th century liberalism (1815–1914) and that of 20th century neoliberalism (1991–2001).

The view that September 11, 2001 has opened a new chapter in global history has found full confirmation in the poll of 275 opinion leaders conducted by the *International Herald Tribune* and the Pew Research Center for the People and Press. Those opinion leaders from 24 countries answered *inter alia* the following question:

*Has the terrorist attack in the United States and the subsequent war opened up a new chapter in world history, or do you think this will not turn out to be such a significant event?*

A quantitative characteristic of the answers is presented in table 2:

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Table 2  
A new chapter? “Yes” answers in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Megaregions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New chapter in world history</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not such a significant event</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know/Refused</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: I.H.T. op.cit.

The structure of the answers presented in table 2 points to two conclusions:
1) the preponderance of the view – “new chapter”,
2) the global uniformization of the expressed opinions.

I.H.T. indirectly suggests that the opinions of the 275 personalities are relevant and representative. We do, however, have to maintain a necessary dose of skepticism:
1) the group of 275 personalities is very narrow, and limits the cognitive value of the poll even if the poll had been designed and implemented in accord with state-of-the-art techniques in public opinion polling;
2) the global uniformization of answers indicates that the 275 personalities belong to the global elite, which ipso facto is more likely to reflect “global” opinions than are societies representing the particular megaregions at large.

These skeptical remarks are not aimed at questioning the general conclusion that the tragedy of September 11th has opened a new chapter in global history.

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4 I.H.T. op.cit.
For it remains a compelling hypothesis, the merits of which will be verified in upcoming inquires, studies, and discussions – and the unfolding of events.

II. The Underlying Causes of the Tragedy

We must dig down to the underlying causes of the tragedy. Interpretations which grasp merely the surface of the problem and only the final links in the casual chain of events lead to mistaken and dangerous conclusions from the point of view of the future of the 21st century.

The phenomenon of global terrorism should be interpreted as a consequence of two failings of the last decade of the 20th century. The first failing was the absence of a grand strategic vision of ordering the global stage following the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The victorious liberal-democratic coalition invested inordinate hope in, and even deified market processes which were expected to spontaneously create a ‘brave new world’.

Market processes are an excellent instrument of the present’s “automatic” regulation of the development of the global economy. And yet market forces are not able to engender the break-through innovations required to change the structure and modus operandi of economies, society and the state. This is the domain of visionary strategic political decisions. An excellent example in this field was the opportunity to design and implement a ‘Marshall Plan II’, which in a strategic way would have changed the qualitative development of the post-communist world.

Guided processes of transformation would have created much better results than those to be observed in the spontaneous anarchy of the real events shaping the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe.

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Of course, the concept of a Marshall Plan is only one example of a grand vision which could have been designed and implemented in the last decade of the 20th century and have led towards a new organization of the world.

In this vein it is worthwhile to review the charming and illuminating intellectual joke of *The Economist*\(^6\) published in the New Year Issue of 1993 as a *sui generis* science fiction under the title: “Looking back from 2992 – World History, Chapter 13 – The disastrous 21st Century.” Let me present 3 passages from that essay\(^7\):

\[\text{This was an opportunity of a magnitude the world had rarely seen before. As Chapter 12 explained, the three-sided War of Ideas that had occupied most of the 20th century ended in a sweeping victory for the once apparently doomed forces of liberalism. The defeat of racial totalitarianism in 1945 having been followed by the defeat of communist totalitarianism in 1989–91, the victorious pluralists seemed to have the future at their feet.} \]

\[\text{The failure of clear thinking applied to all three members of the victorious coalition – the United States, the European Community and Japan. They could, if they wished, have brought a share of liberty and prosperity to much of the rest of the world by the end of the 21st century. They did wish it. But they failed to see that to succeed they had to remain a partnership. Instead, each of the three almost at once started to assert itself against others.} \]

\[\text{“Looking back from 2992, one can see why the democracies missed the great opportunity they were given in the 1990s. The fact that they had had to spend the 20th century fighting their two-front War of Ideas, against communism and fascism, was itself a sign that a cycle of history was approaching its end. The democracies needed to re-examine the ideas that had created this cycle: but they left the re-examination too late.}\]


\(^{7}\) *The Economist*, op.cit., p. 17–19.
The lost opportunity of the 1990s is the first underlying cause of the tragedy of September 11. The great strategic mistakes in the history of mankind are bearing tragic fruits. Is this truth comprehensible for George W. Bush, who de facto is a traditional 19th century President of the United States of America? Is, however, 19th century thinking suitable for decision making in the 21st century? I hope that this strong value judgment is simply wrong. Nonetheless, we should find strong arguments before rejecting this value judgment.

The second failing of the last decade of the 20th century was the almost total disappearance of concern about the tragic plight of societies all around the globe, coupled with frequently conscious and unapologetic ignoring of mechanisms that have led to a polarization between rich and poor which is unprecedented in history.

In the global ocean of social Darwinism, social sensitivity has almost vanished. The Triad was *grosso modo* interested only in the issues of the wealthy North. The tragedy of illness and misery in the South has vanished from the scope of global awareness. The transfer of aid from the rich countries to the poor countries in the nineties declined to the lowest level in the second half of the 20th century. The growth of global terrorism cannot be explained without the role of misery, something which creates the climate for terrorist activities⁸. This is the second underlying reason of the tragedy of September 11th.

* * *

In addressing the underlying causes of the tragedy in no way do I mean to justify the heinous acts of the monsters who committed the crime of September 11. Nor by any means do I seek to call into question the right of the antiterrorist coalition to employ full-scale military power in the battle against global terrorism. On the contrary: my point is that this is not *the* single

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method of liquidating the causes of the tragedy. Without addressing its underlying causes as well, the enormous problems of the 21st century cannot be resolved.

III. The Classical Paradigm of Globalization Developed in the Last Decades of the 20th Century

We need to analyze three foundations of this paradigm. As the first foundation we recognize the astounding technological progress and especially the breakthroughs in the field of information and telecommunication technologies (I.C.T.).

The matter of the technologies of the 20th and 21st century is comprehensively analyzed in a multitude of magnificent studies and publications developed within the framework of the theoretical and pragmatic infrastructure created by the OECD9. In this context the following observation of R. Miller, W. Michalski and B. Stevens10 is pertinent:

If the risk can be managed, it is plausible that over the next twenty-five years a panoply of technological advances will vastly improve human welfare as well as help set the world’s development on a sustainable course. However, as history demonstrates, the availability of a particular scientific discovery or innovative technology is no assurance that its potential will be extended into useful applications, nor that it will diffuse widely or to those who might use it most productively. Reaping the rewards and reducing the dangers generated by technological advances depend on a complex interaction with underlying economic, social and political conditions.

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Realizing the fruits of socio-technical dynamism demands careful consideration of two dimensions: first, how various socio-economic environments lead to differences in the pace and direction of technological innovation and diffusion; and second, what the implications are of the uses and spread of new technologies for the economy and society.

Reading the *grosso modo* optimistic content incorporated into the OECD publications, we should also remember the critical observations of R. Galar\(^\text{11}\), who attempts to argue that in the second half of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century we have a deficit of break-through innovations.

The second foundation of the classical paradigm is the huge growth of the scale and importance of the world of finances which, following the processes of deregulation and liberalization, transformed into the most important domain of the global economy.

In the last decade of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century the world of finance transformed into a phenomenon of huge scale having almost total autonomy in relation to the world of the tangible objects. An observation made by K. Valaskakis\(^\text{12}\) should be quoted in this context:

*Whereas in the earlier part of the 20\(^\text{th}\) century, trade and empire were the drivers of globalization, in the last decade the new drivers were technology and capital flows. In this age of the internet, short-term foreign exchange flows amount to over 1 trillion US dollars on a daily basis as opposed to $4 trillion of trade flows on an annual basis.*

The enthusiasts of this phenomenon of “dematerialization” will indicate that this is the triumph of the new world of finances over the old world of physical tangible object. The critics however will respond by saying that the world of finances was overwhelmed by the ocean of speculative thinking and speculative modus operandi.

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The third foundation of the classical paradigm is the market as the main manager of the global scene. A sui generis deification of the market has emerged, one that deems the market to be the universal answer to all questions. The critic of this universal deification of the market may present two of many observations:

1) the functional efficiency of the market is strongly differentiated both in time and in space. The market functions well in a setting characterized by sound institutional conditions and especially by an honest and efficient administration of law and justice,

2) as all creations of human mind, market forces have to be subordinated to supreme norms and values.

The three foundations of the classical paradigm—the world of technology, the world of finances, and the world of the market—we're in the past and will be in the future very important factors in global development and in the globalization of economies, society and governance.

But these three forces cannot be transformed into a Pantheon of three Deities—withdrawn from the sphere of theoretical and pragmatic critique.

The transnational corporation has been broadly recognized as the main vehicle and hero of globalization and the most

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13 K. Valaskakis, op.cit., p. 158.


Let us present 3 quotations from this article:

“The impact of corporate-driven globalization is, on balance, highly positive on the welfare and development of the countries concerned. Generally – of course there are exceptions, as always – the standards maintained by multinational corporations in labor conditions, environment, stakeholder relationships and social contributions are
efficient form of governance. This model of governance is very often an inspiration in the processes of reform and transformation designed and implemented in international organizations, the institutions of government and self-government on global, continental, national, regional and local scales.

The classical paradigm of globalization is the focus of a multitude of studies and publications demonstrating a very high theoretical and methodological level and sponsored by numerous academic institutions and international organizations.

There is no doubt, however, that the OECD\textsuperscript{17} – a unique scientific and political institution steadily integrating innovative currents of theoretical and pragmatic thinking – is the most important institution in the field of creating the doctrine of globalization.

IV. The Trajectories Leading to a New Paradigm

In the transformation of the old paradigm and the creation of the new paradigm – four trajectories may be envisaged. The first trajectory is the humanization of technology in the spirit of

significantly higher than those of local firms. This is not to suggest that multinational corporate leaders are superior moral beings. Simply, these matters are dictated by good business strategy and the logic of contemporary capitalism.”

“Corporate-driven market globalization generates entrepreneurship, competition and both job and wealth creation. The allegation that it promotes oligopoly is nonsense. Twenty years ago, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, there were about 6,000 multinational corporations. Today there are more than 60,000 – of which 10,000 come from the developing world.” “With the debris of Seattle behind us, and in the hope that Doha will provide firmer foundations for erecting a solid economic edifice for the 21st century, let us make up for lost time, get this century right and in 2002 look to the future with confidence that capitalist corporate-driven market globalization has a fantastic, unprecedented potential for human well-being. On these foundations, let us build a better world – and resist all efforts, no matter how well intentioned, to plunge it back into the misery that plagued a good deal of the 20th century.”

the last UNDP Report\textsuperscript{18}: “Making Technology Work for Human Development”. Let us quote six theses of this Report:

1. “The technology divide does not have to follow the income divide. Throughout history, technology has been a powerful tool for human development and poverty reduction.”
2. “The market is a powerful engine of technological progress – but it is not powerful enough to create and diffuse the technologies needed to eradicate poverty.”
3. “Developing countries may gain especially high rewards from new technologies, but they also face especially severe challenges in managing the risks.”
4. “The technology revolution and globalization are creating a network age – and that is changing how technology is created and diffused.”
5. “Even in the network age, domestic policy still matters. All countries, even the poorest, need to implement policies that encourage innovation, access and the development of advanced skills.”
6. “National policies will not be sufficient to compensate for global market failures. New international initiatives and the fair use of global rules are needed to channel new technologies towards the most urgent needs of the world’s poor people.”

These six theses indicate that the UNDP is trying to use the language of the world’s poor. Therefore, we should not read only the publications of the OECD, which, after all, represents the point of view of the rich, who, following the gospel by St. Matthew, are most successful in multiplying wealth.

The second trajectory is the implementation of the proposal by L. Emmerij\textsuperscript{19} concerning a global social contract, something


which will kindle the hope of the poorest 20% of the global population. Let us quote the original formulation of L. Emmerij:

What is most urgently needed is a global social contract with special emphasis on meeting the basic needs of the world population, including the poorest 20 percent. Probably the most important challenge in the negotiations for such a Contract is how to insert free and rapidly expending global capitalism into a socially, environmentally and politically accountable system to benefit all citizens of the world. The inevitable second challenge then becomes how new socioeconomic and political spaces can be organized at the regional and world levels within which nation-states would lose a degree of sovereignty in exchange for new forms of free and participatory democratic institutions.

Just as it was being recognized during the first half of the 20th century in the industrial countries that national poverty could be tackled, so it is imperative that during the first half of the 21st century it is recognized that relieving the populations of the world is not an unrealistic target.

A Fund must be set up (which may well precede the conclusion of the Global Social Contract) in order to start implementing the idea of a more equitable distribution of global wealth. Global enterprises – the creators of global wealth – must take a contribution to this Fund.

The global social contract is a great challenge for the 21st century. The inspiring paper of L. Emmerij is to a certain extent a follow up of two earlier publications\textsuperscript{20} related to the activity of that author.

The third trajectory leading to a new paradigm is the rehabilitation of the idea of the nation-state on both the scale of individual countries and the globe. The tragedy of September 11th should create an impulse to look anew upon the fate of the

nation-state in the new conditions of the 21st century. There is no doubt that certain important functions of the nation-state cannot be transferred to any other institution. In this context we find new power in the arguments of the volume “States against markets”21, inspired by the theoretical and methodological concept of the French Regulation School.

The fourth trajectory is the development of a new concept of “global governance”. This concept cannot be reduced only to the war against global terrorism. “Global governance” must be seen as an instrument in the construction of a better and more egalitarian global reality.

These four trajectories are to my mind holding forth an opening of the way to a reconstruction of the old paradigm and the construction of a new paradigm. We need a new hierarchy of fundamental values creating a moral and political climate for the construction of the new paradigm. The new paradigm will also provide new answers to the new questions of globalization and the privatization of terrorism.

V. PAX TRIADICA, PAX AMERICANA, PAX DEI

The new paradigm can emerge only in the context of a new vision of the global future. In the last quarter of the 20th century this vision was expressed in the concept of Pax Triadica22. The triadic pattern of cooperation and competition – the USA, European Union, and Japan – seemed at that time to form the main axis of the organization of the global reality23.

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The tragedy of September 11th generated the hope that Pax Triadica will be replaced by a more encompassing solution. Contrary to those expectations, the last months have accelerated the growth of unilateral American diplomacy, which *per pacta* and *facta concludentia* is implementing the idea of Pax Americana²⁴. In this context it is advisable to look once more to information published by *I.H.T.*²⁵ and incorporated in table 3:

The difference in relation to table 2 is quite striking. Two observations are especially important:

1) the megaregional differentiation in the structure of the answers,

2) the contrast in the evaluation of US policies and actions as per US versus non US (column one and two in table 3).

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“These power relations and exercises of statecraft are obscured in the current talk about globalization. Far from being just a collapsing of distance and widening of opportunities for all, the increasing mobility of information, finance, goods and services frees the American government of constraints while more tightly constraining everyone else. Globalization and the global supervisory organizations enable the United States to harness the rest of the world to its own rhythms and structure.

Of course these arrangements do not produce terrorism in any direct way. But they are deeply implicated in the very slow economic growth in most of the developing world since 1980, and in the wide and widening world income inequality. (The average purchasing power of the bottom 10 percent of Americans is higher than of two-thirds of the rest of the world’s population.)

Slow economic growth and vast income disparities, when seen as such, breed cohorts of partly educated young people who grow up in anger and despair. Some try by legal or illegal means to migrate to the West; some join militant ethnic or religious movements directed at each other and their own rules. But now the idea has spread among a few vengeful fundamentalists that the United States should be attacked directly.

The United States and its allies can stamp out specific groups by force and bribery. But in longer run, the structural arrangements that replicate a grossly unequal world have to be redesigned, as we did at the Bretton Woods conference after World War II, so that markets working within the new framework produce more equitable results. Historians looking back a century from now will say that the time to have begun was now.”

Table 3
Do most people, many people, only some, or hardly any ordinary people think... a. that U.S. policies and actions in the world were a major cause of the attack (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People</th>
<th>Megaregions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most people</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many people</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only some</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardly any</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know/Refused</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: I.H.T. op.cit.

The promotion of the idea of Pax Americana in a global climate, where a vast section of non-US public opinion is indirectly saying to US “Medice cura te ipsum”, may raise some very serious questions. Therefore, what our world’s current and anticipated circumstances in the 21st century would demand is neither Pax Triadica nor Pax Americana, but rather Pax Dei.

Here I have in mind a new concept of God, one for both believers and atheists, of God as a synthesis of the ideas of goodness, love, and truth.

I think that the vision of Saint Francis of Assisi, so close to the heart of John Paul II, could be of supreme value in shaping the world of the 21st century. Let me quote in this context the concluding sentences of an inspiring comment made by F. Lewis26:

Andre Malraux said that ‘the 21st century will be spiritual or it won’t be’. The world cannot run on power alone.

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Philosophers, scholars, leaders and all thoughtful people need to stop and consider now how to articulate some guiding ideas for this new age.

In the discussions of the visions of globalization of the 21st century we face two dilemmas: 

primo – the Darwinian versus Franciscan visions,  
secundo – the material versus spiritual visions.

The rich imagination and the ability of visionary thinking is a conditio sine qua non in all activities leading to the development of a New Paradigm of globalization.

**Conclusion**

The tragedy of September 11th should elicit our deep reflection on the causes and consequences of this turning point of global history. We should not let ourselves be fooled into believing that after a few months, the status quo ante will be re-established. The new visions for the 21st century will emerge in a climate of deep

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27 To avoid the trap of simplistic egalitarianism in the evaluation of the grand route of historical experiences please see, D. Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some Are so Rich and Some so Poor*. Little Brown and Company, London 1998. Please however consider the following opinion of D. Landes:

“How big is the gap between rich and poor and what is happening to it? Very roughly and briefly: the difference in income per head between the richest industrial nation, say Switzerland, and the poorest nonindustrial country, Mozambique, is about 400 to 1. Two hundred and fifty years ago, this gap between richest and poorest was perhaps 5 to 1, and the difference between Europe and, say, east or South Asia (China or India) was around 1.5 or 2 to 1.

Is the gap still growing today? At the extremes, clearly yes. Some countries are not only not gaining; they are growing poorer, relatively and sometimes absolutely. Others are barely holding their own. Others are catching up. Our task (the rich countries), in our own interest as well as theirs, is to help the poor become healthier and wealthier. If we do not, they will seek to take what they cannot make; and if they cannot earn by exporting commodities, they will export people. In short, wealth is an irresistible magnet; and poverty is a potentially raging contaminant: it cannot be segregated, and our peace and prosperity depend in the long run on the well-being of others.”
uncertainty related to the global and individual future of the humanity\textsuperscript{28}. This uncertainty should not lead to despair, but to summoning of courage and the ability to think about the global future. This is the attitude and intention of this paper, one which has been written in the hope that some of its ideas and suggestions will prove useful in the construction of a New Paradigm. I am aware that this paper contains many empirical and methodological weaknesses\textsuperscript{29}, but to my mind they do not invalidate the main message of the paper\textsuperscript{30}. Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, the judgment is yours!

Warszawa, Żoliborz, January 7 2002

\textsuperscript{28} In this paper I have quoted several times the materials published in the International Herald Tribune. I.H.T. is and let’s hope will be in the future an especially inspiriting source of new materials very useful in the construction of the New Paradigm.

Compare:
1) William Pfaff, Don’t look for a New World Order after Afghan War. I.H.T., December 22\textsuperscript{nd} – 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2001.
2) Anthony Sampson, To defeat the terrorist, their grievances must be addressed. I.H.T., op.cit.
3) Susan E. Rice, Africa is breeding future bin Ladens. I.H.T.
4) R. A. Levine, Economic Puritanism is bad for Argentina, Too. I.H.T., December 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2001,
5) P. Krugman, Argentina’s crisis is a U.S. failure. I.H.T., January 2\textsuperscript{nd} 2002
6) W. Pfaff, Will the New World Order rest solely an American might? I.H.T., December 29\textsuperscript{th}–30\textsuperscript{th} 2001.

\textsuperscript{29} In this paper, very often a critical judgment in relation of the USA was expressed. For an interesting laudatio of the American modus operandi, please see: “The patient accumulation of success – their military achievement in Afghanistan should make Americans proud and the world optimistic”. The Economist, December 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2001 – January 4\textsuperscript{th} 2002.

Pax Kantiana and the eternal reality of power*. A contribution to non-conventional wisdom**

Introduction¹

The conventional wisdom related to Pax Kantiana is a splendid chapter in the history of human reflection on eternal peace seen from a philosophical, moral and political perspective.

It is extremely difficult to discover a new dimension in this conventional wisdom expressed in a limited set of questions developed in the framework of different interpretations of PAX Kantiana.

We have to try to formulate a new set of questions – in other words to develop a new paradigm in the analysis of Pax Kantiana. I have a very limited knowledge related to the conventional wisdom. This is a great weakness but also a small advantage – since

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¹ This is a preliminary outline of a paper presented at the Seminar “The political thoughts of Immanuel Kant – seminar organized in the framework of Forum Kaliningrad 2–3 February 2001 – Kalmar Sweden. In the preparing of this outline I had the privilege to benefit from the bibliographic support of Professor Jozef Niznik and Mrs. Rebecka Lettevall. Let me express my deep gratitude for this support.
my knowledge of Pax Kantiana is not “paralyzed” by the existing stock of knowledge.

There is a serious intellectual risk in this attitude – but audaces fortuna vivat, so let us try. My discussion paper will be organized along the following thematic sequences:

I. The Eternal Reality of Power.
II. The Essentials of Pax Kantiana.
III. Pax Kantiana versus Pax Fridericiana.
IV. The Pax Kantiana and the Pax Wilsoniana.
V. The Pax Kantiana and the Visions of Constitution for the European Union.
VI. Towards a New Paradigm in the Interpretation of Pax Kantiana.

I. THE ETERNAL REALITY OF POWER

In the early seventies one of the Polish weeklies published an open letter asking questions which should be answered by history as an important academic and cultural discipline.

In this context professor Jan Szczepanński² formulated the following suggestions. Please try to answer the question “why the deep mechanisms shaping the realities of power are more or less the same throughout the whole space of human history?”. The confirmation of this observation of Jan Szczepanński we find in the presentation of Donald Rumsfeld – the American defense secretary – designate during his appearance before the Senate’s Armed Services Committee.

Let us quote two relevant sentences from the I.H.T.³:

² The suggestion of Prof. Jan Szczepanński – I am quoting only from my memory. I am almost sure that this memory is correct – especially related to the spirit of the Jan Szczepański’s proposal.
History shows that weakness is provocative” he said. “Weakness invites people into doing things they wouldn’t otherwise think of”. “Weapons and systems of deterrence “he said “work without being fired – they alter behavior.

If Mr. Donald Rumfeld would have had a hearing in the Senate of Roman Empire – he would say just that – “Si vis pacem, para bellum”.

The eternal realities of power have many brilliant and comprehensive interpretations – let us mention only two relevant in the context of this paper: the interpretation of Niccolo Machiavelli and the interpretation of Karl von Clausewitz.

These interpretations are just contradictory to the spirit and letter of Pax Kantiana. It would be an exciting intellectual venture to explore the vision of Immanuel Kant as an anti-Machiavelli and an anti-Clausewitz or better Clausewitz as anti-Kant.

II. The Essentials of Pax Kantiana

The essentials of Pax Kantiana are clearly presented in the existing stock of knowledge representing the best traditions of conventional wisdom. I would like to present in this context – a tentative non-comprehensive list of these essentials – having a deep feeling of modesty that this list is imperfect and incomplete:

1) Pax Kantiana is a product of the Enlightenment as one of the greatest chapters of human history. The optimistic ideology of

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4 Niccolo Machiavelli, Il principe and Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio.
5 Karl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege – On War.
6 Kant as anti-Machiavelli is not my original formulation.
7 Compare the following quotations from I. Kant’s contribution “What is Enlightenment”: “For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all – freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters (...).”
Enlightenment – that humanity is able to generate a structural progress – leading to permanent improvement of the moral and political order – is well reflected in Pax Kantiana.

2) Pax Kantiana was indirectly but strongly influenced by the vision of the French Revolution⁸. Especially important in this context is the Republican ideology in the peculiar interpretation of Immanuel Kant.

In *Perpetual Peace* we read⁹:

*A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common legislation (as subjects); thirdly, the principle of legal equality for everyone (as citizens). It is the only constitution, which can be derived from the idea of an original contract, upon which all rightful legislation of a people must be founded. Thus as far as right is concerned, republicanism is in itself the original basis of every kind of civil constitution, and it only remains to ask whether it is only constitution which can lead to a perpetual peace.*

“*The public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment restricted, however, without undue hindrance to the progress of enlightenment (...).”*

“If it is now asked whether we at present live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No, but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things are at present, we still have a long way to go before men as a whole can be in a position (or can even be put into a position) of using their own understanding confidently and well in religious matters, without outside guidance. But we do have distinct indications that the way is now being cleared for them to work freely in this direction, and that the obstacles to universal enlightenment, to man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity, re gradually becoming fewer. In this respect our age is the age of enlightenment.” Kant – Political Writings – op.cit. p. 55 and 58.


3) The Federation of Free States is one of the most important elements of Pax Kantiana. In *Perpetual Peace* we read¹⁰:

*The Law of nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States.* People who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged in the same way as individual men living in a state of nature, independent of external laws; for they are standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbours.

Each nation, for the sake of its own security, can and ought to demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a constitution, similar to the civil one, within which the rights of each could be secured. This would mean establishing a federation of people. But a federation of this sort would not be the same thing as an international state. For the idea of an international state is contradictory, since every state involves a relationship between a superior (the legislator) and an inferior (the people obeying the laws), whereas a number of nations forming one state would constitute a single nation. And this contradicts our initial assumption, as we are here considering the right of nations in relation to one another in so far as they are a group of separate states which are not to be welded together as a unit.

4) Pax Kantiana is based on the supremacy of morality and law over politics. Let us quote in this context the final sentences of Appendix I¹¹

*A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first paying tribute to morality. And although politics in itself is a difficult art., no art. is required to combine it with morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict,

¹⁰ H. Reiss op.cit, p.102. I have corrected the translation – changing the “Right of Nations” into the “Law of Nations”.

¹¹ H. Reiss, op.cit, p. 125.
morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot untie. The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance.

Naturally, this reconstruction of the Essentials of Pax Kantiana is not comprehensive – but it can be seen as indication of the intentions of the author.

III. PAX KANTIANA versus PAX FREDDERICANA

N. Davies concluded the presentation of the views of Immanuel Kant – by the following observation:

None of these views was particularly fitting for a subject of the King of Prussia.

It is very interesting to note that the greatest mind of the Kingdom was never invited to Berlin by Frederic the Great who was hailed by Voltaire as “the Philosopher-King”. Immanuel Kant was involved in an open conflict with the Prussian Monarchy. According to the New Encyclopedia Britannica:

12 The term Pax Fredericana in my interpretation covers not only the time of Frederic the Great but the whole phase of the rapid territorial expansion of Prussia. The starting point of this period is the coronation of the first Prussian King – 17th of January 1701. The closing point is the battle of Jena and Auerstadt – 14th October 1806 – the glorious victory of the Napoleonic Army over the Army of Prussia.


With the publication in 1793 of his work 'Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft', Kant became involved in a dispute with Prussian authorities on the right to express religious opinions. The book was found to be altogether too Rationalistic for orthodox taste; he was charged with misusing his philosophy to the 'distortion and depreciation of many leading and fundamental doctrines of the sacred Scripture and Christianity' and was required by the government not to lecture or write anything further on religious subjects. Kant agreed but privately interpreted the ban as a personal promise to the King, from which he felt himself to be released on the latter's death in 1797. At any rate, he returned to the forbidden subject in his last major essay, 'Der Streit der Fakultaten (1798, “The Conflict of the Faculties”).

However the most important and challenging problem is related to the obvious fact that the whole life-time of Immanuel Kant took place in a period of ruthless territorial expansion of Prussia including its eminent participation in the three partitions of Poland15.

The observation by J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann16 may be quoted in this context:

*The immediate occasion for Kant's essay was the March 1795 signing of the Treaty of Basel by Prussia and revolutionary France. In this treaty, Prussia ceded to France all territory west of the Rhine, in exchange for which Prussia expected to be allowed to join Russia and Austria in partitioning Poland to the East.*

The information that the Prussian Army marched into Warsaw in 1795 with the indirect blessing of revolutionary France is a deeply


shocking experience for me. Polish historiography is silent in this respect. Now I see that we should study very carefully the whole set up related to the Treaty of Basel. The Prussian diplomacy of this time was extremely cynical and ruthless. The Memoirs of the Prussian Ambassador in Warsaw in the last years of the Polish Commonwealth are a horrifying document from the moral point of view and an excellent piece of diplomatic “Treppengedanken”. We remember also that Berlin and Petersburg have organized a very skillful and large scale propaganda in Europe trying to convince the European elites that the Poles are really a nation not deserving to have their own independent country and that the elimination of Poland from the map of Europe is an act of great European wisdom. This propaganda was one of the elements creating a negative attitude to Poland at the Congress of Vienna.

These deeply Machiavellian practices of the Prussian Monarchy were violating in an extravagant way both the letter and spirit of Pax Kantiana. This was probably the feeling of the defeated Poles who immediately translated the Perpetual Peace into Polish and published the Polish edition in Warsaw in 1797\textsuperscript{17}. The stage of the tragedy of Poland was only 300 km away from Königsberg. It is impossible to assume that Immanuel Kant got no information about the partitions of Poland. Why the author of Eternal Peace was not able to present even one comment indicating how his Prussian Monarchy was violating all principles of his philosophy and morality in the process of ruthless destruction of the Polish Commonwealth? How to reconcile this silence with the monumental personality of Immanuel Kant? In a different interpretation one can suggest that Kant very indirectly condemned the Partitions of Poland. There is no doubt however that Kant was not able to formulate an explicit value judgment in this field.

\textsuperscript{17} Compare: J. Garewicz – B. Markiewicz in footnote 1.
IV. The Pax Kantiana and the Pax Wilsoniana

We can indicate – two Kantian features in the visions and activities of Woodrow Wilson:

1) the League of Nations as an institution leading to Eternal Peace

2) the principle of open diplomacy – promoted by W. Wilson. His famous formulation “open treaties openly arrived at” has some prototype in the following formulation of I. Kant:

If, in considering public right as the jurists usually conceive of it, I abstract from all its material aspects (as determined by the various empirically given relationships of men within a state, or of states with one another), I am left with the formal attribute of publicness. For every claim upon right potentially possesses this attribute, and without it, there can be no justice (which can only be conceived of as publicly knowable) and therefore no right, since right can only come from justice. Every claim upon right must have this public quality, and since it is very easy to judge whether or not it is present in a particular instance, i.e. whether or not it can be combined with the principles of the agent concerned, it provides us with a readily applicable criterion which can be discovered a priori within reason itself. If it cannot be reconciled with the agent’s principles, it enables us to recognize at once the falseness (i.e. unrightfulness) of the claim (praetensio iuris) in question, as if by an experiment of pure reason.

After we have abstracted in this way from all the empirical elements contained within the concept of political and

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18 Compare: J. Habermas, Kant’s Idea of Perpetual Peace with the benefit of two hundred years’ hindsight (in:) J. Bohman and L. Bachman (eds) op.cit. p. 126.

international right (including that evil aspect of human nature which makes coercion necessary), we may specify the following proposition as the transcendental formula of public right: ‘All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public’.

There are some other phenomena in the comparative – Kant–Wilson analysis. Let me add here that W. Wilson was a great friend of Poland.

V. The Pax Kantiana and the Vision of a Constitution for the European Union

_The Economist_ has published a beautifully designed and edited project of a Constitution for the European Union.

From the formal point of view – it is a magnificent document. From the substantive point of view it is a trajectory aiming at stopping the processes of European integration.

Naturally this is my subjective judgement. Some persons will definitely not share my judgement. The project of _The Economist_ is expressing the Kantian idea of a Federation of Free States as a “group of separate states, which are not to be welded together as a unit”.

VI. Towards a New Paradigm in the Interpretation of Pax Kantiana

I am aware that this paper has not presented a comprehensive proposal how to develop a new paradigm in the interpretation of

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Pax Kantiana. I hope, however, that in this paper we can find one hint leading us in this direction.

This is the suggestion to study the field of interaction of two broad spheres: the illusions and realities of Perpetual Peace and the illusions and realities of power.

Thus we have an interaction not only between the two spheres but also the interaction of illusion and reality inside each sphere. In this way we can build in Pax Kantiana into a dynamic framework opening new approaches to the challenges of the 21st century. One of them is to demonstrate that the rule “Si vis pacem para bellum” is no longer valid. This new approach will be an input in the process of development of a new paradigm in the interpretation of Pax Kantiana.

In this context we can formulate the following question:

Will the 21st century – be a new age of Enlightenment opening a new perspective for the idea of perpetual peace? This idea must be very strong in order to change the deep mechanism of the eternal realities, change their quality in the 21st century recognizing the moral and political imperative of eternal peace?

VII. The Process of the Creative Intellectual Destruction of This Paper

I hope that our Seminar will generate a process of creative intellectual destruction of this paper.

In this process we should, however, promote the emergence of a new paradigm in the interpretation of Pax Kantiana21 presenting inter alia alternative approaches in relation to this paper. I must confess that Pax Kantiana is for me a fascinating field of

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21 The life of Immanuel Kant and his immense success to enter into the trinity of greatest philosophers of Western Civilization (Plato, Aristotle and Kant) is a dramatic warning against uncritical admirers of the Internet age. The loneliness of a long distance runner is sometimes a better environment for creative thinking than the constant interchange of information of everybody with everybody else.
studies, which I will try to continue in the future, if this is possible. I am very grateful for the invitation to participate in the Kalmar Seminar\textsuperscript{22}.

Warsaw, Żoliborz, January 14 2001

\textsuperscript{22} An inducement to continue the studies on Pax Kantiana may be found in a recent article by Per Ahlmark – Former Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden. In this article we read: “Two hundred years ago in an essay ‘On Perpetual Peace’ Immanuel Kant has presented a vision of the future union of liberal republic’s”. In 1795 the liberal republics were an abstraction and Kant never less was able to imagine our present reality, the reality of blossoming liberal democracies. Even more, Kantian idea of perpetual peace is now less distant than in the time of Kant. It has never happened that a democratic state has declared war in relation to another democratic state. We can say that the thesis “there are no wars among democracies” – is almost a perfect rule of diplomacy. The validity of this thesis is already proved in scientific terms. Professor Rummel from the University of Hawaii has analyzed 353 conflicts from the years 1816–1991. He found out that a democratic country was in a war conflict with an undemocratic country in 155 cases and a dictatorship was in war conflict with another dictatorship in 198 cases. Professor Rummel found no proof to demonstrate – that a democratic country was in a war conflict with another democratic country. Quoted from the article in Polish – Per Ahlmark – “There will be no war – there will be no famine” – The Kantian idea of perpetual peace is less distant today – \textit{Rzeczpospolita} – January 30, 2001.

It is very pleasant to read this optimistic interpretation of Pax Kantiana. The article of Per Ahlmark is an excellent example of optimistic political thinking in the conditions of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. May be we will be able to forget the rule – “\textit{Si vis pacem, para bellum}”.

THE CREATION AND DESTRUCTION
OF THE GLOBAL ORDER*

INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the XX and XXI century the world is experienc-
ing a deep crisis of the global order. It is necessary to analyze this
crisis in the secular perspective of the processes of long duration
and the processes of turning points1 in the temporal framework of
the grand chapter of our historical and prospective experiences of
the years 1800–2050.

In this context I would like to propose the following thematic
construction of this paper:

I. The creation and destruction of the global order as the dia-
lectics of the processes of long duration and turning points
II. The creation and development of the global order in the years
1815–1914
III. The destruction of the global order in the years 1914–1945
IV. The great renaissance of the global order in the years
1945–1985
V. Á la recherché du temps perdu. Why – in the temporal frame-
work of the 25 years between 1985 and 2010 it was impossible
to create a new global order for the 21st century?

(eds.) Faces of the 21st century, The 21st Century Institute&Rewasz Publishing
1 A. Kukliński, B. Skuza (eds) Turning points in the transformation of the global
scene, The Polish Association for the Club of Rome, Warsaw 2006 – later quoted as
Turning points.
VI. The perspective of the creation of a new global order in the years 2010–2050 versus the perspective of global chaos and catastrophe
VII. In search of a new paradigm

I. The creation and the destruction of the global order as the dialectics of the processes of long duration and turning points

The global order\(^2\) is emerging in the scope of inquiry of a broad system of economic, sociological, political, legal and historical sciences. In this context we can find different theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches which are trying to analyze the visions and realities of the global order.

In this paper I would like to present a matrix of four concepts which to my mind are most important in the studies related to the global order.

Global order
The matrix of key concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processes of</th>
<th>The global order as a phenomenon of long duration</th>
<th>turning points</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The creation of global order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The destruction of global order</td>
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In the perspective of this matrix I would like to formulate four methodological theses:
1) In the years 1800–2050 the global order was and will be a field of the processes of creation and destruction. In all historical

situations we observe the dynamic interactions between the creation and the destruction of global order.

2) In each historical situation we find changing relations linking the power of creation of the global order and the power of its destruction. In some situations the power of creation is prevailing, in some other situations the power of destruction is prevailing.

3) The processes of creation and destruction of the global order are processes of long duration having a strong developmental dynamics and at the same time a big power of inertia supporting the given status quo.

4) Particular attention should be given to the turning points\(^3\) in the history of global order. The turning points could be defined as deep changes in the structure and the dynamics of the global order. These changes incorporate the transformation of the global scene related to the diminishing power of the existing actors of the global scene and the growing power of new emerging actors\(^4\).

The result of a turning point is a new configuration of the global order and a new configuration of the global scene.

*   *   *

Naturally this set of four theses has only a preliminary character to serve as an inspiration for the discussion related to the methodology of the studies of the global order as an object of transdisciplinary cognitive and pragmatic reflection.

\(^3\) Turning points, op. cit.

\(^4\) A. Kukliński, The Transformation of the global scene. The crucial turning points (in:) Turning points, op. cit.
II. THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GLOBAL ORDER IN THE YEARS 1815–1914

Sixty years ago, the well known Polish economist and a liberal and Christian philosopher\(^5\) published a charming volume in which \textit{inter alia} we find the idea that the XIX century was an age of \textit{peace and liberalism}.

This age\(^6\) has shaped the classical period of the global order as having the following features:

1) it was a global order dominated by the ideology of leseferism and liberal democracy
2) it was a global order dominated by Europe as the leading continent; the colonial system was an important element of this global order
3) in the team of global powers, Great Britain and the ideology of PAX Britannica were most important
4) it was a global order as a framework for the development of the capitalistic system involved in the dynamic forces of the first industrial revolution leading to great technological, economic social and cultural transformations.

Around 1900 there was a prevailing confidence that the global order will last forever. Not sufficient attention was given to processes of destruction growing inside this global order which led to almost total destruction of the global order in the years 1914–1945.

III. The destruction of the global order in the years 1914–1945

The time 1914–1945 is a period of the destruction of the global order developed in the XIX century. In this destruction the following events should be mentioned. These events created a great historical drama or even a set of tragedies.

1) World War One and World War Two creating a set of big waves of genocide and material and moral destruction. Those Wars ruined the dominating position of Europe on the global scene. This dominating position was taken over by two victorious superpowers of the USA and the Soviet Union. We should not forget the special role of Germany in the ignition of World War One and World War Two.

2) The second crucial point in the years 1914–1945 was the Bolshevik Revolution which in a certain area of the global history was trying to create an alternative in the relation to the system of capitalism and liberal democracy.

3) The third crucial point of the years 1914–1945 is the great crisis 1929–1933 which destroyed the model of classical laissez – faire capitalism.

Those thirty years were not only the domain of the destruction of the global order. In the dominating climate of destruction we find concepts and processes which anticipated the renaissance of the global order in the years 1945–1985.

One can indicate the following phenomena as the seeds of the new global order:

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7 N. Davies, op. cit. p. 897.
8 N. Davies, op. cit.
Part I. The paradigmatic interpretation...

1) the theory and ideology of Keynesism as a concept organizing the world economy\textsuperscript{10}.

2) Initial elements of the ideology and practice of the welfare state\textsuperscript{11}.

3) already in the time of World War Two the ideas of a new system of international organizations were born as a \textit{sui generis} substitute of global government.

4) in the time of World War Two in the USA new intellectual and political elites had emerged. These elites were able to define in a convincing way the role of the USA as a leading superpower developing an effective integration of hard and soft power\textsuperscript{12}. The culture of the American intellectual and political elite, in the climate of the growing Soviet danger resulted in the whole Free World’s recognizing of the American leadership in the years 1945–1985.

We need a deep evaluation of the years 1914–1945 including the establishment, the crisis and the catastrophe of the Versaille Europe. We have to remember that the Versaille Europe had re-established the independence of Poland after 123 years of partitions\textsuperscript{13}.

IV. The great renaissance of the global order in the years 1945–1985

This is a splendid period of the renaissance of the global order in the years 1945–1985.

I would like to present seven observations related to this renaissance

\textsuperscript{10} Compare, Z. Madej, \textit{Turning Points}, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{11} Compare, A. Kukliński, \textit{The Future of Europe} (in:) \textit{Europe}, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{12} J.S. Nye, \textit{The Paradox of American Power, Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone}, Oxford University Press 2002.

\textsuperscript{13} N. Davies, op. cit.
1) this is a period of dominance of the theory and ideology of Keynesism and Fordism as a pattern to organize the global economy;
2) it is a period of deep modification of the theory and practice of liberal democracy. The welfare state was the most important instrument of this modification;
3) it is a period of the greatest long-term boom\textsuperscript{14} in the history of capitalistic economy; this boom created a climate of optimism documented in the growth of employment and welfare;
4) it is a period of not only a negative but also positive face of the Cold War. The Cold War increased the leadership role of the USA and promoted cohesion of the institutional structures of the Free World;
5) it is a period of creation of an innovative and efficient system of international organizations like UNO\textsuperscript{15}, OECD\textsuperscript{16}, Washington Institutions and the European Union. In terms of cumulative and multiplier effects this system has created the theory and practice of a quasi global government.
6) it is a period when the pluralistic ideology of PAX Americana was a positive phenomenon;
7) it is a period of innovative, long-term strategic thinking and the eruption of a great team of global leaders, who were able to think in terms of next generations and not only in terms of next elections.

I fully understand that the evaluation of the great renaissance is in a shadow of a sin of a sui generis cosmopolitan ideology concentrating attention on the power and performance of great global actors. From the point of view of Central and Eastern Europe

\textsuperscript{14} W. Michalski, \textit{The anatomy of long boom} (in:) H. Bunz and A. Kukliński (eds) \textit{Experiences and prospects}, F. Ebert Stiftung, Warsaw 2001 – later quoted as \textit{Globalization}.

\textsuperscript{15} L. Emmerij, \textit{The history of ideas. A blind spot in the life of the United Nations} (in:) \textit{Europe}, op. cit.

which was located on the wrong site of the Iron Curtain this vision of the great renaissance may be seen in an extremely critical perspective. We have to remember, however, that Central and Eastern Europe was not a very important actor of the global scene, having strong impact on the reconfiguration of this scene. This is, however, a subjective judgment, which may be challenged in the next stage of our project.

* * *

At the end of the 1970s the architecture of the global order started to break down. The global order was quickly loosing its vital power confronted with new technological, economic, social and political phenomena. The challenge of the new global order has emerged. The success of this new global order will change the XXI century into an age of development and well being. The failure of the new global order will create an age of crisis and catastrophes.

V. Á la recherché du temps perdu. Why – in the temporal framework of the 25 years 1985–2010 it was impossible to create a new global order for the XXI century?

*Prima facie* one might think that the years 1985–2010 would be an opening for the magnificent world of the XXI century. In this opening we might see three bundles of processes having a great developmental dynamics and an immense technological, economic and social potential.

The first bundle contains the processes of globalization\(^\text{17}\) changing the faces of the world.

The second bundle is related to the creation of Information Society as a new chapter in the history of civilization.

\(^{17}\text{Europe, op. cit.}\)
The third bundle is related to the development of knowledge based economy\textsuperscript{18} which is changing into a new source of the dynamics of economic growth.

The years 1985–2010 are a period of the transformation of the global scene. Let me mention five elements of this transformation.

1) The downfall of the Soviet Empire and a short period of \textit{smuta} in the history of Russia. I mean the Russian \textit{smuta} at the beginning of the XVII century and the Russian \textit{smuta} at the end of the XX century. These were the unique historical opportunities to break down the Russian \textit{samodzierżawie} being the Russian incarnation of \textit{absolutum dominum};

The first opportunity was wasted by the elites of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The second opportunity\textsuperscript{19} was wasted by the Western World, which could have developed a long term strategic policy and change the \textit{smuta} of Jelcyn into a new chapter of the history of Russia and the world. The wasting of those opportunities has resulted in the reconstruction of the Russian \textit{samodzierżawie} in the incarnation of the Putin empire.

In this way the positive effects of the break-down of the Soviet Empire were in a large degree wasted.

2) The rapid growth and slow decline of the USA as a monopolistic superpower\textsuperscript{20}. In the end of the XX century the USA reached the peak of its power and glory.

The two presidential terms of George W. Bush promoting an arrogant version of unilateralism as an apotheosis of hard power in negligence of soft power are in our times limiting the imperial status of the USA which is in the process of transformation from the status of the monopolistic superpower to a new


more modest status of one of the superpowers. The USA of the XXI century will not decide in a unilateral way about the grand shape of the global scene. The PAX Americana is already located on the sunset boulevard, which is definitely a drama of the Western Civilization which can be described in the language of Oswald Spengler’s *Untergang des Abend Landes*.

3) The enlargement and weakening of the European Union which at the turn of the centuries found itself in a process of deep and multidimensional crisis – the crisis of the will to life, the crisis of innovation and the will to power.

4) A rapid growth of the importance of China and India as the new superpowers of the XXI century\(^{21}\).

We could have an impression that the beginning of the XXI century and the transformations of the global scene will create a climate conducive for the emergence of a new global order. This is not the case. The beginning of the XXI century is a chaotic time. The old global order is not functioning well and the new order is not yet born.

This diagnosis can indicate three reasons:

*Primo* – the bankruptcy of the neoliberalism\(^{22}\) as a doctrine organizing the global scene and the global order. The deification of the markets as a universal arbiter for all problems was a fatal religion of the turn of the centuries.

*Secundo* – the bankruptcy of the ideology of PAX Americana which experienced a shorter life than the ideology of PAX Britannica. The USA failed the test\(^{23}\) as a global leader at the turn of the XX and XXI century. The irresponsible policies of the USA have weakened the system of international organizations which is an important element of the global order.


\(^{23}\) Compare, J.S. Nye, op. cit.
Tertio – the bankruptcy of long-term strategic thinking in the minds of the global elites of power, money and culture.

* * *

The vision of the years 1985–2010 may be seen as an over pessimistic one. This vision may be contrasted with an optimistic vision. We have to remember, however, that we are not discussing a universal vision but only a vision related to the conditions of the emergence of a new global order. From this point of view I would like to defend the theses – that the years 1985–2010 – are a lost time.

VI. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CREATION OF A NEW GLOBAL ORDER IN THE YEARS 2010–2050VERSUS THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL CHAOS AND CATASTROPHE

The XXI century is an age of global risk and universal uncertainty. Every day we are living on the brink of a global catastrophe. The vision of an apocalyptic catastrophe is not a pathological, utopian, pessimistic nightmare. The emergence of a new effective global order is a conditio sine qua non of survival and development of humanity. This grand dramatic problem should be an object of innovative, scientific and pragmatic reflection.

In this context I would like to submit to your attention the concept of five strategic triangles:
1) The triangle of the grand actors of the global scene
2) The triangle of sustainable development
3) The triangle of the system of power
4) The triangle of the vehicles of civilizations
5) The triangle of leading religions.
The triangle of the grand actors of the global scene

In the processes of the creation and destruction of the global order of the XXI century a great, maybe decisive, role will be performed by the grand actors of the global scene.

The first actor is the system of international organizations, which will experience a deep reconstruction following the challenges of the XXI century.

The second actor is the system of grand powers – the USA, the European Union, Russia, China, India, Brazil and Japan.

Will these superpowers be able to create a climate of cooperation which will lead to a new strong system of global order?

The third actor is the transnational corporations. Some years ago in Geneva I presented a view that the world needs not only the UNO but also an UCO. I meant UNO as the United Nations Organization and the UCO – as the United Corporation Organization. The UCO should have an important share in the collective responsibility for the state and the development of the global order. It is difficult to continue the present situation in which the TNCs are using the benefits of the global order without the responsibility for the state of this order.

The triangle of sustainable development

An important foundation of the global order is sustainable development integrating the dynamism and structures of economic, social and ecological change.

The triangle of the systems of power

The global order is strongly influenced by the power and dynamics of three global actors: the liberal democracies, the autocratic regimes, the systems of global anarchy created by international terrorism and by the narco-business complex.
In this context we have two questions:

1) Will the XXI century be a preponderant domain of liberal democracy of the Western Civilization or a domain of autocratic empire of China\textsuperscript{24}?

2) Will the XXI century be an age of global anarchy dominated by international terrorism and by the mafia of narco-business?

**The triangle of the vehicles of civilizations**

The global order is a crucial element in the development of civilizations. In this context especially important is the interactive and dynamic performance of the triangle education, science and culture. This triangle can create a climate to improve the quality of the global order.

**The triangle of leading religions**

Contrary to the expectations of fundamentalist atheism, religion will be an important element of the global scene and a potential participant in the creation of the global order.

* * *

This idea of strategic triangles is an original interpretation of the processes of the creation of the global order of the XXI century.

VII. IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM OF THE GLOBAL ORDER

I hope that this paper could be seen as opening a trajectory to discover a new paradigm of the global order. We remember that a paradigm is a set of questions addressed to the objective reality and a set of concepts and methodological approaches used in answering those questions.

This paper is representing the opinion that the institutional framework is not the only field for the rich and differentiated problématique of the global order. The global order should not be interpreted in the narrow framework of the institutional system responsible for the global order. We need a new paradigm of holistic interpretations seeing the processes of the creation and destruction of the global order as processes of long duration and turning points. These processes have not only an institutional dimension but also material and ideological dimensions. These processes are related to the holistic interpretation of human activity in all contexts of time and space.

Naturally, this proposal to see the holistic causality of global order in the years 1800–2050 has numerous weaknesses in the theoretical, empirical and pragmatic perspective. However, the most important is the question if this paper is entering a trajectory to outline a new paradigm of the global order? If the critical reader of this paper will find a positive answer, we can say vivant sequentes. Vivant sequentes means here:

− Primo – the design and inspiration of an international research conference and publication programme for the year 2008–2010;
− Secundo – the organization in Warsaw of an international conference titled “The creation and destruction of the global order. The experiences and prospects of the year 1800–2050”.

The programme and the conference should be seen as a modest contribution to the grand efforts to promote Warsaw as an emerging nod in the network of global centers, which are able to contribute to the processes shaping the visions of the XXI century.
Part II

The paradigmatic interpretation of the European drama
The future of Europe.

Four dilemmas and five scenarios*

A challenge for prospective thinking**

Introduction

The discussion related to the future of Europe should try to sail down the golden stream between the Scylla of voluntary and the Charybdis of fatalistic approaches.

The voluntaristic approaches in this field are expressed in the value judgement that the individual and collective will of European societies can shape the future of our continent irrespective of the trends prevailing in the global environment.

The fatalistic approaches represent the opinion that the European freedom of choice is vastly reduced, or even totally eliminated by the patterns, which are produced in the framework of the “almighty” globalization process.

The golden stream should represent the opinions and value judgements that even in the 21st century Europe will have quite a considerable freedom of choice, especially, if Europe will act as an United and Integrated Continent.


** The first version of this paper was published in the volume Locality, State and development. Essays in the honour of Jos G. M. Hilhorst. Edited by Bert Helmsing, Joao Guimaraes, Institute of Social Studies, 1997. The second – deeply revised version was prepared in 2002 following Professor Mircea Malitza’s invitation. Naturally the author bears the responsibility for the opinions and value judgements expressed in this paper.
The scope and the quality of the European freedom of choice will be discussed in this paper in the following topical sequence:

A. The Four Dilemmas
B. The Five Scenarios
   I. The Welfare State Scenario
   II. The Darwinian Scenario
   III. The Thurowian Scenario
   IV. The Singapurian Scenario
   V. The Christian Scenario
C. The Anatomy of the Scenario Approach
D. Research Priorities

I hope that this line of thinking will produce useful results in both academic and pragmatic dimensions.

A. THE FOUR DILEMMAS

There are four dilemmas related to the Future of Europe
– Equality versus efficiency
– Individual freedom versus collective order
– Spiritual versus material values
– Short-term versus long-term thinking

EQUALITY VERSUS EFFICIENCY

This is the object of an important contribution published in 1975 by the Brookings Institution¹. Let me quote the final sentences of this book:

¹ A. M. Okun, Equality and Efficiency. The Big Tradeoff, The Bookings Institutions, Washington DC 1975, p.120. Compare also the paper of J. Wilkin, Efektywność a sprawiedliwość jako problem ekonomiczny (Efficiency versus Equality as an Economic Problem), Warszawa 1996.
The future of Europe

A democratic capitalist society will keep searching for better ways of drawing the boundary lines between the domain of rights and the domain of dollars. And it can make progress. To be sure, it will never solve the problem, for the conflict between equality and economic efficiency in inescapable. In that sense, capitalism and democracy are really a most improbable mixture. Maybe that is why they need each other – to put some rationality into equality and some humanity into efficiency.

I agree – we will “never solve the problem” but we can and should try “to put some rationality into equality” and some “humanity into efficiency”.

**Individual freedom versus collective order**

The principle of individual freedom is the foundation of the European culture, civilization and the organization of the state, society and economy. However, the contemporary global scene is supplying a growing number of situations where the dilemma of individual freedom versus collective order is a real squaring of a circle – without a satisfactory solution.

A promising and terrifying example was created by Singapore where the trade off – individual freedom versus collective order – was solved as the limitation of individual freedom for the improvement of collective order.

**Spiritual versus material values**

Europe’s unique historical experience is related to the integration of spiritual and material values in processes of comprehensive and sustainable development.

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At the turn of the 20th and 21st century there is a growing apprehension that the role of the spiritual values is shrinking at an alarming speed. This is the essence of the doctrine represented by John Paul II.

**SHORT VERSUS LONG-TERM THINKING**

Europe’s great transformations were created by long-term visionary thinking. Unfortunately, Europe’s present political and economic scene is rather dominated by short-term approaches, which constitutes a very weak response to the challenges of the III Millennium. The short-term approaches are very deeply implicated in the nature of contemporary democracy as a political system and of contemporary capitalism as an economic system.

**B. THE FIVE SCENARIOS**

**I. THE WELFARE STATE SCENARIO**

The Welfare State was one of the greatest institutional innovations of the 20th century. It was an important instrument to eliminate the suicidal mechanism of social auto-destruction incorporated in the philosophy of the 19th century laissez-faire capitalism.

The Welfare State was a response of the Great Western Liberal Democracies to the three challenges of the dramatic experiences of the 20th century:

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1) the Great Depression of the early Thirties
2) the experience of World War II
3) the challenge of the quasi-socialistic ideology and practice generated by the Soviet Empire.

There are many important chapters in the development of the Welfare State: F. D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, The British Chapter started during the World War II, The French Chapter, The Dutch and Swedish Chapters and – last but not least – the German Chapter of the Soziale Marktwirtschaft.

The ideology of the Welfare State was deeply incorporated in the value judgements and institutional solutions developed in the framework of the consecutive incarnations of the European Union.

A comprehensive analysis of the intellectual and pragmatic activity of J. Delors would be very instructive from this point of view.

In this spirit, we should discuss the Welfare Scenario – as a scenario of the European development of the 21st century. In this Scenario, the European Union will transform itself into a federal welfare state – following the best traditions of the national welfare states of the 20th century.

Prima facie – this Scenario is totally unrealistic. The last quarter of the 20th century has generated a deep crisis of the Welfare State, which according to the neoliberal thinking, will lead to the total destruction of the Welfare state in the beginning of the 21st century.

In this context, the idea of Europe as a federal Welfare state is pure nonsense. This judgement is however both superficial and dangerous.

It is true that the inefficient and degenerated versions of the Welfare State will be rejected and eliminated. But it is also true that the question how to put “some humanity into efficiency” will remain an important European question of the 21st century.

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5 Europe – Twilight of the Welfare State: “For decades Europe’s generous social programs were a model of compassionate government. Now they are running up grant deficits, stifling competition and creating record joblessness. Something has to change”, Business Week, International Edition, November 27th, 1995.
This means that the Welfare State Scenario should not be eliminated from the scope of our attention.

The Welfare State Scenario found a new incarnation in the discussion related to the so-called “Third Way”\textsuperscript{6}. The following observation by R. Dahrendorf\textsuperscript{7} could be quoted in this context:

\textit{In many European countries, politicians are trying to go ‘beyond left and right’ to a Third Way. Most of its protagonists have a close relationship to what in Britain is called new labor, or sometimes, the ‘Blair Project’. In fact, the Third Way debate has become the only game in town – the only hint at new directions for Europe’s politics in a confused multitude of trends and ideas.}

* * *

Anthony Giddens, Great Britain’s chief Third Way theorist, places the task of combining wealth creation and social cohesion in several contexts, including the great changes wrought by globalization, the ‘new dialogue’ with science and technology, and the transformation of values and lifestyles. He then identifies six policy areas of the Third Way: a new politics, or ‘second wave of democratization’, from going directly to the people; a new relationship that joins up state, market, and civil society; supply-side policies incorporating social investment, notably in education and infrastructure projects; fundamental reform of the welfare state by creating a new balance of risk and security; a new relationship to the environment evolving out of ‘ecological modernization’; and a strong commitment to transnational initiatives in a world of fuzzy sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{6} Compare: M. Dauerstadt, \textit{Ways, Byways and Third Ways to a Social Democratic Europe}. Eurokolleg 44 (2001) F. Ebert Stiftung.

Much can and has been said about each of these policy areas in various books papers. Overall, the Third Way project has been described as a combination of neoliberal economics and social democratic social policy. That is not entirely fair. In some ways the key feature of this approach is implicit rather than explicit: its optimism. I call this globalization plus’ – accepting the needs of global markets but adding key elements of social well-being.

The well-known German approaches to the Soziale Marktwirtscharft were developed in a global and ecological framework by F. J. Rademacher8. Finally the contribution of J. Kleer9 is an interesting perspective in this field.

II. The Darwinian Scenario

Europe must face the challenge of the global competition, which will be stronger and more ruthless in the 21st century than it was in the 20th century. In this scenario, the Institutions in Europe will have other no choice than to support the development of the most efficient social and entrepreneurial actors, local, regional and national communities – in other words – the European Institutions will promote the “survival of the fittest” who will win the competitive struggle on the Global Scene.

The Darwinian Scenario is not an abstract phenomenon. It should be analyzed in the context of the new Darwinian vision of the Global Society.

Such a vision was presented by I. O. Angel10.

Peter Drucker has a very interesting forecast. He says that humanity is polarizing into two employment categories: the intellectual, cultural and business elite (the mobile knowledge workers), and the rest (the immobile service workers). (...) Routine production services can either be replaced by robots or exported anywhere on the globe, and wages in this sector are already beginning to converge world-wide to Third World levels. (...)

Inevitably the slow redistribution of wealth that has occurred over the last century is being reversed rapidly. Societies are stratifying and new elites are appearing. The future is inequality; at the very bottom of the heap, western societies and already witnessing the emergence of a rapidly expanding underclass.

I. O. Angel is concluding his analysis by formulating an ominous question mark: “How long before the notion of ‘Human Rights’ is as outdated as the ‘Divine Right of Kings’? The Darwinian Scenario is supported by the fatalistic logic of Globalization.

It is also the surrender of the unique features of the European culture and civilization facing the challenges of the Global Scene. Nevertheless, this is a very important scenario – deserving very serious attention in our studies.

The extreme neoliberal vision of I. O. Angel is challenged by the liberal – conservative vision – presented in the paper prepared by R. Galar and K. Pawlowski. In the introduction to this paper we read inter alia the following:

> Our task in this project was to draw up a picture of relations in such a Europe, which would be able to cope with appearing challenges, via implementation of a widely understood liberal concept. We did not strive to elevate and extrapolate

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the current orthodox liberal concept, or discuss the underlying features of such orthodoxy. We were expected to express personal views in a clear and original way so that it would encourage an open discussion. We tried to respond to such a challenge despite the fears that a resulting discussion might confine itself to the stamping out of our ‘heresies’.

* * *

We feel that, at the very beginning, the reader ought to be warned that our opinions, though liberal in their nature, do not match the labels usually attached to liberalism today. We would especially like to separate ourselves from the permissive-egoistic liberal fraction because, to us, their system of values appears both primitive and destructive. Moreover, we do not think that, under today’s postmodernist oppression, there is a need to position the liberal views in direct opposition to tradition, especially the Christian tradition. Rather, there is a need to collectively defend the endangered positions of mind and humanity. Hence we describe our vision as liberal-conservative. The adjective conservative is to signal the distance from actions motivated by short-term interests — either individual or group — and emphasize the pragmatic importance of tradition.

III. The Thurowian Scenario

The brainstorming book The Future of Capitalism could be seen as a starting point of the third Scenario – The Thurowian Scenario – following the name of the author of the book – Lester C. Thurow.

L. C. Thurow is dramatically exposing the weakness of contemporary capitalism and the necessity of a profound metamorphosis of
Part II. The paradigmatic interpretation...

this system. The essence of the Thurowian philosophy of development is presented in the following way\textsuperscript{12}:

{
Technology and ideology are shaking the foundations of 21\textsuperscript{st} century capitalism. Technology is making skills and knowledge the only sources of sustainable strategic advantage. Abetted by the electronic media, ideology is moving toward a radical form of short-run individual consumption maximization at precisely a time when economic success will depend upon the willingness and ability to make long-run social investments in skills, education, knowledge and infrastructure. When technology and ideology start moving apart, the only question is when will the ‘big one’ (the earthquake that rocks the system) occur. Paradoxically, at precisely the time when capitalism finds itself with no social competitors – its former competitors, socialism or communism, having died – it will have to undergo a profound metamorphosis.

To my mind, the Thurowian Scenario is probably the best Scenario for the Future of Europe. It is the scenario of “long-run social investments in skills, education, knowledge and infrastructure”. This scenario will create the long-term competitive advantages for the European Economy, which is the crucial problem of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

This line of thinking is represented very strongly in the activities of the Euro-pean Union in the field of innovation, research and knowledge based economy\textsuperscript{13}.


IV. The Singaporean Scenario

The Thurowian Scenario is accepting the assumption that both the political system of democracy and the economic system of capitalism will successfully face the challenge of a “deep metamorphosis”.

If, however, Europe will not demonstrate the capacity to face this challenge – and the upper hand will be given to the phenomena of economic weaknesses and to political and social anarchy – then the only way out will remain for Europe to accept the Singaporean model to restrict the individual freedom as a trade off in relation to the improved collective order and growing economic efficiency. It is clear that the Singaporean Model is a great contradiction to the fundamental values and principles of European culture and civilization.

Will, however, Europe be able to defend and develop the principle of individual freedom in the global environment of the 21st century?

Whatever emotions and value judgements we have in relation to the Singaporean Scenario – this Scenario should be discussed in a deep and comprehensive way.

V. The Christian Scenario

The four Scenarios discussed in this paper are – *ex necessitate rei* – related more to material than to spiritual values. These proportions are reversed in the fifth Christian Scenario. Christianity is a very important element of European History and of the European Future.

Let us quote in this context the conclusion of K. Porwit’s paper:

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Altogether – it seems that the primordial condition for the chances of a Christian scenario to materialise, to succeed and to proliferate would come from manifold corresponding changes in human minds, towards Christianity with all aspects including those concerned with social capital, with ethical and moral criteria in the strife for success, with personal conscience and its spiritual premises for appraisal and choice. It would be easy to argue that the above mentioned condition proves very demanding and difficult in practical implementation. Nevertheless – parallel arguments can be raised that evolution towards such a goal seems indispensable so that Europeans are dealing here with the issue of crucial importance for the future, how to overcome the dilemma of a gap between “feasible” and “needed”.

I think, however, that this framework should be extended to include the three great monotheistic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam¹⁵.

This line of thinking is well represented in the contribution of El Hasan bin Talal¹⁶ and the European Commission¹⁷.

C. The Anatomy of the Scenario Approach

In this paper’s context there are three elements in the anatomy of the Scenario Approach:

1) the first element is related to the theoretical and methodological coherence of the scenario;


2) the second element is the ideological dimension of the scenario internalized by some segments of the public opinion and by significant parts of the political, economic, social and cultural elites
3) the third element is the political dimension as a set of value judgements and motivations, which can be implemented through effective political activities leading toward a new Future Europe.

Within this framework, we can look at different profiles of each scenario – Table 1 can be seen as an inducement for further thinking in this field. In Table 1 I present my subjective evaluation of the Five Scenarios.

Table 1
The matrix of comparative evaluation of the Five Scenarios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemmas and Values</th>
<th>Scenario I</th>
<th>Scenario II</th>
<th>Scenario III</th>
<th>Scenario IV</th>
<th>Scenario V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality versus Efficiency</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Freedom versus Collective Order</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual Values versus Material Values</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Term Thinking versus Long Term Thinking</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Research Priorities

Europe is a pluralistic continent both in a historical and in a prospective dimension. Plurality and diversity in the field of political, economic, social, cultural, ideological and religious facts,
approaches and value judgements – are permanent features of Europe. This means that our reflections on Europe’s future must also be pluralistic and diversified.

This observation is reflected in the philosophy of this paper – outlining five scenarios as an inducement for pluralistic thinking about Europe’s future. The selected set of scenarios can be outlined in different ways. My set is only a tentative proposal for critical evaluations and brainstorming discussion and an invitation to present alternative set of Scenarios integrating cognitive, political and ideological dimensions and value judgements.

There is no doubt however that our Scenario thinking must be incorporated into a rigorous diagnostic and prospective framework. The diagnostic framework is related to a comprehensive analysis of the European experiences especially in the last decade of the 20th century. The prospective framework is related to the construction of a comprehensive set of Scenarios for the years 2001–2020.

The diagnostic and prospective framework will be not designed and implemented in a set of individual impressionistic contributions written in an ad hoc convention. This framework can be created only by a large scale and long-term research programme. The Polish Association for the Club of Rome has presented such a Programme proposing the formulation: The Club of Rome. The Future of Europe. The Global Future. I am convinced that this formulation may be seen as valid not only for the Polish Association but also for the Club of Rome in toto.

I hope that my paper presented in the framework of the Ankara Conference is a step in this direction. A background for the interpretation of the spirit and letter of my proposals is outlined in the rich set of studies and contributions incorporated in the volume created by the joint efforts of the Polish Association for the Club of

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Rome and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation\textsuperscript{20}. The proposed \textit{modus operandi} is a great challenge for prospective thinking of the Club of Rome at the beginning of the third Millenium. The Future of Europe is a challenging laboratory to test the imagination, wisdom and courage of the Club of Rome.

\textbf{Conclusion}

It is a long way from the formulation of the first version of this paper in 1997 to the formulation of the present second version in 2002. Unfortunately the development process of my ideas was very slow. I hope, however, that some real progress has been achieved.

To my mind the most important is the fact that the Polish Association for the Club of Rome was able to use my individual point of view as a modest starting point for the construction of a valid programme, demonstrating the intellectual capacity of the Association. It remains to be seen whether the contribution of the Polish Association will find a proper place in the general landscape of the Club of Rome’s global activity. This will be a test to what extent the “Warsaw Support Centre”\textsuperscript{21} is able to create comprehensive inducements to promote the design and implementation of a Grand Programme – The Club of Rome. The Future of Europe. The Global Future\textsuperscript{22}.


\textsuperscript{21} Naturally this is only a metaphor. There is only one Support Center in Europe – the Vienna Support Center. I think however that the active Associations in individual European countries will be de facto functioning as support centers in relation to the Club of Rome’s activities. So the Vienna Center should see its activities in a competitive framework. The position of the Vienna Center will be not determined by institutional background but by the qualities of its competitive performance. It is worth while see the activity of the Vienna Center in the years 2000–2003 from this perspective.

\textsuperscript{22} Compare: A. Kukliński, \textit{The Club of Rome...}, op.cit. Compare also the most interesting contributions published in \textit{Millennium III Workshop of Ideas and Projects for European Integration and Global Civilization}. Black Sea University Foundation, Bucarest, 2002. Finally see the charismatic contributions of L. Kulakowski, \textit{Czy
Now the judgement is yours – Ladies and Gentlemen. I will accept even a most critical judgement. However, it will be extremely difficult for me to accept the Todschweigen attitude.

Warsaw, Żoliborz, November 11 2002

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Europa Quo Vadis*

I. Programmatic paper – an interpretation

The Lower Silesian Conference is a dynamic intellectual and pragmatic processes leading to new interpretations of the history and the future of Europe. This is an innovative processes opening the trajectories of pluralistic value judgments inside and outside the limits of conventional wisdom and political correctness.

In this context the concept of a programmatic paper is interpreted as a mission to outline the framework of the Lower Silesian Conference seen as a dynamic process.

There are three elements in this framework:

• The substantial element a set of paradigmatic questions trying to find the scope of the attention of the Conference
• The methodological element trying to find the charismatic spirit of the Conference
• The pragmatic element trying to find the place of the Conference in the European, Polish and Lower Silesian decision making processes.

II. The spirit of the Lower Silesian Conference

„The paradigm is a set of questions exploring the empirical and prospective reality and a set of methodologies creating the philosophical and instrumental framework how to answer those questions”. I am convinced that we can try to outline the paradigm of the Lower Silesian Conference. The first element of the paradigm is a set of questions which concentrate the scope of our attention. This scope must be both comprehensive and limited in order to achieve valid results of the Conference. The second element is how to answer the selected questions. We can accept the conventional spirit of academic discussion developed in the climate of moderation and objectivity.

We can accept the pragmatic business as usual attitude. This would be probably a wrong choice. Anno Domini 2010 is “Europe’s moment of truth”. So according to my judgment the climate of mega-historical dramatic choice should be present in the deliberations of the Lower Silesian Conference. Anno Domini 2010 is the time “to be bold and ambitious”. How to discover and develop the spirit of a really charismatic Conference?

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III. The set of paradigmatic questions of the Lower Silesian Conference

I would like to propose a set of 14 questions opening the trajectory to outline the scope of the Lower Silesian Conference. Let us consider the following list of questions:

1. To what extent will the XXI century be really a clash of civilizations both in global scale and inside Europe?
2. How to envisage the new global order emerging in the conditions of global risk and universal uncertainty?
3. Is the global ecological catastrophe a fatal verdict of the XXI century?
4. Is it probable to imagine a revolution in the field of global science and technology?
5. How to define the Gordian Knots of the XXI century?
6. Is it possible to outline a comprehensive diagnosis of the glory and misery of the transformation of Europe in two decades 1990–2010?
7. How to define and analyze the turning points in the development of Europe 1990–2010?
8. How to define and analyze the role of the European Union in the development of Europe 1990–2010?
9. Why are the decades 2010–2030 crucial for Europe of the XXI century (the dramatic role of the Question “Europa, Quo Vadis?” – Europe’s moment of truth)?
10. How to define and analyze the prospective internal transformations of Europe 2010–2030?
11. How to face the changing place of Europe in the global order of the XXI century?
12. How to envisage the future of European Governance and the Futures of the European Union?
13. How to define and analyze the most important transformations of the Europeans regions in the years 1990–2030?
14. How to improve the strategic capacities of the regions to face the challenges of the enigma of the XXI century?

This set of 14 questions can be analyzed as a system of four subsets:

I. The global enigma of the XXI century (questions 1–5);
II. The glory and misery of the transformation of Europe – the explored and lost opportunities of the two decades 1990–2010 (questions 6–8);
III. Prospective glory and misery of Europe 2010–2030 (questions 9–12);
IV. The Quo Vadis of the European Regions (questions 13–14).

I am not trying to say that this is the “best” set of questions. This is only a proposal to open an interpretation of the rich and differentiated contents of the Lower Silesian Conference developed in
the Conference papers and consecutive discussions. With a view to this extended interpretation I would like to present a vision of four philosophical climates.

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IV. The four philosophical climates of the Lower Silesian Conference

The essence of the four climates will be expressed following the names of four grand personalities who have created a specific climate for the interpretation of the Europa Quo Vadis Question: Thimothy Garthon Ash¹
Giuseppe di Lampedusa²
Oswald Spengler³
Jose Manuel Barroso⁴.

* * *

Primo – the Ashian philosophy⁵

We should read once more the charismatic book by Timothy Garton Ash promoting the idea that the West has a surprising future and that the West can be put together again.

⁵ T.G Ash op. cit.
The dramatic Gordian Knot of the Atlantic Community at the beginning of the XXI century is the destruction of the unity of Western Civilization, the unity of the European Union and the USA as an integrated actor of the global scene.

We need mega-historical Alexandrian Solutions to establish the unity of the Atlantic Community as an integrated and powerful actor of the global scene of the XXI century.

Nobody – China, India, Russia, the Islamic powers, the power of oil – can challenge the integrated power of the Atlantic Community of the XXI century. This optimistic message is emerging from the brilliant book of Timothy Garton Ash *Free World – America, Europe and the surprising future of the West.*

The Atlantic Community is a very grand and powerful Community – A Community of Western Civilization, a Community of Liberal Democracies, a Community of Innovative Culture, a Community of Academic Freedom, a Community of dynamic capitalistic enterprises.

This power and grandeur is paralyzed by the political and ideological disintegration – a dramatic or even tragic Gordian Knot. **If the Atlantic Community does not find an Alexandrian Solution for this Gordian Knot then the Atlantic Community will really transform itself into the Titanic of the XXI century**\(^6\).

* * *

The Ashian philosophy is getting a new powerful interpretation by John Kornblum who served as the US ambassador to Germany from 1997–2001. Let us quote his challenging point of view\(^7\):

*The main conclusion I draw from the debate about Germany is that it is not about Germany at all. The task of building a democratic Europe is far from complete. Most of the foundations have been laid and now the residents are starting*

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\(^7\) J. Kornblum, *Germany In need of a dream*. International Herald Tribune, April 23 2010.
Part II. The paradigmatic interpretation...

to haggle over the design. Weaving today’s 27 states into a true trans-Atlantic partnership is a task that is too big for Germany or even Europe to accomplish alone. They desperately need some skilled architectural assistance.

Uniting Europe and North America is the most audacious project ever conceived. If it works, the United States will be joined by nearly 500 million Europeans to form a democratic space, within which modern democratic values will harness more energy than in any single nation on earth. Democracy’s future as the operating system for a globalized world will be assured. European fecklessness seems to worry Washington officials these days. But if Germany has forgotten how to dream and the United States is too busy to try, we will both be guilty of perpetuating the aimlessness we so criticize. To hold up its side of the bargain, Europe needs exactly what Barack Obama originally promised – the audacity of hope.

The thesis that „Uniting Europe and North America is the most audacious project ever conceived” is an inspiring message for the Lower Silesian Conference. I think that Thimothy Garton Ash and John Kornblum should be invited to participate in the Lower Silesian Conference and in the post-conference volume.

The message of the renaissance of the Atlantic Community is expressed in the already quoted8 volume – The Atlantic Community. The Titanic of the XXI century? Seven co-authors of this volume are participating in the Lower Silesian Conference.

Secundo – The Lampedusian philosophy.

Lets us quote the charming note published in The Economist9:

One of the great studies of decline is a novel about a fictional Sicilian prince, living more than a century ago. There is much

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8 A. Kukliński, K. Pawłowski [eds] The Atlantic Community ... op.cit.
9 The Economist op.cit.
about Giuseppe di Lampedusa’s „The Leopard” that is remote now: peasants paying their rent with wheels of cheese and freshly killed lambs, footmen in knee-breeches, a constant threat of revolutionary violence on the horizon. Today’s Europe is at peace. Feudalism is long gone. Blatant inequalities are frowned on. Yet today’s European leaders would still do well to study „The Leopard”, for it offers them some topical lessons.

* * *

Today „The Leopard” is best-known for a single line: „If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” It is a fine line, but it is also one that can easily be misinterpreted. Today’s European leaders talk about things changing, but in ways designed to appeal, all too often, to the side of Europe that is old, tired and anxious. Buzzwords of the moment include a „Europe that protects” (a phrase recently used by both President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany). It is a horribly defeatist slogan. What about a Europe that makes its citizens strong, or one that equips them to compete? Europeans can live off their inherited wealth for a bit longer, and many still lead largely enviable lives. There is much that is fine and even noble about Europe, including its ambitions to reduce social inequalities. But Europe’s rivals are young and hungry. The old continent should resist the allure of a genteel surrender.

* * *

I am convinced that the United States and Europe should strongly resist the allure of a genteel surrender. The allure of a “genteel surrender” of Europe is a fascinating philosophical topic for the Lower Silesian Conference

* * *
**TERTIO – THE SPENGLERIAN PHILOSOPHY**

The deep crisis of the Atlantic Community\(^{10}\) is creating a climate for the revival of the Spenglerian philosophy, expressed in the famous title of his maybe prophetic opus *Der untergang des Abendlandes*. The original German edition was published in 1918–1922, the English translation – *The decline of the West* – in 1926–1928.

The Lower Silesian Conference may be inclined to discuss the dilemma if the opus of Oswald Spengler is a “false diagnosis” or a poetic historical truth\(^{11}\).

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**QUARTO – THE BARROSIAN PHILOSOPHY**

Jose Manuel Barroso is a living monument of the Mind of Brussels as the capital of the European Union Anno Domini 2010. Let us quote the preface by J.M. Barroso introducing *Europe 2020* document of March 3 2010\(^{12}\).

The critical sentence in the Preface is the following formulation:

„The crisis is a wake-up call, the moment where we recognize that „business as usual” would consign us to a gradual decline, to the second rank of the new global order This is Europe’s moment of truth. It is the time to be bold and ambitious.”

Unfortunately, this formulation was not developed in the Document of March 3 2010. It was submerged in the

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\(^{11}\) Compare the introduction to the Polish translation of Oswald Spengler, *Zmierzch Zachodu*, Warszawa 2001 Wydawnictwo KR.

\(^{12}\) J.M. Barroso op.cit – The Wroclaw Conference – will consider the full text of the document *Europe 2020*. The conventional thinking of the European Commission is well reflected in this document. But this is not a message about Europe’s moment of truth.
conventional “business as usual” language of the European Commission. However, the Lower Silesian Conference might be able to meet the challenge to answer the question: “how to define Europe’s moment of truth”. Can we translate this moment of truth into the mega-historical choice “The Renaissance versus the Bankruptcy of Europe”? There is a great advantage to have a Conference in Wroclaw where the pressure of conventional wisdom, political correctness and business as usual approaches is maybe not so strong as in Brussels. May be?

V. Europe’s moment of truth – a challenge for the Lower Silesian Conference

The Lower Silesian Conference could be designed and implemented as a “Conference as usual” – one more item in a vast and continuous stream of meetings, which are creating illusions that we are able to think about the Future of Europe. But the Lower Silesian Conference can find a new trajectory to be “bold and ambitious” and face the challenge “How to define Europe’s moment of truth”. This trajectory is a trajectory of knowledge, imagination and courage to see the real shape of the past and the future Europe. I am convinced that the eminent team of the Lower Silesian Conference will be able to see this real shape of Europe.

VI. The four features of the crisis of the European Civilization

Europe of the XXI century is facing the greatest challenge in its history – the challenge of marginalization – the challenge of the transformation of Europe into a fragment of a new global periphery. This historical moment is creating a strong demand for a grand debate related to the diagnosis of the present state
of Europe and to the visions and scenarios related to the Future of Europe.

There are different approaches in the discussion related to the very deep crisis of the European civilization emerging in the first decade of the XXI century. In this context we would like to concentrate our attention on four most pronounced features of the crisis:
1. the lost capacity of innovation
2. the lost will to life
3. the lost will to power
4. the lost spiritual identity

1) THE LOST CAPACITY OF INNOVATION

This lost capacity is well outlined by R. Galar\textsuperscript{13}:

The main competitive asset of Europe used to be freedom, not perfection. At present perfection receives more and more attention, while freedom is being pushed to the preserves of procedural democracy and unconventional lifestyles. The progressing degradation of the once paramount innovative prominence of Europe might be a direct consequence of this shift.

2) THE LOST WILL TO LIFE

The lost will to life is well grasped by M. György\textsuperscript{14}:

To balance the dramatic decrease in the number of children European countries must turn to external labour forces,


which at the same time deepen the internal cultural differences. Maintaining economic growth, providing the expected standard of goods and services, ensuring welfare services at a relatively high level – still considered low by many people – are possible only by involving external labour force. This will have two types of consequences which will generate complex social effects. On the one hand, the labour force – due to the scope of a relatively free movement – shall migrate from the less developed regions to the more developed ones. It will increase – or at least maintain – the regional differences, differences which in turn will bring about actions directed alleviating them. On the other hand, the settlement of labour from other regions shall become a necessity – it will cease to be an option that one evaluates in terms of its benefits and drawbacks. The choice will only be whether the labour force (and population) is “exported” from (1) quickly industrialized Asian countries with huge populations – which follow a life-programme very similar to the Protestant ethics, but also face similar population problems in the medium-term, or (2) African or Near-Eastern countries where the mentality fundamentally differs from the Protestant life-programme, and which struggle with severe problems of a demographic boom. In the latter case, however, the cultural assimilation problem the host societies face will increase manifold.

3) THE LOST WILL TO POWER

The lost will to power is captured by a reflection emerging from the pages of the contribution by R. Cooper\textsuperscript{15}. Let us present two quotations from this author:

Nietzsche is arguing that justice originates not in the desire of the weak for protection, but in the tragic experience of the strong. The same argument could be applied to peaceful, postmodern systems of international relations. Whatever the truth of Nietzsche’s insight into the origins of justice, it is certain that the trauma of the twentieth century lies behind what might be described, in Nietzschean terms, as the loss of Europe’s will to power.” „The logic of European integration is that Europe should, sooner or later, develop common foreign policy and a common security policy and, probably, a common defense. But the world does not proceed by logic. It proceeds by political choice. None of this will happen unless Europe’s leaders want it and choose to make it happen.

4) THE LOST SPIRITUAL IDENTITY 16

It is extremely difficult to define the spiritual identity of Europe in a global context leaving the Christian tradition outside of our attention. To my mind the atheistic and agnostic segments of the European society could accept the Christian element in the spiritual identity of Europe as a civic value of instrumental character useful in the defense of the European spiritual Identity in a global context.

Naturally this crisis of the European civilization can be defined only in a multidimensional open minded perspective. It would be however very difficult to support a thesis – that the crisis of European civilization is only an eurosceptical dream.17


VII. The Bankruptcy versus the Renaissance of Europe

The multidimensional crisis of Europe can lead to the bankruptcy of Europe as a global power and as a dynamic society. In a pessimistic scenario the genteel surrender can transform itself into a rapid surrender. This is a scenario which could be considered by the Wroclaw Conference.

However, in this paper we find not only the pessimistic Lampedusian Scenario, but also the optimistic Ashian scenario.

The Lower Silesian Conference should consider the vision of a new Renaissance of Europe created *inter alia* by a new incarnation of the European Union as an ego stimulating the processes discovering again the European capacity for innovation, the European will to life, the European will to power and the European identity of the XXI century.

VIII. The great mission of the European Union of the XXI century

The *Europe 2020* document is not a charismatic document creating a climate of the great Mission of the European Union facing the enigma of the XXI century.

The unique opportunity of the Lower Silesian Conference is to outline some elements of a grand vision of a new incarnation of the European Union.

There are five elements of this vision:
1. The European Union as an inspiration and as a co-author of the revival of the Atlantic Community.
2. The European Union as an inspiration and co-author of a new global order leading to efficient cooperation of the grand civilizations of the XXI century\textsuperscript{18}.

3. The European Union as an important element of the global democratic space creating a strong countervailing power in relation to the growing role of the global autocratic space (J. Kornblum).

4. The European Union as an inspiration of multidimensional processes which are constantly creating the consecutive incarnations of dynamic and creative societies.

5. The European Union as a strong inspiration to promote new systems of education as an instrument to develop the idea of European identity in the minds of the young, European generations.

This Great Mission of the European Union can be outlined in different ways following different theoretical and pragmatic assumptions. There is no doubt, however, that the Wroclaw Conference will consider the challenges related to the Great Mission of the European Union facing the enigma of the XXI century\textsuperscript{19}.

IX. The Lower Silesian Conference
– The programmatic paper

This programmatic paper has a modest goal to try to create a substantial methodology and pragmatic framework to see the Lower Silesian Conference as a dynamic processes leading to new interpretations of the history and the future of Europe.

\textsuperscript{18} Compare B. Góralczyk, The European Union and China In the New World Order, Yearbook of Polish European Studies. Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, volume 12, 2009.

\textsuperscript{19} The weaknesses of the European union were exposed in the Greek case: the weaknesses of long term diagnosis, the weaknesses of long term strategy and the weaknesses of rapid crisis management, compare Dan Bilefsky, Europa added Greece as its Achilles heel, IHT May 5 2010.
This programmatic paper is trying to interpret the challenge that Anno Domini 2010 is a moment of truth in the history of Europe.

This moment of truth is an inspiration for the Lower Silesian Conference to develop a climate of historical urgency for the brainstorming discussion of three problems:
1. The multidimensional crisis Europe
2. The vision of a new European Renaissance
3. The new incarnation and the new role of the European Union.

The framework of the three leading problems is opening a field for pluralistic value judgments and interpretations. I am sure that all participants of the Conference will join the creative effort to answer the crucial problems related to the history and the future of Europe.

We have to develop the art to formulate holistic questions which are interpreting the crucial dynamic processes of structural change in Europe.

X. The Polish perspective

We note with great satisfaction that the “Europa Quo Vadis?” Conference in Wroclaw (June 10–13 2010) will have a sui generis counterpart in the “Polonia Quo Vadis?” Conference in Cracow June 17–18 201020.

Both these conferences could be seen as contributions to the spirit and letter of the Polish Presidency of the European Union Anno Domini 2011. Both of the conferences are a demonstration of the Polish art of strategic thinking trying to create opportunities for brainstorming discussions Europa Quo Vadis?, Polonia Quo Vadis?

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20 Compare A. Kukliński, K. Pawłowski, J. Woźniak, Polska wobec wyzwań XXI wieku (Poland facing the challenges of the XXI century), Kraków 2009.
XI. Modus operandi

In an optimistic interpretation this programmatic paper is opening a dynamic process leading to a path-breaking conference. The active participants of the conference are expected to send, if possible within four days, a comprehensive critical comment related to this programmatic paper. This paper and the set of comments will be printed in a pre-conference publication jointly with all outlines of the conference papers.

In this way the “Europa Quo Vadis” Conference will have a comprehensive and well organized starting point leading to an interesting conference, a promising post-conference volume and a medium-term international research program “Europa Quo Vadis”.

In this process, the group of the conference participations will change itself into a research community building up a new paradigm “Europa Quo Vadis”.

Warszawa–Wrocław, May 10 2010
THE RENAISSANCE OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC THINKING.
A PAPER FOR DISCUSSION*

INTRODUCTION

The success of the First Lower Silesian Conference “Europa Quo Vadis?” is an inspiration to develop an idea of the Second Lower Silesian Conference “The Renaissance of European Strategic Thinking”.

The general idea of this Conference was outlined on the last pages of the “Europa Quo Vadis” volume1. It is now time to open a new stage in the preparation of the Conference and to propose a sequence of topics which may be an inspiration for the construction of the next approximation of the Conference. Let us propose for your critical evaluation the following list of 10 topics:

I. The starting point for a preliminary definition of strategic thinking
II. The capacity of strategic thinking and the capacities to govern
III. The concept of strategic thinking
IV. Strategic thinking in different perceptions of development
V. The culture of strategic thinking
VI. The doctrines of strategic thinking
VII. Strategic thinking – the grand actors of the global scene

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VIII. The culmination of European strategic thinking of the XX century. The creation of the European Union
IX. The strategic deficit. The Achilles’ Heel of Europe
X. The renaissance of European strategic thinking. A feasible reality or a utopian dream.

Naturally this list can be formulated in different ways following different substantial and methodological assumptions. It is necessary, however, to outline the starting point of the discussion leading to the Programme of the Conference.

I. The starting point: the preliminary definition of strategic thinking

The selection of a single starting point is probably a simplistic proposal. I think, however, that chapter 2 of the book\textsuperscript{2} by Bob de Wit and Ron Meyer titled *Strategy synthesis* has some qualities which could attract our preliminary attention. \textbf{Especially important for the process of strategic thinking is the paradox of creative versus logical thinking which is well formulated in the book by the two Dutch Authors,} even though the book may be seen as too narrowly concentrating attention on the strategies of corporations\textsuperscript{3}.

In our Conference we need a much broader approach comparing strategies of international organizations, strategies of corporations, strategies of states and strategies of regions.

The proposal of a single starting point may be approved or rejected by the potential participants of the Wroclaw Conference – this kind of an approval/rejection debate will be a useful contribution to the creation of a brainstorming intellectual climate of the Conference.


II. THE CAPACITY OF STRATEGIC THINKING
AND THE CAPACITIES TO GOVERN

“The capacity to govern”4 is one of the best and most interesting Reports to the Club of Rome. The intellectual and institutional impact of this Report was rather limited. Perhaps the slightly dirigistic ideology of this Report was not fitting well into the philosophical climate of neoliberalism. Maybe it is advisable to read this Report once more as an indirect contribution to our Conference. We might be inclined to analyze the 38 Recommendations of Y. Dror, which were presented in a paper published in 20035. We should see the link integrating the improvement of the capacities of strategic thinking and the improvement of the capacity to govern. This link is not explicit in the Report, but we can make it explicit in our Conference.

This is probably a controversial suggestion following the controversial Report to the Club of Rome.

III. THE CONCEPT OF STRATEGIC THINKING6

There are six essential elements in the concept of strategic thinking:

1. Strategic thinking is the integration of knowledge, imagination and will, seen in a different perspective of time and space.
2. Strategic thinking is a holistic phenomenon incorporating the whole set of most important developmental process.

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3. Strategic thinking is a holistic phenomenon of long duration, understanding the role of continuation and even inertia of the historical experiences.

4. Strategic thinking is a holistic phenomenon trying to discover the turning points, which are introducing deep and relatively rapid structural changes in the system of factors and driving forces, shaping the processes of global development.

5. Strategic thinking is a holistic phenomenon incorporated in the domain of teleology – it is a system of goals defining the character of the given prospective reality.

6. Strategic thinking is a holistic phenomenon of the decision making domain – the domain of grand strategic choices.

The Conference may be interested to allocate some attention to see the permanent features of strategic thinking emerging in different historical experiences.

**IV. STRATEGIC THINKING IN DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT**

There is a vast field of publications related to the conceptual and pragmatic dimensions of development. In this context I would like to present only some reflections related to the question how the concept of strategic thinking is incorporated into different models of development.

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The renaissance of European Strategic Thinking

In the traditional perception we see a clear duality separating the spontaneous and leseferic development, being the creation of the free interplay of market forces, and the guided and dirigistic development. The duality is much less pronounced in the intellectual and political climate of the present pentagonal crisis.

In this context four theses can be formulated:

1. **Each development processes is both a spontaneous and guided process** – naturally in different conditions of time and space the relative power of those two components has different dimensions

2. At the turn of the XX and XXI century we observe the process of bankruptcy of the classical leseferism as the uncritical apotheosis of the miraculous mechanism of market forces and the process of bankruptcy of classical dirigisme as an uncritical apotheosis of the “always successful” intervention of the public authorities in the developmental processes

3. In this context we observe the emergence of a new concept of guided organic development defined as a system creating the conditions which stimulate pro-developmental strategic decisions in the economic, social, political, scientific and cultural domains

4. This concept of organic guided development opens new horizons for the expansion of strategic thinking as an intellectual and pragmatic construction. The capacity to master this construction is a *conditio sine qua non* of the survival of the given person, enterprise or institution in the competitive global scene of the XXI century.

V. The culture of strategic thinking

The cultures of strategic thinking are phenomena of long duration, which are deeply differentiated in time and space. In the processes of rise and fall of civilizations the role of the cultures of strategic thinking is very important.
In the framework of our Conference it would be impossible to outline the macro-historical and macro-geographical dimensions of the growth and diffusion of the cultures of strategic thinking. Let us say only that in different nations, different international organizations, different corporations and regions we can find different patterns of a complex set of phenomena which we call a culture of strategic thinking.

We hope that some examples of different cultures will be analyzed in the contributions to our Conference. Let us mention only a perspective of a comparative study analyzing the Polish and Finnish experiences in the field of strategic thinking.

VI. The doctrines of strategic thinking

In general terms a doctrine is a network of concepts and fundamental questions – an accumulation of historical experiences and patterns of behavior – a system of decision making process. A doctrine is in most cases represented by a subject with a strong institutional ego having the capacity to formulate the doctrine of strategic thinking and the capacity to implement this doctrine in the changing conditions of time and space.

If we restrict our attention to the history of doctrines developed in the framework of the long duration of the state as a subject of power, then we may mention six cases for comparative studies and discussions:
1. the British doctrine of strategic thinking;
2. the French doctrine of strategic thinking;
3. the German doctrine of strategic thinking;
4. the American doctrine of strategic thinking;
5. the Russian doctrine of strategic thinking;
6. the Chinese doctrine of strategic thinking.
Naturally, the label “the British”, “the French”, “the German” etc. doctrines is a simplification and a short cut in our discussion. We should rather use the term “the strategic doctrines” since in the history of strategic thinking of each nation there are times of long duration and times of turning points, times of the end of a doctrine and times of the emergence of a new one. At any moment of history in each country there are competing doctrines of strategic thinking. From this point of view we could analyze the contents of the brilliant volume *The Paradox of American Power*[^7]. The world of doctrines of strategic thinking is a grand galaxy of different ideas and experiences, patterns of success and failure. Maybe the national context is a useful framework for the interpretation of the emergence of different doctrines of strategic thinking.

**VII. Strategic thinking**

— THE GRAND ACTORS OF THE GLOBAL SCENE

Let us assume that on the global scene of the XXI century we will find a community of 1000 grand actors who have a sufficient capacity in terms of hard and soft power to participate in the processes of design and implementation of strategic thinking as an instrument to transform the global reality *in toto* or some fragments of this reality. The typology of the grand actors may indicate the following five groups of actors:

1. the national states as the classical ego of strategic thinking;
2. the international organizations as a new ego of strategic thinking which have emerged in the conditions of the XX century[^8];
3. the non-governmental organizations as new actors of the global scene;


4. the transnational corporations as a new important power house of strategic thinking;
5. the most important global metropolitan regions which are organizing the global space of the XXI century.

The global scene of the XXI century is a dynamic scene of deep transformations. Even more than that; we can observe processes of the decline of the old scene of the XX century and the emergence a new scene of the XXI century. **The new scene will be not dominated by the old actors of the Atlantic Community. It will be a pluralistic scene of competition and cooperation within a new network of global civilizations and a new global order.** This situation will create a new geography in the processes of creation and diffusion of new models of strategic thinking. Especially important in the context of our Conference is the competition of three models of strategic thinking – the European, the American and the Chinese models. In the next sections of our paper we will analyze the glory and misery of the European Model.

**VIII. The culmination of European strategic thinking of the XX century.
The creation of the European Union**

The creation of the European Union is the greatest institutional innovation of the XX century. The creation of the European Union is a monument of the power of European Strategic Thinking especially visible in the first stages of the development of the Union. Let us consider the two decades 1950–1970 as the pioneering stage in the development of the Union. Why was the Union created at just that time of European history?

To my mind we can outline three interpretations:

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1. Interpretation in terms of objective historical processes. The European Union has emerged as a light of hope after the *ten-ebrae* of Europe of the years 1914–1945. The tragedy of the divided Europe ruined by the two World Wars was a dramatic inspiration to open the trajectory leading to the building up of the united and integrated Europe.

2. Those objective historical processes found a heroic expression in the minds of grand charismatic personalities who created a vision of a United Europe and a *modus operandi* of the implementation of this vision. Let me mention only the personalities of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi. In our Conference we can allocate some attention to the heroic interpretation of the processes leading to the establishment of the European Union. The Polish participants in our Conference could use an excellent volume by Jerzy Łukaszewski to answer the question how the goal of Europe was promoted by nine grand personalities:

3. • Aristide Briand  
• Altiero Spinelli  
• Jean Monnet  
• Robert Schuman  
• Konrad Adenauer  
• Alcide de Gasperi  
• Paul Henri Spaak  
• Johan Willem Beyn

4. The heroic interpretation can be expressed in a more radical way. Let us quote the following opinion of Lukas Tsoukalis: „Regional integration in Europe has been mostly the product of an elitist conspiracy with good intentions and pretty remarkable results“.

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Let us say once more – the European Union was an instrument of the grand European strategic thinking. There is no doubt that in the pioneering time of the development of the European Union, the grand European strategic thinking was a real phenomenon.

Our Conference should try to explore the sources and experiences of this phenomenon:

1. Is this phenomenon a result of a deep change in the perception of the European history taking place in the minds of European nations and societies?
2. Is this phenomenon an expression of the historical power of charismatic personalities or even a result of an elitist conspiracy?

In this context we would like to formulate a controversial thesis: “The democratic deficit was highly visible in the processes leading to the establishment of the European Union. The democratic deficit was a *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of the European Union”.

* * *

It is necessary to note that the European strategic thinking of that time was influenced by the behavior of the leading global powers: the USA and the Soviet Union. *Primo* – the friendly behavior of the USA (especially the experience of the Marshal Plan) *Secundo* – the hostile behavior of the Soviet Union creating a dangerous challenge for the development of liberal democracy in Western Europe.

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Our Conference should try to test the thesis that the creation of the European Union is a monument to European Strategic Thinking of the XX century.
IX. THE STRATEGIC DEFICIT. THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF EUROPE

The Second Lower Silesian Conference should revive the spirit of the path-breaking Conference titled “The Sound of Europe” which was organized in Salzburg 27–28 January 2006 in the framework of the Austrian EU Presidency. The post-conference volume is available online at www.europaeische-rundschau.at. The rich and inspiring content of the volume has not lost its validity to the present day. Just the opposite, it has a special meaning now in the conditions of the great global crisis, in the conditions of the crisis of Europe, and in the conditions of the crisis of the European Union. To my mind the key thesis of that conference was formulated by Werner Weidenfield: “The strategic deficit: The Achilles’ Heel of Europe”.

This thesis is explained by Werner Weidenfield in the following way:

But even if the EU clears this hurdle, will Europe be in a position to use its potential effectively, to become a mature political actor both internally and externally? Essentially, Europe lacks not only an operational center to fulfill this role, more importantly it lacks strategic thinking. Europe’s great powers have all lost much of their place on the global stage. None of these states has developed the will to compensate for the national loss of global standing by developing it at the European level. The deficit in strategic thinking thus proves to be the actual Achilles heel of Europe.
There is no agenda that could give Europe direction in crises and conflicts. The big thinkers, people who would be capable

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not only of conceptualizing Europe's strategic role but also of implementing it, are at present nowhere in sight. Only when Europe manages to develop a culture of strategic thinking will it gain a significant ability to shape events internally and externally, and thus keep its place on the world stage over the long term. To many decision-makers, this seems like too distant a question, given the acute internal problems facing EU and its member states. They would be well advised, however, to consider this question today. Coming to terms with change will continue to be a key task for the European project and the ability to structure developments will be decisive for Europe's ability to face the future.

In this long quotation each sentence is a valid observation and a value judgment. Let us explore some fundamental questions emerging from Werner Weidenfield's thesis:

1. Will Europe become a mature political actor both internally and externally?
2. Europe lacks strategic thinking; Europe's great powers are not willing to develop the global standing of Europe.
3. There is no agenda, there are no big thinkers who would be capable to conceptualize Europe's strategic role.
4. Europe must develop the culture of strategic thinking to keep its place on the world stage over the long run.
5. In order to face the future Europe has to eliminate its dangerous weakness. The strategic deficit. We can call this deficit the Achilles' Heel of Europe. We can also call this deficit the Gordian Knot of Europe – this latter expression is opening the way to consider the feasibility of a set of Alexandrian Solutions.

After five years, in 2011 the strategic deficit of Europe is more painful than the Achilles' Heel and more complicated than a Gordian Knot. The Alexandrian Solutions are practically removed from the landscape of the future.

The deficit of strategic thinking is a tragic challenge for Europe facing the greatest reconfiguration of the global scene
in the last 500 years. In this spirit, let us read once more the brilliant observation and value judgment presented by Werner Weidenfield and by the comprehensive content of the volume *The sound of Europe*.

**X. THE RENAISSANCE OF EUROPEAN STRATEGIC THINKING. A FEASIBLE REALITY OR A UTOPIAN DREAM**

A crisis is not only a symbol of misfortune or even despair. A crisis is also an environment creating a historical necessity to cut the Gordian Knots and find Alexandrian Solutions. There is no doubt that the great pentagonal crisis is also a deep structural crisis of Europe, of the European Union, and of the European strategic thinking. In this spirit we should analyze:

*Primo* – the pattern of success which was leading to the creation of the European Union as a monument of European Strategic Thinking of the XX century;

*Secundo* – the pattern of failures leading to the crisis or even break-down of European Strategic Thinking in the decade 2000–2010. The Weidenfield thesis could be a very efficient instrument to organize our thinking in this field;

*Tertio* – we should formulate a question if in the decades 2010–2030 we will find a pattern of success or a pattern of failure.

The Alexandrian Solution will suggest that in the years 2010–2030 we have to invent a new model of European strategic thinking leading to a new incarnation of the Union as an actor of the global scene.

We can ask a fundamental question if it is possible in the years 2010–2030 to re-create the innovative spirit of the years 1950–1970.

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15 Compare *Futurology* op.cit. p. 27.
This question sounds as nonsense and *prima facie* there is no way to avoid a negative answer.

We have, however, to consider this simple truth that a negative answer is a verdict for Europe to be an element of a new global periphery located between the expanding American and Chinese megaspaces.

**The renaissance of European Strategic Thinking is not only a problem of wisdom and imagination; it is a problem of an honorable survival of Europe as a grand actor of the global scene.**

## Conclusion

In the perception of The Second Lower Silesian Conference – The Renaissance of European Strategic Thinking we should hear not only the cognitive and pragmatic “Sound of Europe”. We should not be afraid to promote a sound of *pathos* for Europe: a sound of passions and emotions in the interpretation of the future of Europe.

**The mission of a New Renaissance of Europe**\(^\text{16}\) including the renaissance of European strategic thinking should be promoted not only in academic, political and business communities. This mission should be internalized by the European Societies in toto. **This is an extremely difficult mission, but this is not a mission impossible.**

* * *

In this conclusion, I would like to say once more that this is only a note for discussion which might not be free from factographic mistakes and wrong value judgments.

Please join us in our efforts to create an interesting cognitive, pragmatic and full of *pathos* climate of the Wroclaw Conference. Please try to support the Conference by presenting new ideas,

observations and approaches. The Conference in Wroclaw should not be seen as a business as usual Conference. This Conference should be seen as a contribution in the processes of the development of new approaches promoting the renaissance of European Strategic Thinking\textsuperscript{17}. [...] 

March 12 2011

\textsuperscript{17} European Commission Investing in Europe's future, Brussels November 2010.
Europa Quo Vadis reconsidered.
A note for discussion*

Introduction

The fascinating question “Europa Quo Vadis?” was formulated by the Lower Silesian Conference which took place in Wroclaw in June 2010. The post-conference volume published in December 20101 is a collection of 33 papers prepared by eminent authors – adding new dimensions concerning the analysis of the past, the present and the future of Europe. The substance of the volume is organized in four parts:

Part two: Transformations of Europe.
Part three: Europe facing the challenges of the XXI century.
Part four: the future of European regions.

The substance of the volume is a challenge for conventional wisdom and political correctness. In the volume we find a diagnosis of the present state of Europe. The volume is trying to face the motto by Jose Manuel Barroso “This is Europe’s moment of truth. It is time to be bold and ambitious”2. The intellectual and pragmatic climate of the volume is incorporated into a deep stream of critical thinking related to the past, the present and the future

2 Postconference volume p. 13.
of Europe. The final message of the volume is however optimistic: “We will find a way out in the labyrinth of the present crisis of Europe. The XXI century will be a scene of a new European Renaissance”.

To keep the spirit of the controversial discussion I would like to outline in my present paper – titled Europa Quo Vadis reconsidered – a pessimistic vision of Europe as the real Titanic of the XXI century³. In September 2011 we are overwhelmed by the force of the global, pentagonal crisis⁴ and by an emerging vision of a holistic, multidimensional break-down of Europe. This is a very pessimistic vision, which means more than a decline of Europe. It sees the break-down of Europe as an discontinuity in the processes of long duration. The break-down of Europe is a holistic breakdown incorporating five dimensions:

1. the breakdown of European civilization
2. the breakdown of demographic potential
3. the breakdown of social potential
4. the breakdown of economic potential
5. the breakdown of political potential
6. the breakdown of European cohesion.

### The breakdown of European civilization

The history of European civilization⁵ is a phenomenon of long duration. For 500 years the European civilization was a leading civilization in the global scale. Hinc et nunc the European civil-

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⁴ A. Kukliński, Megaspaces of the XXI century. Ministry of Regional development, Warsaw 2011, in next quotations called the Megaspaces. This text is available from patrycja.artymowska@mrr.gov.pl.

zation is losing this status and trying to find a proper place in the multidimensional global scene in the XXI century.

We are afraid, however, that this discontinuity is not only a decline in the global role of the European civilization, but also a deep break-down of the civilization. This break-down has three dimensions:

1. **the breakdown of the system of values** seen as an integrated interpretation of three canons reflected in individual and social value judgments:
   - the canon of good and evil;
   - the canon of truth and falsity;
   - the canon of beauty and ugliness.
   These three canons of ethics, logics and esthetics have been the foundation of the European system of values since antiquity to the middle of the XX century. **The postmodernistic revolution has rejected the universal validity of these three canons leading to the destruction of the European system of values.**

2. **the breakdown of the European civilization as a system of honest and responsible pattern of behavior.** For a very long time the virtues of honesty and responsibility were accepted in the individual and social dimension. These important features of the European civilization have almost totally evaporated from the new reality emerging in the last fifty years.

3. **the breakdown of the identity of the European civilization** as a foundation of the cohesion of the European society.

   **The hypothesis of the break-down of the European civilization is opening a field of a really controversial discussion leading to different interpretations in the framework of our studies trying to answer the question “Europa Quo Vadis?”**

   We hope that the interpretation of the break-down of European civilization as a field of interaction of values, behaviors and identities can be seen as a useful inspiration.
The shrinking demographic potential of Europe is a great tragedy of our continent. The shrinking demographic potential is a sui generis suicide of the European society, which is not able or not willing to create conditions for sustained demographic development. The break-down of the demographic sustainability of Europe is leading to the decline of the global status of Europe. This breakdown has also far reaching implications in the field of the regional demographic structure of Europe. The European Union should promote a comprehensive set of demographic studies analyzing the democratic landscape of Europe in the years 2010–2020–2030–2040–2050.

The reconfiguration of the landscape will discover a new duality of the European regions:

1. the strong dynamic regions growing even in the conditions of demographic decline in Europe.
2. The weak stagnating regions dominated by shrinking populations. A new type of regions and localities will emerge in the map of Europe: the dying regions and localities.

The shrinking European demography will open the gates for large scale flows of immigration which will transform a growing number of regional societies. This transformation will change the substance of the European civilization, which may lose the status of the dominating civilization in some European regions.

The break-down of the demographic potential in Europe is not only a problem of some distant future. It is an urgent problem hinc et nunc. It is difficult to understand why this problem

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6 Compare P. Szukalski in the postconference volume.

7 Compare P. Szukalski op. cit.
was not even mentioned in the fundamental document of the European Union Europe 2020.

**The break-down of social potential**

The dynamic innovative and creative society was for a very long time the engine of Europe’s development and of Europe’s role in world history.

*Hinc et nunc* the performance of this engine is rather low. Roman Galar in his Cracovian paper has presented a fascinating analysis of the crisis of the culture of experiment in Europe.

The whole system of the European Union is not able to promote strong inducements developing a creative and innovative society. The break-down of Europe is at least partially explained by the deficiencies of the primary, secondary and tertiary education in Europe. In the evaluation of the social potential in Europe we should note also the very slow progress of the processes which create the European Society. The European Union was able to create an integrated European economy, we can say that in the global scale we see the identity of the European economy. **However, the identity of an European Society has not yet emerged in the processes of European integration.** In the social dimension Europe is still an aggregation of national societies.

The present pentagonal crisis is creating centrifugal forces which diminish the European society in statu nascendi.

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8 Compare Postconference volume.


10 Compare The third Cracovian Conference, Kraków 2011.
The resources of the European economy are just immense in terms of traditions, wealth and productive capacities. But these productive capacities are less dynamic than the capacities of the USA or China. This “less dynamic” economic growth of Europe is explored in the papers of J. Kotyński\textsuperscript{11} and S. Szukalski\textsuperscript{12}.

I will not present the content of these papers which were published in the post-conference volume. I will add only a comment important from the point of view of the break-down of the economic potential of Europe. In the International Herald Tribune of July 19 2011 we find the following information “Germany builds future beyond the EU export and investment are increasingly moving to emerging countries”.

A new phenomenon was noticed in this piece of information: some German enterprises are moving the center of gravity of their enterprises from Germany to China. In a pessimistic interpretation this phenomenon can be described as the beginning of a new trend of translocation of the German productive capacities from Germany to China. This is not outsourcing it is a \textit{de facto} emigration of the German enterprise from Germany to China.

This is a new interpretation of the flows of FDI. We should observe the movement in the center of gravity of the European and American enterprises leaving the less dynamic environment for the more dynamic environments. If this phenomenon changes itself into a translocation of a very large scale then the \textbf{emigration of the European enterprise} will be an important factor in the break-down of the economic potential of Europe.

\textsuperscript{11} Compare J. Kotyński in the Postconference volume.
\textsuperscript{12} Compare S. Szukalski in the Postconference volume.
THE BREAKDOWN OF POLITICAL POTENTIAL OF EUROPE

The European Union was the greatest institutional innovation of the XX century. The European Union has created a new political potential of Europe promoting a climate of peace, cooperation and prosperity. The institutional, substantial and territorial enlargement of the Union was a very efficient political, social and economic process. It was assumed that the Union was creating a new type of international organization.

The *acquis communautaire* and the free flows of persons, commodities, information and capital created a new megaspace\(^\text{13}\) which is a phenomenon of a higher order in relation to the classical megaspaces constituted by countries, mezzospaces of regions and microspaces of localities.

In 2007 the evaluation of the 50 years of experiences of the European Union was very optimistic. There was no doubt that in 2057 we will have a glorious centenary of the European Union.

However, the great pentagonal crisis of 2008–2012 is at the same time a deep crisis of the European Union, shaking the foundations of its existence. The crisis has exposed five weaknesses of the Union\(^\text{14}\)

1. the culture of connivance
2. the paralysis of procedural perfection
3. the strategic blindness
4. the deficit of real solidarity
5. the deficit of federal solutions.

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\(^{13}\) Compare, *The Megaspaces*, op.cit.

\(^{14}\) Compare *The Megaspaces*, op.cit.
The culture of connivance

Let me quote the final conclusion of the brilliant note by John Vinocour titled *Frankness would serve Europe well*:\(^\text{15}\):

> At that rate, this question holds for now: How does Europe advance from what has been described as its culture of connivance to a community convincingly committed to the ruthlessness of truth?

Connivance is described by the Webster’s Third New International Dictionary:\(^\text{16}\) as an “intentional failure to notice or discover a wrong doing”. J. Vinocour is suggesting that the European Commission already in 2001 had a knowledge concerning the real situation in Greece. This knowledge was not used, due to the culture of connivance, which is pathology to be eliminated by “the ruthlessness of the truth”. This is an extremely difficult, maybe impossible, task for the European Union. We should try at least to diminish the impact of connivance in the decision-making processes of the European Union.

The paralysis of procedural perfection

There are two perceptions of the European Union: *Primo* – the Union as a world of procedures

*Secundo* – the Union as a world of realities.

*Prima facie* the answer is very simple. The Union is an integrated phenomenon of two worlds: the world of procedures and the world of realities. The world of procedures should be seen as

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\(^{15}\) J. Vinocour, *Frankness would serve Europe well*: “The idea that EU can muddle through without cathartic change looks feeble”, IHT May 25 2010.

\(^{16}\) Volume 1, Chicago 1986 p. 481.
secondary in relation to the world of realities. In the last decade, however, we observe a tendency of a growing gap separating the world of procedures and the world of realities. The main stream of the activity of the Union is more and more consumed by the world of procedures. The procedural perfection is changing itself into the main mission of the Union. Maybe we can even use the term “the trap of procedural perfection”.

There are two trajectories promoting the domination of the world of procedures.

Primus – the “natural” trajectory incorporated in the history of all institutions which accepts the growing procedural perfection as an indicator of the growing quality of the institution.

Secundo – the difficulty to grasp the growing complexity of the reality of the European Union, especially after the enlargement of the Union.

We need a critical reflection challenging the domination of the world of procedures in the European Union. Perhaps the following comments may be useful in this context:

1. The creation of a perfect world of procedures is an illusion outside the capacity of our mind.
2. The interaction of the world of procedures and the world of realities is the foundation of the modus operandi of the Union.
3. In the world of procedures there must be a place for experimentation, for trial and error, for the creative and innovative human mind.
4. The procedure is not a final value; it is only an instrument to grasp the comprehensive reality.

It is an open question if the reversal of the mentality of the European Union is possible. The Union should be dominated by the

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17 Compare the brilliant diagnosis by R. Kuźniar: “The power of the Union and its member states is allocated to serve the procedures and mechanism. The idea of integration is losing its importance including the metaphysical side which was empowering the policies of integration”. The European Union has found itself in a situation of relatively permanent incapacity for strategic activities” R. Kuźniar, The 100 year anniversary of the European Union in Polish published in Polska Mysł Strategiczna. Biuletyn PTE, kwiecień 2011, wydanie specjalne.
world of realities. The worlds of procedures are not a final value; they are only an important instrument to grasp and guide the processes shaping the reality.

The strategic blindness

The European Union has created a comprehensive, competent and efficient machinery of short- and medium-term programming. This machinery is working very well in the scale of the European Commission and in the scale of the institutions of the countries, regions and localities which function inside the European Union. The methodology of short- and medium-term planning is an excellent instrument in the management of the business as usual activities of the European Union. This methodology is very deeply incorporated in all dimensions of the modus operandi of the European Commission. The long term strategic thinking is outside the limits of this methodology. So we can formulate a paradox: the European Union has developed impressive capacities in the field of short- and medium-term programming. At the same time the European Union is strategically blind.

Strategic thinking is a field emerging in the bold encounter of grand visions of the future and very deep comprehensive and critical diagnoses of the experiences of the past. Unfortunately the European Union was not able to create propitious intellectual and moral climates for diagnostic and visionary thinking. Maybe the culture of connivance and the incapacity to accept the ruthlessness of the truth has created the strategic blindness of the European Union. This is a controversial and complicated problem deserving intensive and well-focused attention.

The European Civilization represents splendid traditions in the field of culture of strategic thinking. The creation of the European Union in 1957 is a great monument to the capacity of strategic thinking.\footnote{Compare J. Łukaszewski, \textit{Cel: Europa, dziewięć esejów o budowniczych jedności europejskiej}, Noire sur Blanc, Warszawa 2002.}
The present strategic blindness of the Union is a rather exceptional situation. **The renaissance of strategic thinking in Europe is not a utopian dream. It is a feasible reality of the XXI century.**

**The deficit of real solidarity**

The greatest idea of the European Union is the idea of **European solidarity.** The solidarity of nations, societies, governments, corporations, regions, political, economic, social and cultural communities, academic communities, business communities, religious communities. **There is no future for Europe, no future for the European Union without the foundation of the European solidarity.** This solidarity is a phenomenon of long duration demonstrated not only in times of development and success, but also in times of crisis and dramatic difficulties.\(^1\)

Europe and the European Union will be not able to face the new challenges of the reconfiguration of the global scene without a deep reconsideration of the European solidarity. The European Union torn apart by egoistic national motivations will shift itself into the shadows of new global peripheries of the XXI century.

In this contribution we are accepting a broader interpretation of the European solidarity than the conventional interpretation in the framework of cohesion policies. The difficult situation of the European Union in the present pentagonal global crisis is demonstrating how grave the challenges for the real European solidarity are. We must have the moral capacity and the courage to face these challenges in theoretical and pragmatic terms.

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\(^1\) The idea of European Solidarity is torn into pieces in the storm of the present discussion related to the next EU budget. Compare P. Taylor, *A bad time to ask more money*, IHT May 3 2011.
The deficit of federal solutions

There is no disagreement that the European Union should be an important actor of the changing global scene. There is no disagreement that the European Union should be an important co-author of the new global order of the XXI century.

There is however a loud silence (cum tacent clamant) in answering the fundamental question if the present institutional structure of the European Union is not a barrier against assuming the global responsibility by the European Union.

This new global responsibility can be designed and implemented only by a new European Union which incorporates federal solutions into the modus operandi of the Union. The current wisdom and political correctness have practically eliminated the case for a Federal Union from the field of attention of the public opinion and political elites. The proposals of Joschka Fisher presented five years ago are just forgotten.

This is a wrong policy. We should have the courage to discuss the case of the Federal Union as an important problem of the future of Europe. We should try to design a new model of an European Federation as a new original model which will open a new chapter in the global experiences of federalism.

* * *

The Greek drama has ruthlessly exposed the fundamental weaknesses of the decision-making machinery of the European Union and in more general terms the fundamental weakness of the whole institutional system of the Union.

The connivance, the strategic blindness, the deficit of real solidarity, the deficit of federal solutions are creating a dramatic climate of a break-down of the Union in the present institutional shape. The threat of the dissolution of the European

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20 Compare How to save euro? The Economist, September 17 2011.
Union is a real danger. The present European Union has no future. A new European Union must be invented.

*   *   *

THE BREAK-DOWN OF EUROPE IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The present multidimensional break-down of Europe is a real phenomenon which should be seen in a long historical perspective of the European experience. Let us mention only 1914\(^{21}\) as a break-down point of liberal and monarchistic Europe. This break-down found a brilliant analysis in the opus magnum of N. Davies. The great crisis of the 1929 is another example of a break-down – a break-down of the leseferic model of capitalism. How to define the essence of a great historical breakdown by trying to find common features of 1914–1929 and 2008?

THE PAPER EUROPA QUO VADIS RECONSIDERED

This paper was not written in crudo radice. It is just a footnote to two volumes which integrate valid contributions analyzing the break-down of Europe\(^{22}\). These volumes were written in a less dramatic language exploring the dilemma of strong versus weak Europe.

In this paper we use much more dramatic expressions. The break-down of Europe is seen as a cumulative process of the break-down of the European Civilization, of the European

\(^{21}\) Compare N. Davies op.cit.

\(^{22}\) The Postconference volume op.cit.; the Titanic volume op.cit
demography, of the European society and the economy and a breakdown of the political order of Europe.

* * *

THE LOWER SILESIAN CONFERENCES.
THE LOWER SILESIAN FORUM EUROPA QUO VADIS?

The Lower Silesian Conferences 2010 and 2011 have created a network of personalities inclined to participate in discussions related to the past, present and the future of Europe. The network should be a framework for the expression of controversial observations and value judgments. I hope that my paper titled Europa Quo Vadis Reconsidered will be recognized as a useful contribution to this discussion. The bold analysis of the break-down of Europe is not excluding the next step in our studies. The break-down of Europe is a fact, but the real tragedy is hidden in the question if this break-down of Europe is irreversible.  

September 20 2011

23 Compare The end of Monnet. The debt crisis is exposing problems in the basic design of the European Union. The Economist September 3 2011.
Part III

THE CASE OF POLAND
THE DILEMMA – INNOVATION VERSUS IMITATION IN A HISTORICAL AND FUTURE ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE*. THE CASE OF POLAND**

INTRODUCTION

I would like to propose the following thematic organization of this paper:
I. The conceptual framework.
II. The case of Soviet Union.
III. The case of China.
IV. The case of Latin America
V. The case of the European Union.
VI. The case of Poland – the golden ages of Poland as an innovative country.
VII. The transformation of Poland 1990–2010. Two decades of success – two lost decades?
VIII. The map of innovative Europe. The weak position of Poland.
IX. The vision of a new innovative Poland 2050. A feasible reality or a utopian dream?
X. The future of Europe – two scenarios.
XI. Innovation versus imitation. A proposal of a research programme.

I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

It is not easy to find a proper conceptual framework for the reflection related to the dilemma – innovation versus imitation. As a first approximation please consider table I.

In the interpretation of this table the following formulations can be discussed:
1) There are three foundations of the innovative society and economy: knowledge – imagination – freedom.

Table I
The innovative versus imitative society and economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society and economy</th>
<th>innovative</th>
<th>imitative</th>
<th>dynamic</th>
<th>stagnant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>innovative</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>imitative</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>dynamic</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stagnant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) A process of permanent and comprehensive innovation is the main driving force in the long-term development of society and economy.
3) The process of imitation in different historical and geographical situations functions as a supplement or a substitute for the innovation process. The climate of creative imitation can be an inducement for endogenous innovation processes. The climate of passive imitation can destroy the endogenous climate of innovation.
4) In the interpretation of table 1 the distinction between innovation prone and innovation averse societies\(^1\) may be very useful.
5) It is an open question to what extent the civil society\(^2\) is a direct, strong driving force in the development of innovation processes.

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Maybe the contribution of the civil society in this field is rather indirect, acting via promotion of social capital as an important element of the innovation processes.

6) In the discussion of the proposed framework please consider the conceptual map presented on p. 412 of the volume *Europe – two strategic choices*. The central place of innovation in this conceptual map should be noted.

II. The case of the Soviet Union

In the interpretation of the experiences of the Soviet Union, T. Zarycki has presented an interesting comment explaining the failure of the imitation policies designed and implemented in the Soviet Union. So the Soviet drama was a great historical failure in the field of innovation policies and in the field of creative imitation of the global technological development.

III. The case of China

The different interpretations of the Chinese experiences, stressing the sunny side or the shadow side of those experiences

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3 A. Kukliński, K. Pawłowski (eds) *Europe – the strategic choices*, Nowy Sącz 2005 – in the next quotations this volume will be quoted as “Europe...”.


are opening the grand question if China will be able to overcome the gap separating the imitative and innovative economy and society. Without a solution to this dramatic problem China will not achieve the status of a first class global power.

Is it possible to develop in China an innovation economy and society based on knowledge, imagination and freedom?

IV. The case of Latin America

In the context of our discussion I would like to quote a fragment analyzing the experiences of Latin America. This analysis is a dramatic indication of deep structural similarities linking the experiences of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe.

Naturally “omnis comparatio claudicat” – so the similarities are not incorporating all details and specific features. However, it is a fascinating paradox that the Polish scene is *grosso modo* correctly captured by Latin American authors analyzing the Latin American Scene.

*External obstacles to access knowledge from global science are important. However, the inability of scientific and technological communities of developing countries to gain endogenous economic and political support for their activities appears as a major limitation for this access. Insufficient resources for research, even in countries that could easily allocate important funds for these activities, are shown to be an important barrier to access knowledge, in a word where scientific and technological information is increasingly marketed and expensive. The dynamics leading to low efficiency equilibriums of scientific and technological activities is characterized in this section, based on the experience of some Latin American countries.*

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National scientific communities do not form automatically or as the result of market or other spontaneous social forces. Quite the opposite, the free play of these forces tends to bring developing countries and their scientific communities into low efficiency equilibriums. In those unfortunately stable equilibriums, scientific communities are extremely reduced and stagnant. Structures of production and diffusion of both scientific and technological knowledge need some form of collective action to ensure access to high-efficiency equilibriums, where production and use of knowledge are sufficient and capable of sustaining moderate to high rates of growth. The situation of these communities may be characterized as a trap, in the sense that no endogenous forces disturb the low efficiency equilibrium. Three questions may be raised concerning the stability of the trap, which is advanced as a main obstacle to access knowledge: why, if knowledge is a recognized determinant of growth and social development, do governments and politicians of developing countries end up putting science and technology as a low priority? Why do private sector firms in those countries not resort to scientific communities for the knowledge they require? Why are science and technology communities in these countries so rarely mobilized as a political force in favour of knowledge?

The last three questions at the end of this long quotation require an answer also in the conditions of the Polish scene (the questions emphasized in bold by A.K.).

V. The case of the European Union

The fundamental doctrine of the EU is very well presented by two comprehensive papers published in the volume Europe – the
strategic choices\textsuperscript{8}. I think it is necessary in this context to quote the following comment by R. Galar\textsuperscript{9}:

The main competitive asset of Europe used to be freedom, not perfection. At present perfection receives more and more attention, while freedom is being pushed to the preserves of procedural democracy and unconventional lifestyles. The progressing degradation of the once paramount innovative prominence of Europe might be a direct consequence of this shift. Perfection is tempting as it allows to squeeze most from the existing opportunities. Freedom is necessary as to explore opportunities not yet identified, what is the essence of adaptation. It is needed to open the doors into the world of trial and error, spontaneity and soft selection, where subsequent waves of priorities and high-techs emerge rather than are decreed. The specific predicament of the present European might be that its S&T sector and economy are both: not free enough to compete with the US in opening new innovative horizons, and not perfect enough to compete with the East Asian cultures in exploitation of new technologies.

We can find a much stronger critical comment in the recent paper by T. Zarycki\textsuperscript{10} formulating a provocative thesis: “There is no doubt that the European Union similarly to the past Soviet experiences is more and more clearly falling into the classical trap of imitation.”

Naturally this is a strong and maybe false judgment. There is no doubt, however, that this judgment should be discussed seriously and not rejected \textit{a priori}. The dilemma innovation versus

\textsuperscript{8} H. Delanghe, U. Muldur, \textit{From vicious to virtuous cycle. Europe – growth and knowledge based economy} and J.M. Rousseau, \textit{Constructing XXI century economies by reshaping the European Society} – both papers in \textit{Europe – the strategic choices Reupus} volume 2 [...].

\textsuperscript{9} R. Galar, \textit{Adaptive versus managerial approach in S and T Policy in Europe}, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{10} T. Zarycki, op.cit.
imitation is deeply related to the center – periphery problem in Europe. *Ceteris paribus*, the centre is strong and innovative and the periphery is weak and imitative.

There are different delimitations of the centre and periphery in Europe. I think, however, that map 1 – Knowledge Flows between European Regions as captured by Interfirm Patent Citations in High Technology Sector (1985–2002) is the best definition. The map is reproduced from M.M. Fisher et alii\(^\text{11}\).

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**Map 1**  
Knowledge Flows between European Regions

The paper of M.M. Fisher et alii\textsuperscript{12} is presenting an excellent documentation for the discussion of the double dilemma – innovation versus imitation, center – versus periphery in Europe.

VI. THE CASE OF POLAND – THE GOLDEN AGES OF POLAND AS AN INNOVATIVE COUNTRY

There were two really golden ages in the history of Poland\textsuperscript{13}: the XV and XVI century in the era of the Jagiellonian Poland. At that time Poland was an innovative country having an innovative society, an innovative political system, an innovative army, and innovative science and culture.

The most glorious symbol of the innovative power of the Jagiellonian Poland was Nicolaus Copernicus\textsuperscript{14}. His \textit{opera omnia} are not only a reflection of his knowledge and imagination but also of the climate of political, religious, and intellectual freedom which prevailed in the Jagiellonian Poland. This climate was more an exception than a rule in Europe of that time.

VII. THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLAND 1990–2010. TWO DECADES OF SUCCESS. TWO LOST DECADES?

I would like to explain the paradox incorporated in the title of this section of my paper. The two decades are and will be seen as the time of successful transformation of Poland into a democratic

\textsuperscript{12} M.M. Fisher, op.cit.


country incorporating an economic system which is an integral part of the global capitalist economy\textsuperscript{15}. The political, economic and social transformation of Poland is a success especially in comparison with these countries of Eastern Europe which were not able to design and implement comprehensive transformation of the economy, society, and the political system.

However, the two decades are at the same time two lost decades\textsuperscript{16} in this sense that the Polish transformation was not designed and implemented as a strategic transformation towards an innovative, knowledge based society and economy.

The consecutive governments of Polonia Restituta were not able to design and implement a grand set of innovation policies in two dimensions:

1) the direct dimension
2) the indirect dimension.

The principle of the presence of a motivation to innovate in all policies of the public authorities\textsuperscript{17} (economic policy, social policy, regional policy, education policy etc.) was not observed, even though innovation could be seen as an ideology of comprehensive transformation of the society, economy and governance\textsuperscript{18}.

Two historical chances were lost to promote such a set of comprehensive innovation policies.

The first chance was the beginning of the Polish transformation in the early nineties. It was the time of eruption – the creation of

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\textsuperscript{18} J. Routti, Research and innovation in Finland – in Europe, op.cit. Compare also: Charlemagne, In praise of Finland, Economist, July 8\textsuperscript{th} 2006. Compare also: M. Castells, P. Himainen, The information society and the Finish Model, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 2002.
two millions capitalistic enterprises\textsuperscript{19} in Poland. At that time there was a chance to inject the spirit of technological innovation into the emerging community of the Polish enterprises by well designed, long-term innovation policies. This chance was lost.

The second chance was created by the first years of the Polish membership in the European Union. This was a chance to seize the opportunities created by the European Union for the promotion of innovative society and economy in Poland\textsuperscript{20}.

This means not that no progress was achieved over these two decades. We can produce a long list of specific achievements in many fields of economy, science, and technology\textsuperscript{21}. We cannot claim, however, that the two decades have created a firm foundation for the development of innovative society and economy of Poland of the XXI century. The gap separating Poland from Finland in the field of innovation and knowledge based economy is just immense.

\section*{VIII. The map of innovative Europe. The weak position of Poland}


This contribution is presenting a consistent input – output methodology as a tool of the evaluation of the national innovation performance. I am convinced that this contribution could be considered


as a general background and perhaps a common denominator for all papers submitted to our Conference.

In the context of my paper I would like to present only the classification of European countries based on the Summary Innovation Index (SII):

*Based on their SII score and the growth rate of the SII, the European countries can be divided in four groups:*

- Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany make up the group of “Leading countries”.
- France, Luxembourg, Ireland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Norway, Italy and Iceland all belong to the group of countries showing “Average performance”.
- Countries “Catching up” are Slovenia, Hungary, Portugal, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece, Cyprus and Malta.
- Countries “Losing ground” are Estonia, Spain, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey.

The judgment that Poland is “losing ground” in the field of innovative performance should be taken very seriously by the Polish government, the Polish political elites, and by the Polish society *in toto*.

**IX. THE VISION OF A NEW INNOVATIVE POLAND 2050. A FEASIBLE REALITY OR A UTOPIAN DREAM**

Poland has all capacities and chances to develop an innovative society and economy as an active and creative member of the European Union.\(^{22}\) Poland has however a dramatic deficiency being a dual country represented not by one integrated society but by two

\(^{22}\) A. Kukliński – see footnote 19.
societies. An innovation prone and an innovation-averse society. If in the future the innovation prone society will have the prevailing power to determine the substance of the country, then Poland will be developed into an innovative society and economy. If however the innovation-averse society will have the prevailing power to determine the fate of the country, then Poland will change itself into a firm element of the European and global periphery. The most talented young generations will leave the country to live and work outside Poland attracted by better conditions created by innovative economies and societies. In pessimistic, probably wrong, evaluations some elements of this dark scenario are already emerging. We have to contra spem sperare that this dark scenario will not prevail and that the scenario of the innovation prone society will be responsible for the future of Poland of the XXI century.

It is very difficult to answer the question if the vision of a new innovative Poland 2050 is a feasible reality or only a utopian dream. The duality of Poland is not an exception in the European landscape of the XXI century.

Mutatis mutandis we can say that such countries as France, Germany, and Italy are also dual societies unable to face the real dramatic choices of the global scene of the XXI century. The list of dual societies is growing very quickly. The latest spectacular example is the USA. Naturally, the criteria of duality may be different in particular countries. There is however a strong genus proximum. The division of a country into two parts results in difficulties in establishing a common future.

X. The future of Europe. Two scenarios

At the turn of the XX and XXI century Europe is facing a very deep structural crisis in three dimensions:

\[\text{23 Compare two contributions in IHT, July 5th 2006: G. Lakaff, Divided America. Reclaim the meaning of freedom and J. Tierney, Disunited States of America.}\]
1) the crisis of the capacity to create breakthrough innovations\textsuperscript{24}. The spirit of grand innovations and creativity was replaced by the routine of perfection of the already existing solutions;

2) the demographic crisis\textsuperscript{25} – the loss of will to live as a dynamic European community in global context;

3) the political crisis – the loss of Europe’s will to power\textsuperscript{26}.

The pessimistic scenario is assuming that the present crisis of Europe will have a permanent character and that the catastrophe of Europe is already a historical fact.

The optimistic scenario is assuming that Europe will emerge from the present crisis to enter into an era of a new European Renaissance.

**The pessimistic scenario**

1) Europe will be not able to overcome the crisis of the turn of the XX and XXI century and will follow the suit of Venice\textsuperscript{27} of the XVIII century.

2) Europe will be the weakest element of the four megaspaces of the XXI century (China, the USA, India, the European Union)\textsuperscript{28}.

3) The tipping point on the route from the European success to an European catastrophe is already a historical fact\textsuperscript{29}. There is no point in formulating the question how to avoid the catastrophe. We can only try to limit the scale of the catastrophe.

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\textsuperscript{24} R. Galar, op.cit.


\textsuperscript{27} Compare: B. Jałowiecki, *Czy Europejska Europa przetrwa do 2050 roku?* (in:) *Przyszłość Europy*, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{28} A. Kukliński, *The transformation of the global scene* (in:) *Turning points*, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{29} M. György, *Futures of Europe – in Challenges*, op.cit.
The optimistic scenario

For the sake of clarity we will formulate also three theses related to the optimistic scenario:

1) Europe will overcome the deep structural crisis of the beginning of the XXI century. In the long history of Europe we find many cases of a deep structural crisis – Europe was always able to overcome the crisis of the past. Why would this ability be missing in the experiences of the XXI century?

2) Europe will regain the power of innovativeness and creativity. We will have again a strong dynamic European knowledge based society and economy as an important element of the global scene.

3) In the horizon of the XXI century’s Europe a new turning point will emerge: the turning point of a new European Renaissance as an eruption of knowledge, imagination, culture and science.

To generate the power to implement the optimistic scenario we need a strong shake-up of the European public opinion. The present political elites of Europe are paralyzed and unable to formulate visions and programmes to promote a new creative Europe of the XXI century. Maybe this paralysis is an essential feature of the present generation of the European political elite. Maybe this is a task and goal for the young generation acting via a new pan-European political party – Young Europe.

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30 N. Davies, op.cit.
XI. **Innovation versus imitation. The experiences and prospects in Europe in a global context. A proposal of an international research programme**

We need in this field a well designed large scale and comprehensive research programme incorporating three dimensions – the theoretical dimension, the empirical dimension, and the prospective dimension.

Maybe the programme could be organized around four grand topics:

1) Innovation and imitation as technological, economic, social and cultural processes. The creation of innovation, the diffusion and absorption of innovation. The creative and passive imitation. The processes of creative destruction and the processes of destructive destruction.

2) Europe as a historical space of innovation and imitation. A set of historical case studies.

3) Europe as a prospective space of innovation and imitation. A set of prospective case studies.

4) The global experiences in the field of innovation and imitation.

The European Innovation Scoreboard 2005 is an excellent starting point for the construction of this programme.

XII. **The theses of the Paper**

I will not try to present a conventional summary of the paper. In this context I will concentrate attention on six theses of the paper which try to formulate the crucial question – why, according to the European Commission’s European Innovation Scoreboard 2005, Poland’s performance in the field of innovation is very weak:
Poland is included into the group of countries which are “losing ground”.

**Thesis one** – The great Polish transformation of the years 1990–2010 was a more imitative and less innovative transformation. The main problem was adaptation to the general rules and patterns of the global market economy. The idea to accept the ideology of strategic planning as a tool of innovative transformation was rejected by the *grosso modo* excellent L. Balcerowicz’s team.

**Thesis two** – The two decades of Poland’s transformation 1990–2010 were at the same time decades of success and lost decades. The success is the transformation of Poland into a democratic country incorporating an economic system which is an integral part of the global capitalist economy. 1990–2010 were lost decades in this sense that the Polish transformation was not designed and implemented as a strategic transformation towards an innovative knowledge based society and economy. This historical negligence has produced the “losing ground” effect discovered by the European Commission.

**Thesis three** – The deep roots of the weak innovation performance of Poland are explained by the duality of the Polish society and economy. Poland is not represented by one society. It is represented by two societies and economies – an innovation prone and an innovation-averse society.

**Thesis four** – If in the future the innovation prone society will have the prevailing power to determine the substance of the Country, then Poland will be developed into an innovative society and economy. If however the innovation-averse society will have the prevailing power to determine the fate of the country, then Poland will change itself into a firm element of the global and European periphery.

**Thesis five** – The dilemma – innovation prone versus innovation-averse society is related not only to the interpretation of the experiences of Poland. This concept will be very useful in the interpretation of innovation performance of the European countries presented in the classification table outlined in the *European Innovation Scoreboard 2005*. 
**Thesis six** – It is necessary to consider the design and implementation of an International Research Programme “Innovation versus imitation. The experiences and prospects in Europe in a global context”. [...]  

**Conclusion**

In this paper we can see numerous methodological and empirical weaknesses. We can see also a wealth of generalizations which have an insufficient empirical documentation.  
I hope, however, that in this paper we find some inducement for creative thinking related to the field of innovation, and imitation transgressing the limits of conventional wisdom and political correctness.

Warszawa–Łańsk–Nowy Sącz, August 22 2006
**Polonia Quo Vadis? Knowledge, Imagination, Responsibility***

*We are made wise not by the recollection of the past, but by the responsibility for the future.*
George Bernard Shaw

**Introduction**

As a matter of highest scientific, social, political and cultural urgency we should design, develop and promote a grand research, publication and conference Programme Polonia Quo Vadis. This is an endogenous urgency for the Polish Society to answer the crucial problem of “Quo Vadis Polonia” in the turbulent times of the XXI century. We have to enlarge the future oriented imagination of the Polish Society. We should meet the challenge and internalize in our knowledge and imagination the responsibility for the future. This is not a uniquely Polish problem. There is no doubt, that the driving example of Poland will find a broad dissemination in the European and global scale. I am convinced that the grand international organizations and especially the European Union, OECD, the Club of Rome and the World Bank, will support processes of its dissemination. The Regio Futures Programme¹ sponsored by the Polish Ministry of Regional Development is a very effective starting point in the design

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of the conceptual and pragmatic framework of the Polonia Quo Vadis Programme. In fact the Regio Future Programme has already opened a chapter of country studies. The contribution *Slovenia Quo Vadis*² will be presented already in October 2008. In the Polish context we are reviving a stream of publications and conferences which were organized in Poland in the early nineties of the XX century. Especially important are the three volumes of *Polonia Quo Vadis*³ published in 1993. Unfortunately at that time the idea of a grand Polonia Quo Vadis Programme was not implemented.

**THE NEW URGENCY**

Fifteen years have passed since then and the scientific and political urgency to implement this Programme is both stronger and more dramatic. The intellectual and pragmatic environment Anno Domini 2008 is much better than in 1993. In the early nineties of the XX century, the deification of the market by the victorious neoliberal ideology had practically eliminated the social and political demand for long-term thinking and strategic planning. Anno Domini 2008 in the scale of Poland, in the scale of Europe and in the global scale we notice a renaissance of long-term strategic thinking.

In this intellectual climate the proposal of the Polonia Quo Vadis Programme has a great chance of successful development. This paper is not a comprehensive operational outline of this proposal. It is only a preliminary note which may induce our thinking leading along this trajectory. In this spirit I would like to present the following thematic sequence of this paper:

I. The temporal framework

II. The problem oriented framework

² Compare B. Roncevic, Strategic discourse: A path creation tool for development latecomers [in:] P. Jakubowska et al. op.cit.

I. The temporal framework of Polonia Quo Vadis 1990–2050

I would like to propose a sequence of three times twenty years as a temporal framework for the Polonia Quo Vadis. The first link in this sequence is constituted by diagnostic studies of the Polish experiences of the years 1990–2010. This must be an honest and comprehensive diagnosis of the glory and misery of the Polish transformation. This diagnosis is not only a problem of knowledge; it is also a problem of imagination and moral courage. The point of view that we can discuss the Future of Poland without an honest comprehensive diagnosis of the years 1990–2010 is just wrong. We must face the challenge to see the glory and misery of the Polish transformation, we have to answer the question how we had used the diamond of Polonia Restituta in the years 1990–2010.

The second link in the just outlined sequence is constituted by visions and scenarios of prospective Polish experiences in the years 2010–2030. This is a field to test our knowledge, imagination and responsibility for the future, to test our anticipations of the glory and misery of the Polish performance and the global and European scene of the years 2010–2030.

Finally, we should try to answer the question if in the years 2010–2030 the diamond of Polonia Restituta will be used more efficiently than in the years 1990–2010. The third link in the just outlined sequence is constituted by visions and scenarios of the invented future of Poland 2030–2050. The expanding stream of global

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4 Compare The temporal framework of the Regio Futures Programme, P. Jakubowska et al., op.cit p. 459.

and European futurology of the year 2050, is creating a background for the invented future of Poland 2030–2050.

* * *

The reflection related to the temporal framework of the Quo Vadis Polonia is not started in crudo radice. This reflexion can find some inspiration in the methodology of the Regio Futures Programme. Especially important is the discussion “diagnosis versus visions and scenarios versus strategies”. In this context we can also review the Black Swan controversy as presented in the papers by R. Galar and W. Lamentowicz.

II. THE PROBLEM ORIENTED FRAMEWORK OF THE QUO VADIS POLONIA

The crucial general question of the Quo Vadis Polonia should be tested in a set of problem oriented studies trying to analyze the most important fields of the Polish experiences and prospects. To my mind ten fields could be chosen.

Our experience of the past to analyze different individual problems in different time horizons is not providing a comprehensive answer to the crucial problem of Quo Vadis Polonia. We must create a turning point in the ways we answer the question “Polonia Quo Vadis”. This is a trajectory of concentrated research activity of a grand set of parallel studies, testing simultaneously the 10 fields representing different dimensions of the Polonia Quo Vadis problem.

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6 Compare P. Jakubowska et al., op.cit p. 411–484.
7 compare P. Jakubowska et al., op.cit p. 458–462.
Table 1
The experiences and prospects of Poland 1990–2050 – 10 fields

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<th>Fields as inputs</th>
<th>Demography</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Political system</th>
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<th>Education</th>
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III. The basic concepts of Polonia Quo Vadis

There are three channels leading to the interpretation of the grand Programme Polonia Quo Vadis:

*Primo* – the integration of time horizons

*Secundo* – the problem oriented integration

*Tertio* – the network of basic concepts

Naturally, we have to keep an open-minded and flexible interpretation of the three channels of integration. The knowledge and imagination of all persons and institutions participating in the Polonia Quo Vadis Programme should have an open space for creativity and intellectual autonomy. We must, however, remember that the grand Programme Polonia Quo Vadis should also create internal channels of comparability and cumulative effects. In this
In the construction of the conceptual framework of Polonia Quo Vadis, we can use *inter alia* the conceptual framework of the Regio Futures Programme⁹.

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IV. The institutional framework of Polonia Quo Vadis

The take-off of the Polonia Quo Vadis Programme will never take place in the framework of dispersed incremental activities by different persons and institutions. The take-off is possible only via a big push of concentrated large scale studies, designed and implemented by a consortium of 10–15 competent and dynamic institutes. The mobilization of imagination, good will, talent and financial resources in 2008 should create a set of valid answers to the crucial question “Polonia Quo Vadis”, already at the end of 2009. By this time the Polish Society, the Polish political, social and cultural elites, the Polish governance, the Polish business and the Polish and international Mass Media should have a deep insight in to the results of a network of path-breaking studies answering the question “Polonia Quo Vadis”.

* * *

The Polonia Quo Vadis Programme will be a demonstration of rich and comprehensive knowledge, bold imagination and deep internalized responsibility for the Future of Poland in the turbulent XXI century10

Warsaw, August 2008

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The Polish Association for the Club of Rome. Experiences and prospects. Personal observations and suggestions*

Introduction

The 20th anniversary of The Polish Association for the Club of Rome 1987–2007 is an inducement for the active members of the Association to outline a set of reflections answering three fundamental questions:
A) How to define the mission of the Association?
B) How to define the basic achievements and the basic weaknesses of the Association emerging in the experiences of the Association in the years 1987–2007?
C) How to define the future of the Association?

A) The Mission

The mission of the Association can be defined in the following framework. 
Primo – to promote in Poland the ideology and the contributions of the Club of Rome – as a global think tank dedicated to long-term strategic reflection.
Secundo – to develop Polish contributions as an element of the global achievements of the Club of Rome.

* Unpublished paper.
B) The Evaluation of the Past

The list of Publications and Meetings is supporting the point of view that the triple mission of the Association was well designed and implemented in the years 1987–2007. The Community of our Association is a community of about 100 persons with three levels of involvement:

* **Primo** – active members of the Association participating in the substantial activities of the association and paying the membership fees (about 50 persons);

* **Secundo** – less active members nevertheless paying the membership fees – about 25 persons;

* **Tertio** – the non active members keeping the membership for the reasons of the inertia of the past (about 25 persons).

The process of the renewal of our Community will be now accelerated very strongly. According to our expectations new Members will join the Association and the most passive Members will decide to close the formal membership.

* * *

In the years 2002–2008 three institutions were important elements in the existence of our Association.

* **Primo** – Scandia Życie – Towarzystwo Ubezpieczeń SA – creating a yearly grant which was and is very important for the development of the Association. We hope that in 2008 the good example of Scandia Życie will find a follow up in the decision of a few open minded corporations which would be willing to support the new stage in the development of the Association.

* **Secundo** – The Polish Economic Society which has continuously extended its hospitality to have the proper facilities for the meetings
of our Association. The most important is however the strong pat-
tern of cooperation linking the Society and the Association.

*Tertio* – the University of Warsaw which at reduced costs – is
renting to the Association a modest but effective office. What is
more important, the academic community of the University of
Warsaw is creating a stimulating environment for the activity of
the team of the Young Members of the Association.

The list of Publications and Meetings indicates that in the years
1987–2007 three grand problems were inside the scope of attention
of the Association:

*Primo* – the unique historical transformation of Central and
Eastern Europe anticipating and following the collapse of the
Soviet Empire;

*Secundo* – The faces of globalization at the turn of the XX and
XXI century;

*Tertio* – The transformation and the future of Europe.

The Association has created valuable inputs into the interpre-
tation of the three grand problems in the spirit of the triple mis-
sion of the Association. In the evaluation of the performance of the
Association in the years 1987–2007 – the matrix – triple mission
versus three grand problems may be useful.

**Table 1**
The triple mission and the three grand problems 1987–2007

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<th>The Mission</th>
<th>The problems</th>
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<td>The transformation of Central and Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>To promote the ideology of the Club of Rome</td>
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<td>To develop the Polish contributions</td>
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<td>To participate in the networking process</td>
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C) The Future

The New Leadership of the Club of Rome is opening a new chapter in the history of the Club – putting the Club again into the focus of global public opinion. This new chapter will be organized around a grand Programme of the Club of Rome: *New Path for World Development*. The Polish Association for the Club of Rome in the years 2008–2012 will concentrate its main attention on answering two fundamental questions:

1) How to promote the New Path Programme in Poland?
2) How to develop the Polish contributions to the design and implementation of the New Path Programme?

In this framework we see three trajectories in our activities:

The first trajectory is designed primarily for the Polish Scene, but indirectly contributing to the New Path Programme. This is the Polish Forum for Strategic Thinking organized jointly by the Polish Economic Society and the Polish Association. We hope that the Polish Forum will be a broad social process which will inject new doses of long-term strategic thinking into the Polish mind. This forum is already a success.

The second trajectory is the continuation of ideas and approaches developed in the publication of the Association titled *Turning points in the transformation of the global scene* A. Kukliński, S. Skuza (eds) Warsaw 2006.

The third trajectory is a grand research, publication and Conference Programme titled “The Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions of the XXI century” (see K. Rybiński and P. Opala in the volume *The Individuality of a Scholar and Advancement of Social Science*, A. Gąsior-Niemiec and J. Niżnik (eds) Warsaw 2008, see also volume published by the Polish Ministry of Regional Development in the first days of June 2008).
The Polish Association for the Club of Rome

The Gordian Knots Programme (GKP) will be designed and implemented under the auspices of the Club of Rome, by three institutions:
1) The Polish Ministry of Regional Development
2) The Polish Economic Society
3) The Polish Association for the Club of Rome.

In this way we are creating a new matrix for the activity of the Association in the years 2008–2012.

Table 2
The triple mission and the three grand problems for the years 2008–2012

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<th>The Mission</th>
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Concluding suggestions

This note is not an outline of a comprehensive study – The Polish Association for the Club of Rome – experiences and prospects. This note is opening a sequence of short contributions in Polish or in English – written by the active members of the Polish Association. In this way our joint effort will create an interesting outline of the past and the future of the Polish Association. I am also asking our friends outside Poland to express their observations related to the activity of the Polish Association. This set of short papers or notes will lead to a small but very interesting
volume presenting personalized visions of the past and the future of the Polish Association for the Club of Rome.

* * *

We have a comprehensive and convincing vision of the future of The Polish Association for the Club of Rome. This vision will be strongly supported by the Active Members and by the good Friends of the Association in Poland and outside Poland.

Warsaw, May 8 2008
Part IV

The Regional Perspective
Regio Futures Programme (RFP). Experiences and Prospects*

Introduction

The Regio Futures Programme is a Programme of studies conferences and publications organized and financed by the Ministry of Regional Development in the years 2007–2013. The present study „RFP. Experiences and Prospects” will outline the results and the perspectives of development of RFP.

In the framework of RFP the Ministry of Regional Development has organized four international conferences which were successful events both in cognitive and pragmatic terms. Especially important are the publications of RFP including five volumes¹ in English and one volume in Polish. This publication record was created by an eminent team of 50 authors representing the global European and Polish scene. Ministry of Regional Development in the promotion of RFP found a friendly attitude in the institutional environment of the European Union²


Part IV. The regional perspective

and OECD\textsuperscript{3}. This rich documentation will be reviewed in the present paper which I hope will accelerate the diffusion of the results of RFP on the polish and European scene. The synthetic study will try to implement three tasks:

*Primo* – the presentation and evaluation of the initial stage of the Programme in the years 2007–2008

*Secundo* – the presentation of a set of proposals how to adapt the RFP to the new conditions of the emerging XXI century

*Tertio* – the development of three horizons of RFP the cognitive horizon, the pragmatic horizon and the horizon of implementation.

The confrontation of the three tasks and the five volumes may produce various results. We have however to face the decision to select a set of topics which according to our judgment will form the axis of this synthetic study.

Let us propose the following set of 13 topics:

I. The regions facing the enigma of the XXI century
II. The European regions facing the reconfiguration of the global space
III. The goals and assumptions of RFP
IV. The methodology of RFP
V. The empirical dimension of RFP
VI. The futurology of RFP
VII. The conceptual panorama of the organization of knowledge and imagination of the RFP
VIII. The concept of path dependency
IX. The concept of the Gordian Knots
X. The concept of Quo Vadis
XI. The Triple Mezzogiorno concept
XII. The pragmatic horizons of RFP
XIII. The cognitive horizons of RFP

\textsuperscript{3} Compare the paper of M. Pezzini in Volume one.

I. THE REGIONS FACING THE ENIGMA OF THE XXI CENTURY

Enigma is a riddle which can be solved, enigma is a secret which can be discovered, enigma is a mystery which is beyond the limits of our knowledge and imagination. We should however not accept the mysterious interpretation of enigma. We should rather try to overcome the paradox that “the prevision of the future is impossible but necessary”\(^4\).

The region must face the enigma of the XXI century. This is a special challenge for our knowledge, imagination and will Anno Domini 2010 in the historical turning point of the real end of the XX century and the real beginning of the XXI century.

We would like to present an unconventional interpretation of this turning point. The conventional wisdom is assuming that the XIX century was a “long” century started by the Congress of Vienna in 1814 and ending in 1914 by the beginning of World War I.

The XX century is a ”short” century, started in 1914 and closed in 1989–90 by the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.

I think that this point of view is wrong. The XX century is also a “long” century incorporating the years 1914–2010. The object of disagreement are two decades 1990–2010 which according to my judgment are the closing chapters of the XX century and not the opening chapters of the XXI century.

The present crisis of 2008–2011 is an integrated cumulative set of fives trajectories:

- the trajectory of the financial crisis
- the trajectory of the economic crisis

\(^4\) Compare the following observation of J.S. Nye Jr. *Can we do better as we enter the twenty-first century?* The apocrypha of Yogi Berra warns us not to make predictions, particularly about the future. Yet we have no choice. We walk around with pictures of the future in our heads as a necessary condition of planning our actions.

• the trajectory of the crisis of global order
• the trajectory of the crisis of the global elite
• the trajectory of the crisis of the Atlantic Community.

This pentagonal crisis can be analyzed as a great turning point in human history – a multidimensional sunset of four dimensions.

The first dimension of this sunset is the end of the domination of the Western Civilization as the leading global civilization of the grand era 1500–2010. This is not the end of the Western Civilization; it is only an end of the quasi monopolistic position of Western Civilization in the creation and destruction of the global order.

The second dimension of this sunset is the end of PAX Americana as an ideology and power responsible for the global order in the years 1945–2010. This is not the end of the USA as a global superpower; it is only an end of the Roman-like grandeur of the American power.

The third dimension of this sunset is the end of neoliberalism as an ideology and management doctrine organizing during the three decades 1980–2010 the performance of the global economy and indirectly also the performance of global society and culture. This is however not the end of liberalism as one of the greatest achievements of the human mind – an ideology which will find a prominent place in the landscape of the XXI century.

The fourth dimension of the sunset is the bankruptcy of the global elite. The victorious coalition of World War II has created

6 For the methodology of turning points compare A. Kukliński, B. Skuza (eds.) Turning Points in the transformation of the global scene, The Polish Association for the Club of Rome, Warsaw 2006.
a grand global elite which was able to design a new global order organizing the world of the years 1945–1990. The global elite of the years 1990–2010 was not able to design a new global order for the XXI century. This elite is now not able to respond to the challenge of the global crisis of the years 2008–2010 and in broader terms to the challenge of this great turning point in the human history. The intellectual, moral, political and charismatic weakness of this elite is a dramatic *signum temporis* of our times. Will the XXI century find an Alexandrian Solution for this Gordian Knot?9

* * *

The hypothesis of the multidimensional sunset of the XX century is opening a trajectory of two interpretations. A pessimistic interpretation – an approaching era of global catastrophe – the doomsday vision and an optimistic interpretation – the sunrise of the XXI century, which is the vision of hope. It would be quite possible to outline a doomsday vision of the XXI century, but in this paper we will follow the attitude *contra spem sperare*. We will try to outline some elements of the sunrise vision of the XXI century.

* * *

The great challenge of the XXI century is to design and implement the idea of a new global order. Let us indicate two potential features of this order:

1) **It will be an order functioning in the climate of global risk and universal uncertainty**

2) **It will be a pluralistic global order incorporating the coexistence, cooperation and competition of a dynamic network of global powers and global civilizations**10. The challenge of multipolarity of economic, political, cultural and military

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power is the greatest institutional challenge of the XXI century. This multipolarity is not only the multipolarity of political superpowers, but also the multipolarity of grand transnational corporations and the multipolarity of grand international organizations\textsuperscript{11}.

* * *

These reflections concerning the real end of the XX century and the real beginning of the XXI century have an important implication for the reconstruction of RFP.

We have to see that the diagnostic decades 1990–2010 and the prospective decades of 2010–2030 are periods belonging to different patterns of the global order representing different worlds of human experiences. We can formulate the question: what kind of place and rank will emerge for the region as a material, institutional and cultural structure of the XXI century?

An innovative interpretation of this question is emerging in the paper of R. Galar. Let us quote a few lines from the introduction of this paper\textsuperscript{12}:

\begin{quote}
Looking one generation ahead into the future of regions is a particularly ambitious undertaking. In the perspective of around thirty years, not only the present trends expire, but also many boundary conditions of the regional development turn to be challengeable. Still, Kukliński is right that such exercises are necessary, if only to unburden our thinking from involvement in current issues and the related personal interests. Such considerations bring us to the concept of the „future ready regions”. Regions are smaller than states but operationally similar to them. Therefore, in a number of functional spheres, the appropriately empowered regions might serve as proper testing grounds for diverse innovative ideas and spearhead implementation of the successful ones. This is
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} Compare A. Kukliński Volume 5 p. 23.

\textsuperscript{12} R.Galar, Volume 3 p. 29.
ahistorically proved regularity that regions and their social capital give the proper frame of reference for analysis of creative cultures. In the approaching decades, when the impact of information and communication technologies will belittle the role of administrative functions, soft cultural factors may become the main reason behind the continued existence of regions.

This contribution stresses the necessity of the next generation oriented attitude toward future, illustrates the practical impossibility of looking into a more distant future, assesses available tools for future prediction, enumerates the basic functions of regions and considers their durability, points on mounting stresses that will make the „future as usual” impossible in Europe, comments on present direction of regional policy, and advocates emergence of the „future ready” regions.

* * *

In the conclusion of chapter I of this study, let me formulate two questions:

**Primo** – how to define the enigma of the XXI century as a particularly difficult challenge for our mind, imagination and our art of strategic thinking?

**Sceundo** – how to develop the mind and imagination of the region to face the enigma of the XXI century?

II. **The European regions facing the reconfiguration of the global space**

The real end of the XX century and the real beginning of the XXI century are creating one of the greatest reconfigurations of the global space in the human history\(^{13}\). For five hundred years the Euro-Atlantic space was the dominating element in the

\(^{13}\) A. Kukliński, K. Pawłowski (eds) *The Atlantic Community...* op.cit.
global space. We are observing now the decline of the importance of the Euro-Atlantic space, which is in the process of adaptation to a new of world of pluralistic global order incorporating the coexistence, cooperation and competition of a dynamic network of global powers and civilizations. This process of the reconfiguration of the global space, the crisis of the Atlantic Community and the growing role of BRIC – Brazil, Russia, India, and China was analyzed in the volume *The Atlantic Community. The Titanic of the XXI century?* This volume can be seen as a comprehensive comment to the path-breaking *Report of the World Bank* Reshaping economic geography. This is a new interpretation of the economic geography of the global scene. This Report is a hard blow to the Eurocentric perceptions of our “geographical mind”. The European experiences in this Report are only a very small, maybe somehow neglected fraction of the global experiences. In this context I would like to quote my intervention in the framework of the Second Cracovian Conference:

„The rejection of Eurocentric attitudes and the acceptance of universalistic attitudes means not that we follow the thesis of the global marginalization of the European megaspace”.

The transformations of this European megaspace will be an important element of the transformation of the global space of the XXI century”.

**The Report – Reshaping Economic geography is an important inducement for RFP to globalize the scope of the Programme.**

In this context we should define the concept of mega space. Let me propose the following definition:

*A megaspace is a grand geographical area representing a big demographic, political, economic, scientific, cultural and*
military potential recognized very clearly in the global scale. The megaspace is a regionally differentiated area with no barriers limiting the free flows of persons, commodities, information and capital. Megaspace is an area having a comprehensive and valid statistical documentation creating an empirical foundation for the inquiry into the nature and dynamics of the internal spatial differentiations of the megaspace. The megaspace is a phenomenon of a higher order in relation to classical macrospaces – countries – mezzospaces – regions and microspaces – localities.

This is a new interpretation of the growing role of the European Union as a system of institutions creating the European megaspace as a new subject of the global space.

Already in the initial stage of RFP the concept of European, American, Russian, Chinese, Indian and Brazilian megaspaces was introduced. It was proposed to develop an integrated evaluation of the six megaspaces of the XXI century.

Unfortunately this trajectory of thinking and analysis was not able to find a comprehensive and extensive evaluation supported by comparative empirical studies. This is an important and brilliant task for the future.

* * *

Following these general reflections let me formulate three theses related to the global realities creating the modus operandi of the European regions.

**Thesis one**

The European regions will function in new condition of multipolarity of superpowers and civilizations. The European regions will not belong any more to the dominating pattern of the

18 Compare Volume one, p. 124–126.
last 500 years. This means not that the European regions will lose the status of co-leading actors of the global scene and enter the marginalized world of global periphery.

**Thesis two**

The European regions will function in new conditions of globalization which will have a new shape in comparison to the experiences of the XX century.

It is not excluded that this new model of globalization will create a stronger role for the regions as an actor of the global scene.

However, there is a probability of reconfiguration of the global regional scene.

California is a valid example of this process. California was the leading global region of the XX century. Now California is facing a deep institutional crisis. California has lost the status of a model region. We may ask the question if the declining role of the US as a global superpower has also a reflection in the declining global role of the American regions.

**Thesis three**

The European regions will function in new conditions of the emerging European megaspace as an important element of the global scene.

The scale and velocity of the creation of this megaspace will be a function of the general development processes of the European Union. We can envisage two scenarios:

- A scenario of dynamic and strong European Union accelerating the process of the creation of the European megaspace.

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19 Compare volume one p. 429
• A scenarios of weak and stagnating European Union which will slow down the processes of the creation of the european megaspace or even generate processes of renationalization of this space.

* * *

In the initial stage of development the RFP was predominantly an European program. However the global “,problematique” was a strong background of RFP especially in volumes 3 and 4 of REDEFO. However at that time we were not able to see the dramatic magnitude of the problem of reconfiguration of the global scene and the consequences of this reconfiguration for the European regions. **In this context we can consider three new initiatives of RFP:**

**primo** – the initiative of the analysis of the mega processes of regional development transforming the spaces of China and India\(^\text{20}\). These processes must enter in the perception of our mind and imagination still dominated by Eurocentric attitudes

**secundo** – the initiative to start scenario studies outlining the expansion of the Chinese and Indian direct investment in selected European regions. Especially important are the Chinese direct investments guided not only by the spontaneous market forces but also by the long term strategies of the emerging Chinese superpower (see IHT September 14 2010)

**tertio** – the third initiative to organize in Europe two grand international conferences

a) The regional Dilemmas in the developmental processes of the XXI century. The experiences of Europe and China

b) The Regional Dilemmas in the developmental processes of the XXI century. The experiences of Europe and India

The grand and powerful regional establishment of the European Union should create an effective forum of direct

\(^{20}\text{Compare Contest of the century: China versus India, The Economist, August 21–27 2010.}\)
dialogue linking the regions of Europe, China and India. The results of this dialogue should be absorbed by the institutional realities of the European Union and by the European public opinion in toto.

This process of absorption should enter also into the perspective of the member countries including Poland where we find a low level of knowledge concerning the transformation of the Chinese and Indian megaspaces.

* * *

The Problem – the European region facing the reconfiguration of the global scene is opening new global horizons for RFP. “How will the European regions, including the Polish Regions, master the new conditions of the reconfiguration of global scene as a scene of coexistence cooperation and competition of a dynamic pluralistic set of superpowers and civilizations?”

This is the key problem of regional policy of the XXI century which is almost totally disregarded in the overwhelming pressure of short term European considerations.

III. THE GOALS AND ASSUMPTIONS OF RFP

The initial texts of RFP were published in 2007 in the first volume of REDEFO (volume one): The Future of European Regions?21”. This volume has not lost its validity to the present day and it will be broadly quoted in this synthetic study. Let us concentrate our attention on two extensive quotations.

Quotation one: the goal and mission of the Programme22.

The crucial pragmatic mission and goal of RFP is to develop the internal knowledge, imagination and will of the regions

21 Volume 1, p. 122–135.
22 Volume 1, p. 457.
– to recognize the urgent necessity of long term future orient- ed approaches. These approaches are important inputs into the present decision making process trying to solve the basic contemporary problems of the given region. The decision making process in a region is blind without the knowledge and imagination related to long term global perspective. The RFP will create inspirations for the individual regions – how to develop the knowledge imagination and will related to the performance of the region in the future. 

This future oriented „mind” of the regions will at the same time improve the quality of the dialogue of the regions and governments, regions and international organizations and regions and corporations. The future oriented „mind” of the region should have a strong endogenous motivation. Such a region will be not only a recipient of recommendations generated by national governments, European Union and OECD.

A comment

In the programmatic formulations of RFP we are using the inspiring metaphor of the “mind” of the region. This metaphor is expressing the knowledge will and imagination related to the future of the Region. The region in this metaphor should be an active participant of the global debate related to the future of regions and to the role of regions in the geostrategic reconfiguration of the global scene of the XXI century. **We have to develop the concept of self programming capacity in the mind, imagination and the will of the region.**

The whole world of regional institutions must be permanently supported by the development of this self programming capacity. This is the ambitious teleology of RFP. We have to confess that this teleology is more a matter of the future than an already documented achievement of the initial stage of the development of RFP.
Quotation two:\ the three paradigms of the future of a region.

The „paradigm is” a set of questions exploring the empirical reality and a set of answers formulated in proper theoretical and methodological framework. We can use this concept not only in an empirical context but also in the policy oriented context related to the future. In this sense we can outline three paradigms related to regional futurology – nihilistic paradigm, voluntaristic paradigm and the realistic paradigm.

The nihilistic paradigm

The region is not an ego of its own future. The region is only a fragment of the global scene which is permanently creating new forces and structures (political, economic, social scientific and cultural). All perspective visions are extremely difficult or even impossible in an age which is approaching the limit of a global catastrophe. In this paradigm the regional futurology is a quasi Utopian domain.

Our reflection can be restricted only to an answer to the question – to what extent we can enrich the adaptation abilities of the region in relation to the global processes taking into account both optimistic arid pessimistic scenarios.

The voluntaristic paradigm

The region is an ego of its own future developed grosso modo independently in relation to the global processes. The will – voluntas of the governance system and of the society are the deciding forces determining the future of the region. The voluntaristic paradigm is overestimating the power and efficiency of the internal structure of the region and at the same time underestimating the changes and challenges created by external forces.

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\(^{23}\) Volume 1, p. 415.
The realistic paradigm

The region is an autonomous ego of its own future. It is however an autonomy fully aware of the power of external conditions which are extremely important in the realities of the XXI century.

I am accepting the assumptions of the realistic paradigm. It is a way of thinking finding the trajectory between the Scylla of nihilism and the Charybdis of voluntarism. My reflection related to these paradigms may sound as an artificial abstraction. This is not the case – a careful review of regional strategies prepared in the framework of inspirations and institutional inducements of the European Commission – will discover that the models of thinking incorporated in the three paradigms are emerging quite frequently in many European Regions. There are four problems in the construction of the realistic paradigm:

– Primo – spontaneous versus guided development
– Secundo – endogenous versus exogenous development
– Tertio – innovative versus imitative development
– Quarto – global versus niche development

The three paradigms are presented very firmly in the publications of RFP. Please read from this point of view Volume 5 of REDEFO. We will find the nihilistic, voluntaristic and realistic attitudes in the evaluation of the past and the future of Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland. This suggestion could be extended in the following way. Please compare the contents of Volume 1 and 5 of REDEFO, evidencing the state of the art of RFP in 2007 and 2010. Please try to see the permanent elements of the philosophy of the Programme as a creative tension between “rerum cognoscere causas” and “mutare in melius” approaches. Please try to develop in your mind an evaluation of the present validity of the feasibility study published in 2007\(^\text{24}\). To what extent is this feasibility study still an innovative formulation in the field

\(^{24}\) Volume 1, p. 455–487.
of policy oriented European regional studies? An integrated interpretation of this set of papers is a contribution to the formulation of the methodological dimensions of the RFP. Of course, I will not try to present the content of this set of papers. I will try only to outline four methodological challenges of RFP.

IV. The methodology of RFP

The philosophy and “instrumentology” of the Program has been outlined in a set of innovative papers published in Volume 3. An integrated interpretation of this set of papers provides a contribution to the formulation of the methodological dimension of RFP. I will not try to present the content of this set of papers. I will try only to outline four methodological challenges of RFP.

Primo – the first challenge is the Myrdalian methodological triangle: theories – questions – empirical materials. I share the point of view of G. Myrdal that “Theory in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material.”

The paradigmatic stream of questions and answers is very deeply incorporated into the structure of RFP.

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25 Volume 3 p. 29–189, especially the papers of P. Drewe and S. Arnaldi.

26 Compare also the initial formulation of the methodology of RFP, Volume 1 p. 455–487 and Volume 3.

Secundo – the second challenge is the system of comprehensive interpretations linking the past – the present and the future. Following the observation of J.M. Rousseau\textsuperscript{28} we reject the false assumption of deterministic linear thinking that the past is determining the present and the present is determining the future.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \node (front) {Future Regio Futurology};
  \node (past) [below left of=front] {The past – Regio history};
  \node (present) [below right of=front] {The present – Regio diagnosis};
  \draw[->] (front) to (past);
  \draw[->] (front) to (present);
  \draw[->] (past) to (present);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

In this system of interactions the present decision making process is absorbing not only the “lessons” of the past, but also “lessons” of the future. Without the ability of this double absorption the present decision-making system is blind. This is a very strong pragmatic dimension of Regio Futurology and of RFP.

Tertio – the third methodological challenge of RFP is the classical challenge of rerum cognoscere causas. The interpretation and explanation of the changing mosaic of strong and weak regions in Europe is a challenging task for RFP\textsuperscript{29}. Unfortunately the opening route in this field started in Volume one found no continuation in the second stage of RFP in the years 2008–2010.

Quarto – the fourth challenge of RFP is the challenge mutare in melius the challenge to transform the regional reality. This challenge found its strong expressions in Volume 5\textsuperscript{30}.

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\textsuperscript{28} Volume 1, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{29} Volume 1 p. I–XXII, Appendix.
\textsuperscript{30} Volume 5.
In the instrumentology of RFP the main problem is the integration of diagnostic and perspective instruments.

A diagnosis\textsuperscript{31} is the knowledge, ability and courage to formulate valid questions related to real experiences of the past. I stress the term “real” since very often we encounter diagnostic studies which analyze only the apparent or even fictitious problems “Scheinprobleme”. A vision is the knowledge and imagination to “invent” the future to face the enigma of the XXI century to cross the “gap” separating the experiences of the XX and XXI century. There are two bridges linking the diagnostic and perspective thinking.

The first bridge is the scenarios as an art to outline the processes of the emergence of the different shapes of the future. We should quote in this place the observation of P. Drewe in Uncertainties ask for scenarios\textsuperscript{32}.

The second bridge linking the diagnostic and prospective thinking are the strategies as a teleological instrument expressing the dialectic of goals and means. In our opinion the methodology of RFP should absorb some inducements for unconventional strategic thinking developed by two Dutch Authors\textsuperscript{33}. The paradox of creative and logical thinking is a real challenge for the strategic “mind” of the region. The book by B. de Vit and R. Meyer was translated into Polish opening a route to interpretations of this book in the framework of a large scale institutional effort to prepare the third generation of strategic documents outlining the future of the 16 self-governmental Polish regions (the NUTS – 2 level)\textsuperscript{34}.

\textsuperscript{31} Volume 1 p. 459.

\textsuperscript{32} Volume 5 p. 109, P. Drewe, Towards a research agenda of the Triple Mezzogiorno.


\textsuperscript{34} A comprehensive analysis of the Polish regional scene is presented in Territorial Reviews, Poland, OECD, Paris 2008. An interesting interpretation of this OECD publication was outlined in the framework of the Second Cracovian Conference
These strategic documents are prepared now. These documents should be ready for the Polish Presidency of the European Union in 2011. Exempla trahunt: maybe the example of the Polish regions will generate a strong movement to prepare strategic documents for all regions of the European Union. In this favorable institutional context the European Regions may be inclined to absorb the empirical and methodological experiences of RFP. The European regions may be also inclined to develop an European doctrine in the field of regional strategic thinking.

V. THE EMPIRICAL DIMENSION OF RFP

The empirical dimension is one of the most important core dimensions of the RFP. It is impossible to enter into the Future of Regions without a strong starting point created by dynamic diagnostic studies which have four characteristic features:

Primo – studies functioning in the framework of the Myrdalian triangle: theories – questions – empirical materials\textsuperscript{35}. Several times we have underlined how important the logical system of questions is, concentrating the scope of our attention.

Secundo – studies analyzing the processes of long duration and turning points interpreting the continuity and discontinuity of those processes\textsuperscript{36}.

Tertio – studies which are answering the question to what extent the historical experiences of the given region have created valuable resources for the future or barriers for the future development of the region. The content of Volume 5 is especially interesting from this point of view\textsuperscript{37}.

\textsuperscript{35} Volume 1 p. 471.
\textsuperscript{36} Volume 1 p. 426.
\textsuperscript{37} Volume 5 p. 48–49.
Quarto – studies interpreting the concept of path dependency, path destruction and path creation\textsuperscript{38}.

In the publication record of RFP we find a set of about 20 studies which create the beginnings of the diagnostic stream of RFP\textsuperscript{39}. Probably the best example was created by a team of Cracovian authors\textsuperscript{40} analyzing the experiences of the long-term transformation of the region of Małopolska, the region of Cracovia. The main of assumptions of this diagnostic study were presented by the authors in the following way\textsuperscript{41}:

\begin{quote}
There is no doubt that a long-term perspective is needed in order to disentangle of the complex and sometimes contradictory processes of regional development. The region is an eminent structure of long duration in material and spiritual (cultural) dimensions. Long duration finds expression both in economic structures, settlement and infrastructure! networks, as well as in human minds and behavior. At the same time, global processes and regional -activities based on internal strengths and/or weaknesses may cause a shift in the direction of Regional development.

The fundamental general issue addressed here concerns continuity and change in the developmental trajectory of Małopolska (Lesser Poland) in Southern Poland. This paper has been inspired by the Regio – Futures Programme advocated by Antoni Kukliński (2007). The major emphasis is on the mechanisms and impact of the post-1989 transformation on the long-term processes of regional development. This had been an element global transformation at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first century, combined with specific properties of a post-socialist transition’ from state socialism
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{38} Volume 1 p. 169–226.

\textsuperscript{39} Volume 1, 4 and 5.

\textsuperscript{40} B. Domański et al. The transformation of Małopolska experienced and prospects for the twenty first century in Volume 4, p. 95–131.

\textsuperscript{41} Volume 4, p. 95.
to a market economy and liberal democracy. The question is to what extent this recent transformation could be a turning point in the developmental trajectory of Małopolska.

The authors have adopted a relational perspective. Thus, the attempt is to capture salient relationships between the phenomena and processes comprising regional development instead of conventional analysis of economic sectors and social activities. This aims at a better understanding of the determinants and mechanisms affecting the future development of the region.

In this innovative approach we find three challenging questions:

1) “How to disentangle the complex and sometimes contradictory processes of regional development?”

2) “How to analyze the problem of continuity and change in the development trajectory of Malopolska?”

3) “How to develop the relational perspective replacing the conventional sectoral analysis?”

The Cracovian team is preparing now a theoretically and empirically extended version of the diagnostic study of the transformation of Malopolska in the years 1990–2010. The Polish version of this extended contribution will be published very soon in the volume *Polonia Quo Vadis*\(^ {42} \).

It is expected that five or six Polish regions will follow the example of Małopolska and prepare diagnostic studies continuing the route to develop new approaches in the studies of regional transformation. This diagnostic stream in the studies of the experiences of the Polish regions will probably induce the Polish regional studies to rediscover two fields of our inquiry. The first field is the evaluation of the scope and quality of the polish regional statistics. Our Central Statistical Office and indirectly the Eurostat are slowly adapting the content of regional statistics to the new regional reality of Europe. The processes of creative destruction of measurements which have lost their

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pragmatic and theoretical validity is very slow or not existing at all. At the same time the process of creation of new measurements and indexes of regional development is facing the barriers of institutional inertia both in the Polish Center Statistical Office and in Eurostat. Especially important is the phenomenon of oversupply of „structural” data which can be “produced” in relatively cheap and easy ways.

At the same time we experience a strong deficit of “nodal” data related to flows of persons, commodities, information, knowledge and capital.

**In more general terms a strong demand for the reconstruction of the scope and quality of regional statistic in Europe should be formulated.** This demand is incorporating not only the Eurostat, but also the statistical offices of the member countries. This empirical stream should be supplemented and developed by methodological stream related to the fundamental problems of the measurement of regional development.

Lest us consider a very specific attention concentrating proposal how to select 100 indexes which would correctly measure the dynamics of the development of the European Regions both in diagnostic terms of the years 1991–2010 and in perspective terms of the years 2010–2030.

This is a way to push the development of strategic regional information in Europe. The blind multiplication of information is leading nowhere. We must accept the challenge to create a system of selected strategic information as a foundation for diagnostic and perspective studies. This is a way to practice the art of strategic choice\(^43\).

that the “Polish Ministry of Regional Development and the Polish self-governmental regions will use well this historical opportunity to introduce innovative changes in the interpretation and modus operandi of the European regional scene. In this chapter of this synthetic study we propose a triple push:

1. In the field of diagnostic studies of the transformation of the European regions in the years 1990–2010 following the methodology of RFP. To what extent the case of Małopolska can be seen as one of the best examples for a larger set of the European Regions?44

2. In the field of deep reconstruction of the scope and quality of regional statistics in Europe

3. In the field of strategic choices developed in a system of measurements and indexes.

* * *

This interpretation of RFP as an input into the intellectual and institutional “mind” of the Polish EU Presidency is well reflected in the publication record of RFP. Already in the initial stage of the programme we can find the following observation by P. Żuber45:

Looking from the prospect of regional policy, Poland in coming years is going to become the most interesting place in the European Union and one of the most interesting sights all over the world.

We can see now that Poland was quite successful in the change of this vision into reality. The Polish EU Presidency should be an

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44 We are concentrating attention around the case of Malopolska, but in REDEFO we can find numerous examples of valuable empirical studies of Piedmont, Southern Italy, Slovenia, Flanders and Finland (compare Volume 1, Volume 4, Volume 5). Let me mention only two potential frameworks for Polish – Italian cooperation. The cooperation linking Eastern Poland and Southern Italy (Volume 5) and the cooperation linking Piedmont and Malopolska which in historical studies is called the Polish Piedmont (Volume 4 p. 77–133 and Volume 1 p. 202.

important trajectory of the diffusion of the knowledge of polish experiences and prospect in the field of regional development.

VI. THE FUTUROLOGY OF RFP

Futurology is a system of knowledge and imagination organizing the thinking about the future. This organization of thinking can be shaped in different conditions and climates stimulating or retarding the processes of such thinking. Let us compare two historical situations.

Sixty years ago in the 1950s of the XX century a stimulating climate was dominating in the Western World. We have observed at that time the processes of the growing power and unity of the Atlantic Civilization facing the challenge of the Soviet Empire.

The USA was the leader of the Western World in all dimensions of hard and soft power. The world capitalistic economy inspired by the Keynesian ideology was experiencing the beginning of the “long boom”.

In numerous countries there was a remarkable development of the institutions of the welfare state creating in broad strata of the society a feeling of satisfaction and confidence in a better future.

We have observed the development of the UN system. New pioneering organizations like NATO and OECD have emerged. The same applies to the early incarnations of the European Union. In general this was a time of emerging trends opening the future and eliminating the negative heritage of World War II.

In contrasting colours we see the present shape of the general pentagonal crisis outlined in the earlier part of this study46.

We observe now the crisis of the Atlantic Civilization, the vanishing role of PAX Americana and evaporation of the role of neoliberalism as an ideology organizing the global economy and indirectly the global society.

46 Compare chapters I and II.
We observe the crisis of the welfare state which is breaking down under the pressure of quickly growing financial burden above the economic capacities of the present generation. We observe also a deep crisis of the grand international organizations and especially the crisis of the US system, the crisis of NATO and crisis of the European Union.

In such conditions the development of futurology as a system of knowledge and imagination organizing the thinking about the future is a challenge rarely seen in the human experience. We have, however, no choice. The futurology Anno Domini 2010 must face the enigma of the XXI century.

In this perspective we have to see now the futurology of RFP as a much more difficult phenomenon in comparison to the initial stage of RFP in the years 2007–2008. In this climate of contra spem sperare I would like to outline three problems of the new futurology of RFP.

**Primo** – the encounter of three worlds of futurology, the world of knowledge, the world imagination and the world of utopia;  
**Secundo** – the interpretation of the three paradigms of the future of the region;  
**Tertio** – the core triangle of futurology: diagnosis–visions–strategies.

### The encounter of three worlds

**The world of knowledge.**

In the years 1990–2010 we have observed dynamic processes in three domains:

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Primo – in the domain of multiplication of the resources of information. According to The Economist the: “information has gone from scarce to super abundant. That brings new benefits but also big headache”.49

Secundo – in the development of the information society. The creation, diffusion and absorption of information has changed in to the foundation of this society.

Tertio – in the domain of knowledge based economy, which has internalized knowledge as the basic endogenous development factor.

The climate of the interrelated dynamic development of these three domains has created a strong silent assumption that we have entered into a new era of development eliminating the phenomenon of crisis.

The great pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2010 has annihilated this silent assumption. We have seen that the new pentagonal crisis was a great historical surprise50 similar to the unexpected great crisis of the years 1929–33.

We are recognizing the painful reality that the information society and knowledge based economy have not created an immunity in relation to the cyclical nature of capitalistic development. We have discovered also that there is no linear dependency linking the growth of information, the development of information society, the development of knowledge bases economy and the growth of the power of futurology.

In this context we have to formulate the question if the world of knowledge is improving our capacities to face the enigma of the XXI century.

It is very easy to accept the brilliantly formulated reasoning of N.N. Taleb51 that any prevision of the future is just impossible. We have to accept the paradox that the prevision of the future is


51 N.N. Taleb op.cit.
impossible but necessary (see footnote 4). This is the trajectory of thinking developed in RFP.

THE WORLD OF IMAGINATION

*L'imaginaire* the world of imagination is not a phenomenon created by a narrow group of poets, novelists and artists. In the conditions of the XXI century the world of imagination and the world of reality are not representing contrasting dimensions. Just the opposite. Imagination is now an important element in the interpretation of the changing reality. Imagination is a necessary dimension of the mind of any eminent politician, scientist or businessman.

In the conditions of global uncertainty the observation of Albert Einstein that “imagination is more important than knowledge” is assuming the rank of dramatic importance. The observation of A. Einstein brings an indirect criticism of the ideology of the Enlightenment, which has reserved the highest level of hierarchy for the rational mind pushing the world of imagination to the shadow.

Probably this motivation is an inspiration for us to reinvent the culture of Renaissance which has successfully integrated the knowledge and imagination. It is very difficult to overestimate the role of imagination in the interpretation of the enigma of the XXI century and in the creation of different models of regional strategic thinking.


53 Compare Annex A, in the Polish version of this study.
**The World of Utopia**

Thomas Moore is the author of the famous *opus* which was published in 1516. In the title of the book we found for the first time the term *utopia*. “Libellus de optimo reipublicae statu deque nova insula utopia”. The concept of Utopia has Greek roots in two words: ou – “not” and “place” – topos. “Nova insula utopia” is an non-existing place.

The utopian thinking is an opposition term to the thinking in real terms; it is an attempt at liberation from the “prison” of real contemporary experiences.

In RFP we will practice the art of utopian thinking, trying to create the world of invented future of the year 2050.

I would like to formulate a paradoxical thesis, that the great pentagonal crisis can be a source of development of utopian thinking as a way out of the “prison” of the contemporary world dominated by the vanishing trends. Therefore, I think that the triangle the world of knowledge the world of imagination, the world of utopia should be considered in the construction of RFP.

The second problem of the new futurology is the interpretation of the three paradigms outlining the “personality” of the
regions of the XXI century\textsuperscript{54}. We can analyze the nihilistic “personality”, the voluntaristic “personality” and the realistic “personality”. This was done in chapter III of this study.

\* \* \*

The third problem of the New Futurology is the pragmatic triangle: diagnoses – visions – strategies. The foundation of the effective performance of this triangle is the knowledge, imagination and courage to define the key holistic questions, which enter into the scope of our diagnostic and prospective attention.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node (strategies) at (0,0) {Strategies};
\node (diagnoses) at (-3,-2) {Diagnoses};
\node (visions) at (3,-2) {Visions};
\draw[thick,->] (strategies) -- (diagnoses);
\draw[thick,->] (strategies) -- (visions);
\draw[thick,->] (diagnoses) -- (visions);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

In the interpretation of this pragmatic triangle we might read once more the content of chapter IV and V of this study. Maybe this pragmatic triangle is the core of the anatomy of strategic thinking\textsuperscript{55}. However, we can see this problem also in another perspective of the following trajectory of thinking:
1. The pragmatic triangle is not a static, schematic presentation;
2. The pragmatic triangle is a reflection of a network of dynamic processes of multidimensional interactions;
3. The diagnoses the visions and the strategies are seen as a field of interacting forces transforming the diagnostic knowledge of the past into the strategic vision of the future.

\textsuperscript{54} The new Encyclopædia Britannica, volume 12, p. 220, 15\textsuperscript{th} Chicago 1991.

We have to stretch our imagination to find new approaches in the interpretation of the transformation of the diagnostic knowledge of the past into the strategic vision of the future.

* * *

To my mind the futurology of RFP could consider three futurological horizons 2020–2030–2050.

**The horizon of 2020**

These decades in optimistic interpretation will be a core period to overcome the pentagonal crisis and at the same time a period of initial crystallization of the new global order and the reconfiguration of the global space of the XXI century.

Let us quote four documents related to the next decade. This is not a comprehensive list, it is only a sample of approaches which may be useful in our thinking in terms of 2020. **Primo – the first document is Europe 2020.** An European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. This document is a good mirror of conventional wisdom and political correctness dominating in Brussels. This is not a document to discover the great, maybe tragic problem of Europe of the XXI century. Nevertheless the critical analysis of this document should enter in the construction of RFP.

**The second document is the** National Strategy for Regional Development 2010–2020. Regions, cities and rural areas, Warsaw July 13 2010. This is a competent teleology of the Polish Regional Policy in the perspective of the year 2020.

The third document is a spatially differentiated analysis of the German demographic drama in the perspective of the year 2020.

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This is a master study from the point of view of analytic and prospective apparatus. The European Commission should extend this inquiry to the scale of the European Union. We will discover a new category of the European Regions – the dying regions. This is a great problem of tragic dimensions. The dead silence will not solve this problem.

The fourth document is the paper of the III Cracovian Conference presented by K. Rybiński titled The Golden Polish Decade. This is an innovative contribution of the potential glory and misery of Poland in the perspective of the year 2020.

Horizon 2030

I am convinced that the two decades 2010–2030 should be the core period of the futurology of RFP.

In this way in the network of problem oriented monographs we will find an equilibrium between the depth of diagnostic and prospective approaches 1990–2010–2030. This equilibrium is introducing an element of intellectual discipline. We can compare the diagnostic and the prospective glory and misery of the regions, contrasting the real experiences of 1990–2010 and the potential experiences 2010–2030.

The proposed problem oriented monographs can use the inspiration of two schools of strategic thinking.

The first school is represented by the Team of Strategic Advisors of the Prime Minister of Poland which has prepared and published an innovative document Poland 2030 – development challenges.


This is a prospective analysis of the Polish scene in a broad con-
text of comprehensive and well selected international comparisons.

The second school of thinking is the concept Polonia Quo Vadis outlined in chapter X of this study. This is a project of the
Ministry of Regional Development extended and improved by the
III Cacovian Conference which took place in June 2010.

The encounter of these two schools of strategic thinking will
improve the quality of the problem oriented monographs on the
Polish and European Regions (see Annex A).

**Horizon 2050**

In the initial years of RFP we had the impression that the re-
flexion of the invented future of 2050 is entering in the domain of
realistic and pragmatic expectations.  

Unfortunately, the great pentagonal crisis has created cli-
mates slowing down our capacities to consider the invented fu-
ture of the year 2050. The great scale studies Europe 2050 have
not emerged maybe with one exception the demographic studies.
Waiting for better times we must restrict the attention of RFP to the
year 2030. Naturally we may argue in the opposite direction. In the
climate of great crisis we must try to escape from the prison of the
dominating contemporary problems into the utopian world of 2050.

* * *

This is not a full picture of the shape of RFP. We see only some
fragments of this picture as an inducement for a new interpretation
of the assumptions and context of RFP. **In this context we may read the paper of R. Galar titled** Thinking about Region for the
next generation. **This is a complementary vision of RFP. A joint interpretation of these two visions deserves attention of differ-
et schools of Polish Regional Studies.**

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61 Compare the Preface to Volume 1.
62 Volume 3 p. 29–49.
VII. The Conceptual Panorama of the Organization of Knowledge and Imagination of the RFP

This is a new vision of RFP to organize our knowledge and imagination. In this spirit we could interpret the chapters IV, V and VI of this study. In this context we can outline a system of key concepts which have some innovative capacity in the field of regional polices and regional studies. There are four groups of these key concepts:

I. Group is incorporating the long duration, resources for the future, barriers for development and turning points. This is the extended concept of long duration and turning points, which are very important in the interpretation of the past and the future of regions.

II. Group is incorporating the Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions (see chapter IX of this study).

III. Group is incorporating the broadly defined concepts of path dependency, path destruction and path creation (see chapter VIII of this study).

IV. Group is incorporating four concepts following different pragmatic and cognitive motivations: *rerum cognoscere causas*, *mutare in melius*, *quo vadis*, Triple Mezzogiorno.

The following table is a panorama of the key concepts and methodologies of the Program.

This network of the concepts and methodologies represents a set of comprehensive approaches in the inquires related to the history and the future of regions. **To my mind the proposal of an integrated application of this network to the regional reality is an original contribution of the Regio Futures Programme.** This proposal can be reformulated and presented as a map of three trajectories:
Primo – the “natural” evolutionary trajectory, long duration RFF, Turning Point, Long Duration;
Secundo – the “dramatic” trajectory, long duration, path dependency, path destruction, path creation, turning point, long duration;
Tertio – the “tragic” trajectories long duration, barriers, Gordian Knots, Alexandrian Solutions, Turning Points, long duration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The concepts</th>
<th>Methodological approaches</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>diagnoses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Long Duration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources for the future</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Barriers for development</td>
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<td>Turning Points</td>
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<td>Gordian Knots</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alexandrian Solutions</td>
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<td>Path Dependency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Path destruction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Path creation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rerum cognoscere causas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mutare in melius</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Quo Vadis</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Triple Mezzogiorno</td>
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The panorama and the map interpreted jointly in the framework of the five Redefo volumes open the perspective for a new stage in the development of the Regio Future Programme.

We may ask the question if this panorama of 13 concepts and four methodologies is a comprehensive summary of RFP. It is not excluded that the next stages in the development of RFP will create inducement to enrich this conceptual and methodological Panorama.
VIII. The concept of path dependency

Already in the initial stage\(^{63}\) of RFP we have recognized that the concept of path dependency is a trajectory of great cognitive and pragmatic potential.

In Volume one we have published 6 competent papers\(^{64}\) interpreting the theory, the empirical dimension and the institutional framework of the concept of path dependency. In this context we will try to outline 8 problems as an inducement to incorporate into RFP the concept of path dependency:

1. The concept of path dependency in the framework of modernistic and post modernistic theories of regional development

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\(^{63}\) Volume 1.

\(^{64}\) Volume 1, p. 373–381 and pp. 169–226.
2. The main elements and sources of the path dependency concept
3. The strategic discourse in the processes of the creation of a new path of development
4. The institutional importance of the path dependency concept
5. The typology of regions related to the path dependency concept
6. The case of Finland
7. The case of Piedmont
8. The case of Triple Mezzogiorno.

* * *

The concept of path dependency in the context of modernistic and post-modernistic theories of regional development.

We support the observation by B. Domański, that the concept of path dependency has different interpretations in the modernistic and post-modernistic theories of regional development. Let us quote two theses of B. Domański:\footnote{B. Domański, The history and future of European Regions, Volume 1 pp. 373–381.}:

**Thesis one**

*There is a long tradition of conceptualizing development as modernisation and progress. In this perspective, the processes of development lead regions to more advanced stages than before. The social and economic changes which comprise regional development imply the approaching of certain ideal circumstances and may be seen as necessary and irreversible outcomes of, for example, technological progress and the accumulation of knowledge. The salient characteristics of the widespread understanding of the development of regions and countries in the twentieth century was its treatment as a process of change of a teleological, singular, linear, normalizing and instrumental (technical) nature. The attractiveness of this view of development as a historically singular process*
rests on the fact that it portrays the world as an ordered entity, all parts of which are governed by similar rules. This order may manifest itself in the linearity of development, where subsequent stages are always a change for the better. As a result development is basically tantamount to normalization and is intended to bring the attributes of various regions up to the best conditions possible. From the point of view of public authorities, regional policies aimed at promoting regional development are a technical task, relying on the rational selection of available instruments for the achievement of a well-defined goal.

**Thesis two**

The limitations and weaknesses of a modernization approach became the object of massive criticism at the end of the previous century. This even leads to the total rejection of the concept of development. Consequently, in the view of postmodernist anti-essentialism, there are no underdeveloped and backward regions; there are only multiple parallel narratives of development (see e.g. Escobar, 1995; Hart, 2001). Still, the postmodernist celebration of diversity and traditional economic activities may in practice result in the further marginalisation of many regions. The question is whether the concept of development can avoid both the major shortcomings of the modernist perspective and the postmodernist rejection of the evaluation of regional development trajectories and policies.

I share the point of view of B. Domański that we have to accept some of the elements of the post-modernistic critical approaches keeping however the value judgments related to the path dependencies of regions.

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66 B. Domański op.cit.
In this context we might be inclined to compare the evaluation of modernistic and post modernistic approaches by B. Domaniński and the evaluation of old and new regionalism by Anna Gąsior-Niemiec\textsuperscript{67}.

\textbf{The main elements and sources of the path dependency concept}

In the set of quoted papers we find a comprehensive interpretation of the path dependency concept. Let as present the following observations of two Italian authors\textsuperscript{68}:

\textit{The path dependence concept, originally developed in natural science and applied in a broader sense to social science by authors such as David (1985), Arthur (1988), and Arrow (1994), implies that each development step taken by an individual, a social institution, an organization or – as in our field of research – a region, is critically influenced by previous steps. Thus, historical events have a fundamental role in shaping the evolution of a social system (or a regional economy). Anyway, this must not be confused with past dependence. If we consider a system as „past-dependent” only, we assume that its status in a step $t$ wholly depends upon its status in step $t-1$, denying any influence from deliberate action by individuals. On the contrary, the path dependence approach considers the role of intentional actions made by individuals, which are able to influence and modify the outcome of the transition between the different steps in the evolution of a system. Agents are thus able to influence the development path, which is yet open to the effects exercised by a variety of attractors eventually shaping the process itself and its outcome.}

\textsuperscript{67} Volume 1, p. 353–373.

\textsuperscript{68} D. Ietri, S. Rota, Beyond path dependence and path creation. The case of Piedmont, Volume 1, p. 202–215.
The comparison of the point of view of the Italian team and the point of view of B. Domaniński is supporting the interesting reflection related to deterministic and non-deterministic concepts of path dependence, path creation and path destruction.

**The strategic discourse in the processes of path creation.**

B. Roncevic has introduced a new approach into the analysis of the theoretical and pragmatic concept of path creation. **This new approach is the strategic discourse, which is an instrument of path creation.** Let us quote the relevant observation of B. Roncevic⁶⁹:

> However, it is obvious that these mechanisms, which enable path-creation, are successfully activated only in the most developed societies. We showed that in the case of successful latecomers, specific forms of systemic discourse were a key factor which triggered developmental leap in these societies – other factors already existed, sometimes decades prior to that. Successful systemic discourse as a path-creation tool requires specific socio-cultural conditions. Many authors especially emphasize the role of social capital. It is a catalyst of dissemination of human and intellectual capital, a lubricant of network type of organizations, it enhances development of intermediary organizations and thereby allows synergy and coordination (Adam in Roncevic, 2008). It is thus a necessary condition of successful strategic processes and social development. Lack of interpersonal trust (proxy for social capital) is a key obstacle to systemic discourse. Developmental leap therefore requires transformation of strategic processes. Strategic actors, including the state, have to develop capacities to engage in such sophisticated forms of

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⁶⁹ B. Roncevic, *Strategic discourse a path creation tool for latecomers*, Volume 1, p. 315–326.
interaction, if they want to engage in strategic process with positive outcomes.

The model of thinking developed by B. Roncevic deserves a careful attention in the framework of RFP.

THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF PATH CREATION

The pragmatic analysis of the path dependency concept is indicating that this concept may be a useful instrument in the identification of room for manoeuvre in regional policy. Let us quote B. Domański again:

First, it is vital to capture two basic types of process of path dependency, which sustain the direction of development:
1) self-reinforcing mechanisms
2) reactive sequences.

Self-reinforcing (feedback) mechanisms include growth processes based upon cumulative effects (virtuous circles) as well as vicious circles of backwash effects and/or lock-in mechanisms. Reactive sequences are processes where successive phenomena/events A, B and C are linked by cause-effect relationships, where A leads to B, B to C, etc.

Second, the path dependency theory attracts attention to turning points or critical junctures. This is at such a point or juncture when the future direction of development is decided from among numerous possible paths. In other words, it is when path creation happens and/or the break-out from an earlier (locked-in) development trajectory occurs.

In this place we find strong interaction linking the world of path development and the world of long duration and turning point.

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70 B. Domański, Volume 1 op.cit.
Typology of the trajectories of path dependent regions

This typology is an innovative approach developed by B. Domański.\textsuperscript{71} We are reproducing the table by B. Domański suggesting an integrated interpretation jointly with table 1 and 2 included in chapter VII.

The typology of path – dependent trajectories of regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Dominant mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-reinforcing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>Lock-in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>Cumulative growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the next chapter of this study we will discuss the phenomenon of path creation and the phenomenon of “lock-in”.

The case of Finland

In volume one we find two papers by G. Schienstock\textsuperscript{72} and R. Galar\textsuperscript{73} analyzing the problems of path creation in the experiences of Finland, which in the last decades was one of the global leading regions.

We have to remember that the two papers were published before the beginning of the great pentagonal crisis. We see now that Nokia, the \textit{spiritus movens} of the new path of Finland, is not immune in relation to the crisis. This means not that the two papers

\textsuperscript{71} B. Domański po.cit.

\textsuperscript{72} G. Schienstock, \textit{Path dependencies and path creation in Finland}, Volume 1.

\textsuperscript{73} R. Galar, \textit{Path dependency and path creation}, Volume 1.
have lost their original validity. Especially important in this context is the conclusion of the paper by R. Galar⁷⁴:

The considerations presented might offer some hint for a research program concerning the regional path creating potential. Such a program should abstract from the well known benchmarks associated with the path dependent progress (patents, publications, R&D employment and resources). It should concentrate instead on the attitudes, competences and social practices that are conductive to the breakthrough innovations. For example:

- inventive courage Moving from the positive local identity;
- challenges specific to the locality that demand specific reactions;
- a distinct pool of competences;
- innovative achievements of the people educated in the region;
- individualistic attitudes and the culture of cooperation;
- public spirit embodied in informal networks;
- low procedural entanglement enabling learning by trials and errors;
- institutions and traditions of patronage offering long term creative freedom.

In his paper on the future of regions research priorities Kukliński writes about the grand political and economical factors that are going to shape this future. Still, as far as imitative or innovative future is concerned, the humble cultural factors might turn out to be the necessary ingredient of the long term success. This aspect seems very important, if only because it is usually overlooked.

This idea to develop studies which should discover the regional potential to create new paths of development has a new meaning

⁷⁴ R. Galar, Volume 1, p. 190–201.
in the conditions which will try to overcome the great pentagonal crisis of the years 2008–2011.

The case of Piedmont

The paper by the Italian Team analyzing the experiences of Piedmont is a good example of the Myrdalian Triangle: theories – questions – empirical materials.

The paper is analyzing a specific case of path dependency and path creation, where a new idea of short-cut has emerged. This is the most interesting dimension of this paper which should be quoted in this place:

In this paper we addressed the topics of path dependence and path creation proposing a third perspective in which both creation and tradition contribute to the development of a regional economy: the crosscutting perspective. The hypotheses at the basis of this proposal are two: old industrial regions are lively to suffer from lock-in effects at a large extent provoked by path dependence; development path is no longer linear, but winding. Some regions succeed in abandoning traditional paths and create new technological and organizational trajectories. Some others are so firmly tied with their past specialization that path creation is not possible. In these cases, anyway, it is possible for the region to seek for deviations in the traditional path, i.e. new technological trajectories that – as short-cuts – may help in attaining/achieving further stages of development, without dropping the traditional path for good. This is possible because the technological change is adopted for a period that is not long enough to induce mindful change in the organizational paradigm as well.

75 D. Ietri, S. Rota op.cit. Volume 1, p.203.
In the interpretation of this quotation let us consider the relation linking the old and a new path. These processes of the dynamic development of the new path must not necessary be performed in the ruins of the old path, which can continue its existence as a relatively shrinking less dynamic field in comparison to the new more dynamic path.

**The case of Triple Mezzogiorno**

It would be interesting to answer the question, why the Tripple Mezzogiorno Conference and the Post Conference Volume dedicated a very limited amount of attention to the path dependency concepts and realities. We will return to this question in chapter X.

* * *

In the conclusion of chapter VIII let me say that the concept, reality and methodology of path dependencies is a field which should be explored theoretically and empirically in the next stage of development of RFP. This is a really dynamic field of transdisciplinary European regional studies. The global perspective is also very promising from this point of view.

**IX. The concept of Gordian Knots**

The concept of the Gordian Knots is not only a scientific concept, but also a metaphor to mobilize our knowledge and imagination in the processes of development of global and regional strategic studies. This motivation was probably the source of the decision of the team of K. Rybiński to prepare in the framework of RFP a pioneering study titled *Gordian Knots of the 21st century*.  

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76 Volume 5.  
77 REDEFO volume 2.
This decision has created a study defining the concept of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions as an instrument to interpret the most important challenges of the XXI century. Table 4 is presenting the intellectual and pragmatic axis of the volume.78

Table 4
The axis of the volume

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Gordian Knots</th>
<th>The fields of transformation of Gordian Knots into Solutions</th>
<th>The Alexandrian Solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>The discovery and analyses of the Gordian Knots</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>↔</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>The recognition of the existence of the Gordian Knots by the grand decision making elites</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>↔</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>The decisions to apply the Alexandrian solutions and the implementation of these decisions</td>
<td>E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the pragmatic point of view, the most important chapter of the study is chapter V79 outlining a bold formulation of five Alexandrian solutions of the XXI century:

1. Alexandrian Solution to the „political cannibalism” Gordian knot
2. Alexandrian Solution to limits of growth
3. Alexandrian Solution to aging and migration
4. Alexandrian Solution in the rise of China and the failure of Western Democracy
5. Alexandrian Solution to financial market hegemony and the emergence of new global players.

This pattern of five Alexandrian solutions is a bold and innovative formulation. This is not a holistic formulation incorporating not only the spheres of economy, finance, demography, politics and ecology, but also the sphere of culture, which is so important in the shaping of the XXI century.

We have a long way to go to create a really holistic interpretation of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions. This study by K. Rybiński is a first opening step of this field. The concept of the Gordian Knot can be applied in six spatial scales: global, continental, sub-continental, national, regional and local. In each scale we find the specific features of the Gordian Knots.

We have to find a common denominator in the minimum threshold of the scale of the institution at systems involved in the creation of the Gordian knots and potential of responsible for the Alexandrian solutions. There is no doubt that the region as a social economic, political and cultural community can be an “ego” of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions.\(^{80}\)

This line of thinking was developed in chapter IV of Volume 2 and in Volume 5 pp. 48–49.

In this way we have opened the trajectories to incorporate the concept of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian solutions in to the broad domain of regional studies and regional policies.

In the next stage of RFP we should explore not only the theoretical foundations of the concept of Gordian Knots, but we should try to use this concept in the proposed network of diagnostic studies (compare annex A).

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**X. The concept of Quo Vadis**

Quo Vadis is a very old European question, dating back from the period when Henryk Sienkiewicz was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1906\(^ {81}\). This splendid tradition was an inspiration to

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\(^{80}\) Compare Volume 3, p. 142.

\(^{81}\) Volume 5, p. 66.
formulate – after 100 years – a new interpretation of *Quo Vadis* in the form of a grand set of diagnostic and prospective studies facing the challenging mega-historical question “Polonia Quo Vadis”\(^{82}\)?

I would like to formulate a thesis that the Polish social sciences and especially economic, sociological and political sciences should try to answer the fundamental question “Polonia Quo Vadis?” It is impossible to be continuously lost in the forest of detailed questions. It is necessary to formulate a frontal question: “Polonia Quo Vadis?” This is a holistic question, a question which is grasping the essential features of structures and dynamics of the given object of theoretical and pragmatic studies. Poland is the object of these studies.

*Quo Vadis* is a dynamic question; it is a question interpreting the trajectory of thinking: the past – the present – the future. *Quo Vadis* is a teleological question related to the goal of our visions. Please remember the observation by L. Seneka: “Ignoranti quem portus petat nullus ventus suus est”.

The question “Polonia Quo Vadis” entered into the field of attention of RFP in 2009. In March 2009 A. Kukliński, following the initiative of the Ministry of Regional Development, prepared a study titled *The role of the Polonia Quo Vadis Project in the development of the Regio Future Programme*. This study opened a field of conferences and publications which found successful implementation in the years 2009–2010.

Let me mention only Volume 4 of REDEFO published by the Ministry of Regional Development in 2009.

In this volume\(^ {83}\) the concept Quo Vadis is tested not only in the experiences of Poland but also in the experiences of Slovenia, Finland, Flanders, the Urals and Piedmont. This stream of comparative studies could be developed by the Ministry of Regional Development in cooperation with the European Commission, OECD and the World Bank. We can note with great satisfaction that in the last three years we have observed the development in

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\(^{82}\) Compare Volume 4, p. 11.

\(^{83}\) Volume 4, pp. 11–134.
new centres of strategic thinking promoting innovative interpretations of the *Polonia Quo Vadis* question.

We have to mention the three Cracovian Conferences of the years 2008–2009–2010. The Cracovian publication trilogy\(^{84}\) has emerged based on a body of 50 eminent, sometimes charismatic, contributions developing the *problematique* of *Mundus Quo Vadis, Europa Quo Vadis, Polonia Quo Vadis*.

The sponsor of these publications – the Cracovian Observatory of Regional Policy is changing itself into a new actor of the Polish and European scene of regional studies opening at the same time a new chapter in the development of RFP.

In the academic year 2009–2010 the Polish Economic Society and the Polish Association for the Club of Rome promoted activities and publications of the Forum of Strategic Thinking\(^{85}\). In November 2010 The Forum will organize a Conference under a provocative title\(^{86}\) – “The centenary of the European Union”? Last but not least, we should mention two initiatives of Lower Silesia.

The first of them is the excellent performance of the annual Conferences in Krzyżowa promoting inter alia the *Polonia Quo Vadis Question* in the broad academic, business and self-governmental communities.

The second initiative is the international Conference *Europa Quo Vadis* which took place in June 2010. The post-conference volume will be published in October 2010.

These examples are indicating that the *Quo Vadis* concept is incorporated into a broad stream of academic, governmental, self-governmental and social activities and trajectories of innovative thinking.


\(^{85}\) A volume *The forum of strategic thinking. Experiences and prospects* will be published in September 2010.

\(^{86}\) This is the potential centenary 1957–2057.
This rich and differentiated record of publications and conferences is a good background to formulate three questions stressing the dramatic validity of the Polonia Quo Vadis Programme.

The first question: How to promote the culture of strategic thinking of the Polish political elites and the Polish society in toto? The question Polonia Quo Vadis is a grand holistic challenge for our mind and imagination. The Polish “mind” is too strongly dominated by historical thinking. How to introduce a strong futurological dimension into the Polish thinking of the XXI century?

The second question: How to design the processes of the evaluation of the transformation of Poland in the years 1990–2010? The Polish society should have the knowledge, imagination and courage to face the evaluation of the transformation of Poland of the last two decades.

We have to see the glory of this transformation, the renaissance of the independence of Poland, the genius of the Polish economy, Polish state and society, science and culture to find the trajectory of successful adaptation to new conditions created by the global market economy and by the European parliamentary democracy. We have to see the grand geopolitical success of Polonia Restituta, the full membership in the European Union and NATO. Seeing the glory of the Polish transformation, we should not forget the reverse side of this coin, the real field of the misery of this transformation, the record of lost historical opportunities87.

There is no doubt however that in the final result the Polish transformation is a great success not only in the scale of the history of Poland, but also in the scale of the history of Europe.

The third question – to what extent is the leap forward of the civilization of Poland in the years 2010–2030 a feasible reality or an utopian illusion?88

87 Compare J. Staniskis, Nie marnujmy kryzysu, Tygodnik Powszechny, 5 lipca 2009.

88 Compare the title of the contribution by W. Orlowski to the Polonia Quo Vadis conference Cracovia June 2010 The civilization leap of Poland 2010–2030 real chance or illusion?.
In the optimistic interpretation of the potential Polish experiences of the XXI century, these two decades will be a great turning point of the leap forward of the civilization of Poland. Poland will join the community of highly developed and creative societies represented by advanced levels of the information society and knowledge based economy. Poland will cross the invisible line separating the European centre and the European periphery. This leap forward would be created by a dynamic and innovative society which will be able to elect a system of governance designing and implementing pro-developmental polices, placing Poland in the higher domains of the global ranking records. This is not a utopian vision. This is a vision implemented by Finland in the years 1990–2010.

It is interesting to analyze the documentation of this optimistic vision in the Report Poland 2030, the developmental challenges. This Report is not a book dominated by naive optimism. The Report is outlining 10 challenges which are conditio sine qua non of the implementation of this vision.

The leap forward of the civilization of Poland in the years 2010–2030 is not an automatic verdict following the implementation of the optimistic vision. We must discuss also a pessimistic vision assuming that the prevailing forces of the Polish society will select an innovation-averse trajectory of stagnation. This will be the result of strategic paralyses of the prevailing forces of the Polish society and of the system of governance. The critical evaluation of the long experience of Polish history is indicating that the probability of this paralysis is small, but that the specter of this paralysis cannot be totally removed from our reflection concerning the XXI century.

This means that the years 2010–2030 will be the crucial decades for Poland of the XXI century. The leap forward versus the paralysis of stagnation. Let us quote in this context the last sentence of the brilliant paper by W. Orlowski which was presented during the III Cracovian Conference:

90 W. Orlowski, op.cit.
We can imagine the radical leap forward of the civilization of Poland in the years 2010–2030. But the probability of this leap forward is low. The biggest barrier for the potential leap forward is the mentality of the society unable to accept the scale of necessary change. If however the Polish society will be able to overcome this barrier then who knows?91

The paper by W. Orlowski is an important contribution to the processes of the creation of the climate of frontal charismatic discussion focused on the Polonia Quo Vadis issues. [...] We need to develop a new methodology of strategic thinking to face this charismatic challenge.

**XI. The concept of the Triple Mezzogiorno**

In the framework of RFP we have a strong motivation to look for new approaches in the inquiry into the nature of the dynamic mosaic of the European regions. We are trying to find new objects of comparative studies, which will integrate the cognitive and pragmatic motivations.

In this context the idea has emerged to introduce into a holistic comparative perspective the experiences of Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland. As a common denominator the concept of the Triple Mezzogiorno was proposed92. *Prima facie* it is very difficult to prove the validity of this choice. We can find my arguments that each of the three regions is representing a different context of civilization and different shape of long duration.

Nevertheless these regions have a *genus proximum*. These regions are examples of the processes of long duration which have

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91 This is my translation of the original Polish text of W. Orlowski. I hope that the intentions of the Author are well reflected in this translation.

92 Compare Volumes 3 and 5.
created the biggest European regional Gordian Knots. Therefore we represent the opinion that the concept of the Triple European Mezzogiorno is a concept having a pronounced theoretical, empirical and pragmatic validity. The concept can be a foundation of an interesting research Programme and even some decisions in the field of regional policy of the European Union.

This point of view found a strong support in the interesting International Conference organized in Warsaw in September 2009 by the Ministry of Regional Development.93

The problematique of the Gordian Knots in the Triple Mezzogiorno found a comprehensive scientific and pragmatic documentation in Volumes 3 and 5 of REDEFO.94

Following this documentation, I would like to present six comments as an inspiration to change the Triple Mezzogiorno concept into a significant program of studies and international cooperation:

1. The problematique of the Triple Mezzogiorno. The rich content of Volumes 3 and 5 open the Myrdalian field: theory – questions – empirical materials;
2. The methodology: Volumes 3 and 5 have a strong methodological dimension expanding the framework of reflection presented in Volumes 1 and 2. Especially interesting is the encounter of conventional and non-conventional wisdom tested clearly in the German experiences95;
3. The empirical dimension of the Triple Mezzogiorno should be expressed in the shape of 20 charismatic monographs exploring the experiences of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the years 1990–2010. The proposed dynamic diagnoses should be not only a text of well performed conventional methodology. It is should be also

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an act of intellectual courage to discuss the real and not the apparent problems of the regions. The experiences of the Triple Mezzogiorno are a very delicate matter exposed to the pressure of conventional wisdom and political correctness. The text of the Volumes 3 and 5 is very interesting also from this point of view.

4. The futurology of the Triple Mezzogiorno. This is the idea of prospective monographs analyzing the potential experiences of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the decades 2010–2030. In the conditions of the pentagonal global crisis it is difficult to outline the visions and strategies of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the perspective of the year 2030. It is difficult but not impossible. We have no choice: the Triple Mezzogiorno must face the enigma of the XXI century.

5. The world of the Triple Mezzogiorno should be observed in the context of the dynamic reconfiguration of strong and weak regions in the European Union and in the global scale. This idea has already emerged in the papers published in Volumes 3 and 5. We remember that the meaning of the global context in the XXI century will be different in comparison with the experiences of the XXI century.

6. The world of the Triple Mezzogiorno is already an object of international cooperation and especially an object of the Polish–Italian cooperation. Let me mention only the cooperation of the Ministries of Regional Development of Poland and Italy and the decision of Professor Bruno Amoroso to organize in Rome in March 2011 an international Conference dedicated to the Triple European Mezzogiorno. The Rome Conference 2011 will be a big push for ideas developed in the framework of the Warsaw 2009 Conference.

In this context we should mention also the Lublin Project organized by the Lublin School of Economics and Innovation. In the conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Triple Mezzogiorno is functioning already not only as a concept of scientific analyzes. It is also a metaphor inspiring our knowledge and imagination.

In this context we could formulate a question if in the experiences of the Triple Mezzogiorno we should enter also in the
fascinating world of art and especially the great novel. The Leopard by Giuseppe de Lapmedusa\textsuperscript{96} is a great contribution to the imaginative interpretation of the experiences of the Italian Mezzogioro. In the same spirit we can mention also the great documents created by the famous Italian school of film-making.

**XII. The pragmatic horizons of RFP**

The publication record of RFP is demonstrating that the Programme has a potential of cognitive and pragmatic success in the field of regional studies in Europe. The RFP changed itself into a field of effective cooperation of 50 Authors who are supporting the Programme contributing their knowledge and imagination to the developmental of RFP. Unfortunately the pragmatic effects of RFP are smaller than originally expected. Up till now an envisaged consortium of 20 regions willing to prepare problem oriented monographs of their empirical and prospective experiences in the years 1990–2030 has not yet emerged and it remains an important task for the future. Some elements of implementation we are to be found in Volume four of REDEFO. This is a set of individual contributions incorporating the elements of diagnostic and prospective thinking.

However, this set cannot be described as a turning point opening the implementation stage of the Programme in a European scale. By contrast, this turning point was achieved in the scale of Poland following the activities of the Cracovian Observatory of Development Polices.

The activity of this Observatory has created an important contribution to the development of RFP. Let me mention the three Croacvian Conferences of the years 2008–2009–2010 and three post-conference volumes which created an extended interpretation of RFP. The three Cracovian volumes should be included

into the publication record of RFP\textsuperscript{97}. At the present moment this is only a change in the Polish chapter of RFP since the Cracovian volumes were published only in Polish. We hope however that Cracovian Observatory will publish a synthetic volume in English containing the best papers presented during the three Cracovian Conferences.

The Cracovian scene is changing itself into a dynamic growth pole of RFP.

The Cracovian conferences were already mentioned. In volume four we find the diagnostic study of the transformation of Małopolska prepared by the team of B. Domański\textsuperscript{98}. This study is a valuable contribution to the discussion answering the question how to prepare the problem oriented diagnostic monographs of the transformation of the European regions in the years 1990–2010. We have also the promising perspective of cooperation between Cracovia and Torino, focused on a comparative evaluation of the experiences of the Italian and Polish Piedmont\textsuperscript{99}. This is an inspiring metaphor for historical and prospective studies.

We are convinced that the model of the Cracovian growth pole\textsuperscript{100} building up the cognitive and pragmatic structures of RFP will find various channels of diffusion across the Polish and European regional scene. A prominent place in these channels is already defined by the networks created by the Triple Mezzogiorno Conferences in Warsaw 2009 and in Rome 2011.

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\textsuperscript{97} See footnote 84. The content of the Cracovian trilogy can be summarized as reflection around three questions, Mundus Quo Vadis, Europea Quo Vadis, Polonia Quo Vadis.

\textsuperscript{98} Volume 4, pp. 95–134.

\textsuperscript{99} In the experiences of the XIX century Małopolska, the region of Cracovia was presented as the Polish Piedmont.

\textsuperscript{100} I am not trying to say that the Cracovian growth pole is the most important growth pole in Poland. I am saying only that Małopolska, the region of Cracovia was the strongest supporter and participant of RFP. We can present a list of five or six Polish Regions which have directly or indirectly supported the RFP and which I hope will support the RFP in the future.
These are three pragmatic horizons of RFP: the Polish horizon, the horizon of the European Union and the global horizon.

**The Polish horizon**

It is difficult to assume that the whole set of 16 Polish self-governmental regions will join the RFP and prepare comprehensive problem oriented monographs covering the diagnostic period (1990–2010) and the prospective period 2010–2030. We can assume, however, that a group of 5–7 Polish regions will emerge as members of the International Consortium of RFP. This is not a formal membership. It is a membership *per facta et pacta concludentia*. The development of the RFP growth pole in Cracovia is a very good example of the feasibility of this trajectory.

**The horizon of the European Union**

Volumes 4 and 5 are indicating that some elements of RFP already exist in a small group of the European Regions. How to extend this group and develop comprehensive problem oriented monographs outlined in Annex A?

**The global horizon**

There is no doubt, that in the present conditions of the XXI century, the RFP must be globalized. This means, that the proposed consortium of 20 regions should incorporate the experiences of American, Indian, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian regions. In this paper we have proposed the initiative for the European Union to organize two grand conferences analyzing the experiences and prospects of the Indian and Chinese regions. An alternative way of the globalization of the RFP is the cooperation in the framework of OECD.
To my mind this paper is just a beginning of a brainstorming discussion about how to discover and develop new pragmatic horizons of RFP.

**XIII. The cognitive horizons of RFP**

I would like to formulate a thesis that RFP has created an introductory outline of a new model of thinking related to the past and the future of Regions. The *problematique*, the conceptualization and the methodology of this thinking was outlined above.

The maybe controversial concept of the “mind” and “will” of the region was formulated. It was emphasized that the “self-programming capacity” is the most fundamental attribute of the real autonomy of the region.

The Program has analyzed different interpretations of the path dependency concept stressing that this concept has a large potential in the studies related to the past and the future of regions.

To the domain of concepts which are applied in regional studies, the RFP has introduced three new approaches: the Gordian Knots, Quo vadis, and the Triple Mezzogiorno.

The review of nine volumes created in the framework of RFP is an inducement to try to outline the main thematic and methodological streams which in the years 2007–2010 have created some elements of a new model of thinking about the past and the future of regions.

A question can be formulated if this new model *in statu nascendi* is a potential contribution to the creation of a new paradigm of the European regional studies.

This is an optimistic interpretation of RFP. In the pessimistic interpretation RFP is only an episode on the margin of the main conventional stream of the European regional studies, an episode which will be forgotten very soon. Is there any chance that the RFP
will be recognized as a very modest contribution to the development of a new paradigm? The creation of a new paradigm means not only a new model of thinking. A new paradigm is first of all a trajectory of construction of a new system of questions defining our interpretations of the past and the future. In this context I would like to present a list of 10 fundamental questions emerging from RFP.

1. Why should we try to discover the sources of the crisis of the old paradigm of the European regional studies and policies? Why should we try to outline the shape of the new paradigm?
2. How to interpret the greatest transformation of the global space in the last 500 years? How to interpret the processes which are creating the new map of the world?
3. How to interpret the role of the European Union as an institution creating the new European megaspace?
4. How to interpret the regional dimension of the dramatic or even tragic demographic crisis of Europe of the XXI century?
5. How to interpret the European megaspace as a scene of the emerging of the new paths of developmental and the destruction of the old paths of development?
6. How to interpret the concept of Gordian Knots of the European megaspace?
7. How to interpret the cognitive and pragmatic potentials incorporated in the studies of the Triple Mezzogiorno?
8. How to interpret the diagnostic scene of the transformation of the European regions in the years 1990–2010?
9. How to interpret the prospective scene of the transformation of the European regions in the years 2010–2030?
10. How to interpret the European megaspace as a scene of the development of regional centers of strategic thinking?

This list of 10 questions is trying to outline the scope of attention of RFP. I am not trying to say that this is an “optimal” list. It is only a proposal to review the thematic content of RFP. In this way we are seeing the confluence of two trajectories of RFP. The first trajectory is the new model of thinking. The second trajectory is the list of problem oriented questions in the style of Gunnar Myrdal whom the Author quoted many times in the publications of RFP.
I hope that this paper was able to grasp the spirit and letter of RFP. I would be most grateful if the Authors of contributions published in the framework of RFP would like to express some critical judgments concerning the RFP and my presentation of the experiences and prospects of RFP.

Now the judgment is yours – Ladies and Gentlemen.

Warsaw, September 2010

**ANNEX A**

**RFP as a System of Problem Oriented Monographs**

RFP is a system of problem oriented monographs of the Region. We have to develop the original assumptions of RFP presented in Volume 1\(^{101}\) and later developed in Volume 4\(^{102}\). The program is already a well functioning “invisible college” of 50 authors, who have participated in different stages of the development of RFP. We have to implement the initial assumptions that the Programm will perform as a consortium of a minimum of 20 regions supported by efficient regional institutions. Each member of the consortium will prepare a problem oriented monograph following the experience of OECD\(^{103}\), the World Bank\(^{104}\) and the European Union\(^{105}\).

These monographs should be created in a concentrated effort of the next two years 2011–2012. In the publication record of RFP we find good starting points for these efforts, especially interesting are the experiences of six regions:

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\(^{101}\) Volume 1, p. 455–485.

\(^{102}\) Volume 4 p. 11–134.

\(^{103}\) Volume 1, p. 467.


\(^{105}\) Compare inter alia Volume 1 p. 483.
Małopolska\textsuperscript{106}, Piedmont\textsuperscript{107}, Flanders\textsuperscript{108}, Finland\textsuperscript{109}, Eastern Poland\textsuperscript{110} and the Italian Mezzogiorno\textsuperscript{111}. I hope that the list of the potential members of the Consortium will grow\textsuperscript{112} to create a community representing a sufficient scope and differentiation of experiences. The group of six regions can be defined as a new growth pole of RFP. Each member of the proposed consortium will prepare a problem oriented monograph including five chapters\textsuperscript{113}:

**Chapter one** – the methodology in the perspective of critical evaluation of RFP\textsuperscript{114}

**Chapter two** – the empirical and diagnostic dimension of the monograph aimed at a dynamic diagnosis of the transformation of the region in the years 1990–2010

**Chapter three** – the futurology of the monograph: the region facing the enigma of the XXI century; the transformation of the region in the years 2010–2030

**Chapter four** – the region facing the reconfiguration of the global scene of the XXI century

**Chapter five** – the strategic thought of the region and the improvement of the self programming capacity of the region.

Naturally, each region will demonstrate a different dimension of the original thinking\textsuperscript{115}. Each monograph would see the region in a universal perspective and also in the perspective of a niche – a place where special non-universal experiences are emerging.

\textsuperscript{106} Volume 4 p. 95.
\textsuperscript{107} Volume 4 p. 77.
\textsuperscript{108} Volume 4, p. 57.
\textsuperscript{109} Volume 4, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{110} Volume 5 and M. Stefański, *The Lublin Project*, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{111} Volume 5.
\textsuperscript{112} At especially interesting case is the triangle Eindhoven, Leuven, Aachen, proposed in Volume 4 p. 67.
\textsuperscript{113} Compare the OECD methodology, Volume 1 p. 467 and 469.
\textsuperscript{114} Compare especially Volume 1 p. 455.
\textsuperscript{115} Compare Volume 3 p. 29.
We need however, following the experiences of OECD, to estab-
lish certain patterns of methodology and thematic community
for the whole system of the regional monographs\textsuperscript{116}. In this way
the principle of comparability will be introduced into our system
of monographs.

\* \* \*

The idea to start the cooperation of the six regions is a feasible
reality having the potential of an extension by incorporating the
experiences of the next 20 regions. In an optimistic scenario this
community will be further extended to 50 regions in the global
scale. This would be a very great global success of RFP. But the
scale of 20 regions is the minimum size of the consortium to change
the RFP into a pragmatic success. The empirical and prospective
foundations of RFP must be broad and strong to open the field
of generalizations related to the regional futurology of the XXI
century\textsuperscript{117}.

This is the greatest challenge for the future development of
RFP.

\textsuperscript{116} Compare OECD op.cit.; Volume 1 p. 467.
\textsuperscript{117} Compare Volume 1 pp. 478–479.
Towards a new model of regional policy*

Introduction

In this paper I will try to outline 3 theses:

1) In the experiences of the XX century the model of socially minded regional policy – was the dominating phenomenon.

2) In the experiences of XXI century the model of globally minded regional policy will be the dominating phenomenon.

3) The transformation from the old to the new model is taking place in the great Sturm und Drang Periode of the years 1980 – 2020.

This historical turning point can be described as a quartet of mutually interrelated transitions:
– from Fordism to Post-Fordism
– from Modernism to Post-Modernism


1 This paper is a follow up of my short presentation in the framework of the last panel of the Ostuni Conference – Rethinking Regional Development Policies. The role of social capital in promoting competitiveness in less favoured regions, Ostuni, Italy July 2nd–5th 2003. I am very grateful to dr Mikel Landabaso for the inducement to prepare this paper. Naturally, all the weaknesses of this paper are related only to the responsibility of the Author.

– from the Keynesian Welfare State to the Schumpeterian Workfare State
– from industrial to information society.

These transformations are embedded in the processes of globalization which are changing very deeply the global competitive arena and the relative position of Europe in the landscape of the XXI century.

In the latest publication of the European Commission we find the following charismatic formulation:

* * *

Europe is facing a crucial period in its history. It is confronted with a number of major, and sometimes very conflicting, challenges and choices, and the various paths it decides to follow will crucially affect the future shape of European society and its role to the world.

* * *

Europe’s leaders already acknowledge that the transition towards a knowledge-based economy involves a fundamental structural change, and that all the challenges facing Europe need to be reconsidered in the light of this new paradigm. At the Lisbon European Council of March 2000, they adopted a new strategic goal to transform the Union by 2010 into ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy

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in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion'. However, in this transition to a knowledge-based economy, Europe is already lagging somewhat behind the US, and can learn a lot from the US experience. The aim should not be to imitate the US, but rather to seek to define the European way to the knowledge-based economy. As the Lisbon Conclusions state: ‘The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its own values and concepts of society’.

The challenge of the new paradigm must be recognized not only in the terms of verbal declarations but also in the terms of a deep transformation of the institutional structures and systems of policies designed and implemented in the framework of the European Union. In this intellectual and pragmatic climate we are trying to outline the following topical sequence of this paper:

- The XX century as the golden age of a socially minded regional policies
- The transformation of regional policies and the emerging model of globally minded regional policies
- The region as a framework for development of knowledge based economy and knowledge based society
- The new model and perception of regional governance
- The special role of social capital
- The new model of cohesion policies
- Regional policy as an instrument of transformation of the European space
- The research priorities.

THE INTELLECTUAL EQUIPMENT OF THE NEW MODEL

Naturally this outline is not a comprehensive vision of all most important problems related to the transition from the old to the new model of regional policies. I hope, however, that even this
modest inducement will be useful in our theoretical reflections and pragmatic discussions.

**THE XX CENTURY AS THE GOLDEN AGE OF SOCIALLY MINDED REGIONAL POLICIES**

The model of socially minded regional policy was developed by the industrial society and by the welfare state. Two ideological and pragmatic principles were incorporated in the construction of the Keynesian Welfare State:

- the principle of full employment and
- principle of social justice.

These two principles were applied not only to the sphere of interpersonal relations but also to the interpretation of the regional scene – and especially to the relations between strong and weak regions.

The Doctrine of Diminishing Interregional Disparities (D.D.I.D.) was generally accepted as the theoretical and pragmatic foundation in the broad domains of regional policies and regional planning. The essence of this Doctrine may be formulated as follows:

For political, social, moral and economic reasons the society and the state should not tolerate such movements of the spontaneous market forces which generate and multiply long-term disparities between more and less developed regions.

The basic framework of this model was formulated in Europe and North America in the mid-thirties – as a reaction to the tragedy of the Great Depression. The rapid diffusion of this model in the global scale took place in the years 1950–80. The most comprehensive analysis of this model was presented in the UNRISD – Mouton Regional Planning Series (12 volumes) published in the
Towards a new model of regional policy

years 1971–84. This model was absorbed and transformed in an innovative way by the consecutive incarnations of the European Community in the last decades of the XX century. This model was an important inspiration for the European Union in the design and implementation of cohesion policies related to selected countries and selected regions.

In 2001 The European Commission published a splendid monument of conventional wisdom presenting the experiences and prospects in the field of cohesion policies. I would like to outline a view representing a critical approach in the framework of non-conventional wisdom. In this perspective the cohesion policy has four features:

It is a structural policy, a mechanistic policy an introvertic policy and a fragmentaristic policy. The structuralism of this policy is related to the assumption that the increase in the cohesion of the European Union is achieved via the implementation of the doctrine of diminishing international and interregional disparities.

The mechanistic character of the cohesion policy is related to the construction of a rigidly determined system of strictly defined quantitative indicators incorporating such and not other fragments of European space. The advantage of this system is its clarity and objectivity. The disadvantage is the stiffness of the system in which a region meeting the criteria of selection in de facto terms cannot be excluded from the system even in case of consecutive practices of obvious wasting of the structural funds. In this situation some

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weak regions can *de facto* represent a view that the situation of the lagging behind region is better than the situation of the catching up region. The success of the catching up region is at the same time the exclusion of this region from the system of cohesion policies, which in practical terms means the loss of a permanent stream of income “internalized” by the demoralized elites of the given weak region. This is the dilemma of “lagging behind” versus “catching up” regional psychology.

The introvertic character of the cohesion policy is explained by the assumption that the implementation of D.D.I.D is a more important challenge than the challenge of global competitiveness.

The fragmentaristic character of cohesion policy is related to the fact that this policy is embracing only some fragments of the European space losing the holistic perspective of the totality of this space as a fragment of the global space.

Presenting these critical comments I am not forgetting that in the perspective of conventional wisdom the cohesion policy is a very great achievement of the European Union of the XX century.

**The transformation of regional policy and the emerging model of globally minded regional policy**

The *Sturm und Drang Periode* of the last 25 years has produced an intellectual and pragmatic climate of constant erosion of the foundations of socially minded regional policy. This process of erosion found a constructive counterpart in the process of creation of a new model of globally minded regional policies well grasped in the title of a recent volume – *Regions, globalization and the knowledge based economy*.

The region must be an efficient actor on the global scene. This is the regional “to be or not to be”. In this situation the globally minded regional policy is the only one possible choice in the conditions of the XXI century.

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Towards a new model of regional policy

The region as a framework for the development of knowledge based economy and knowledge based society

The Lisbon Agenda taken seriously and realistically is a great inducement to build up a new model of regional policy for Europe, the model of globally minded regional policy. In this context two types of interaction could be observed:
1) the region as a stimulating environment for the development of KBE and KBS,
2) the KBE and KBS as a driving force for the sustainable development of the region.

The virtuous circle of mutual enforcement of KBE and KBS is also very important. I like the formulation concerning the knowledge economy growth being translated into the growth of knowledge society and vice versa. Let us quote in this context the hypothesis formulated by P.A. David and D. Foray:

The knowledge economy’s growth into the knowledge society hinges on the proliferation of knowledge-intensive communities. These communities are basically linked to scientific, technical, and business professions or projects and, as said, are characterized by their strong knowledge production and reproduction capabilities, a public or semi-public space for learning and exchange, and an intensive use of information technologies. Only when increasing numbers of communities displaying those very characteristics are formed by citizens, users, and the uninitiated being brought together by a shared interest in a given subject, will the knowledge society really

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begin to develop. But the challenges outlined above are going to be all the harder to meet.

The follow up of this line of thinking we find in the challenging formulation of S. Boisier\textsuperscript{12}: “Sociedad del conocimiento, conocimiento social y gestión territorial”. I am convinced that the European Commission should organize a path-breaking conference titled “The Lisbon Agenda and the new model of regional policy for Europe”.

\textbf{THE NEW MODEL AND PERCEPTION OF REGIONAL GOVERNANCE}

In the last decades we found a general practice to replace the concept of regional government by a broader concept of regional governance\textsuperscript{13} which \textit{inter alia} is an integration of some elements of the classical doctrine of government and the new doctrines of management.

In the classical regional development doctrine, the leading analogy of the region was a \textit{quasi} state. Now we should consider regions also, or first of all, as \textit{quasi}-firms. This observation may be found in the path-breaking paper of S. Boisier\textsuperscript{14} introducing the concept of regional management in the following context:

A vision of the region as a quasi-firm means applying some corporate procedures to the region mutatis mutandis, particularly those of the ‘large corporation’, one of the few contemporary organizations that uses the modern concept of planning effectively.

This point is very well taken. The region of the XXI century must internalize and develop the important experience of transnational corporations in the field of strategic planning. This internalization is very important from the point of view of the construction of the new model of regional policy. Maybe a proposal could be considered to organize jointly with the European Commission and OECD a conference on regional governance as an element of the model of the new regional policy.

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

There is no doubt that social capital should be recognized as a crucial element in the construction and implementation of the new model of regional policy. Let us quote an important fragment of the Ostuni consensus:

First, it was agreed social capital is especially relevant for regional development. In this context social capital is a market-based social exercise based on trust, shared norms, and institutions. Second, it facilitates cooperation within and among groups as well as enlarges a capacity for collective action leading to mutual benefits. Third, it improves collective processes of learning and constitutes a key element of knowledge creation, diffusion and transfer – all processes

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16 Ostuni Consensus, The Ostuni Conference, op.cit.
critical for innovation and competitiveness. Finally, social capital cements value-based networks stimulating successful regional clusters as well as regional innovation strategies and policies. The issue is especially important for the less-favoured regions that have weak social capital and little understanding of science and knowledge, yet face fundamental economic, technological and social change.

The Ostuni post-conference volume will create a rich and comprehensive documentation of this point of view.

**The new model of cohesion policies**

The new model of regional policies is creating a strong demand for a new model of cohesion policies. Let us try to outline five elements of this model.

The first element is the network vision of cohesion as a system of flows of persons, commodities, and innovations which are the direct indicators in the cohesion of European space. This is a much more difficult and complicated way to measure cohesion as a process of integration of the European continent into one organic totality having a clear identity in the global scale. We have to invest time and money in intensive studies analyzing the development of the cohesion of European space defined in this way. These studies will *inter alia* answer the question how quick is the disappearance of the Iron Curtain which has deformed so deeply the European space of the XX century. This is the matter not only of analytical terms but also and maybe first of all of a new system promoting the cohesion of the European space in the framework of institutional solutions created by the European Union.

The second element is an organic vision of cohesion policy which is building the unity of Europe on the foundation of the creative

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17 A. Kukliński, B. Skuza, op.cit, p. 144–146.
interpretation of the immense European wealth expressed in the diversity of the European culture and economy. The organic cohesion policy will support the endogenous activities of the weak regions to overcome their weakness and to help them achieve a new position in the European and global scale. The organic cohesion policy should bring salvation to those regions which really want to achieve the salvation in the sense of overcoming the very heavy limitation created by the past experiences. This is the shift from “lagging behind” to “catching up” psychology. A documented and reliable will of the region will be the basis for the decision of the European Commission. The mechanisms of automatic support provided to all regions which fit into the framework of established quantitative criteria will simply vanish.

The third element is the holistic vision of cohesion embracing the whole territory of the European Union and in a more distant future – the whole territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The main historical task of this cohesion policy is the elimination of the developmental gap separating the European centre from the European periphery. This is the most fundamental problem of the cohesion policy of the XXI century\(^1\).

The fourth element is the extravertic vision of cohesion policy, which is constantly trying to answer the question, how to improve the position of our continent in the dynamic pattern of ruthless Darwinistic global competition especially in the framework of the strategic triangle America – Europe – Asia. In this context we should formulate a thesis of global cohesion of the XXI century. In the framework of this cohesion Europe will be not transformed into a continent pushed to a new periphery in relation to America and Asia. The specter of the new periphery was consciously or unconsciously present in the minds of European leaders formulating the Lisbon Agenda\(^2\).

The fifth element is the vision of cohesion policy as a long term strategic vision. In the discussions and decisions related to the

\(^1\) A. Kukliński, B. Skuza, op.cit, p. 145.

\(^2\) European Commission, Third Report, op.cit.
new cohesion policy it is not enough to apply the framework of medium-term thinking. We have to use the framework of long-term thinking for example for the years 2006–2025. Only in this context can we build up a grand vision of real cohesion of the European space.

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The XXI century will constantly create new European and global situations not known in the experiences of the XX century. Therefore, we need a new cohesion policy which will not be a continuation of the cohesion policy known from the experiences of the XX century. The power of inertia of the old cohesion policy is very strong. But all the same we must start the movement in the direction of a new policy – “In principio erat verbum”.

**REGIONAL POLICY AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF TRANSFORMATION OF THE EUROPEAN SPACE**

The evaluation of regional policy must in each case answer the fundamental question – how effective is this policy as an instrument incorporated into the processes which are transforming the European space.

This question should be answered in relation to the experiences of the XX century. This question must be incorporated into the hypothesis concerning the transformation of the European space in the XXI century.

**THE RESEARCH PRIORITIES**

It is necessary to build up a list of fundamental problems which should be discussed via theoretical reflection, empirical studies and
pragmatic recommendations. Maybe the following list of problems can be regarded as a starting point of our thinking in this field:

The measurement and evaluation of the efficiency of the model of socially minded regional policies designed and implemented in the framework of the experiences of the XX century.

The Lisbon Agenda as a stimulating environment for the processes, which create the model of globally, minded regional policies of the XXI century.

The role of the new perception of governance in the development of the new model of regional policy.

Social capital as a new approach to incorporate the social dimension into the new model of regional policy.

The new cohesion policy in the framework of the new model of regional policy.

The holistic character of the new model of regional policy and the challenge of the center-periphery gap in Europe.

The regional problem and regional policy in Europe in a comparative perspective – The Atlantic Regional Policy Forum (see Annex).

Naturally this list of problems in not comprehensive or unique. I hope however that the evaluation and development of this list will lead to the formulation of a Grand Research, Conference and Publication Programme which will create a valid intellectual equipment for the new model of regional policy.

THE INTELLECTUAL EQUIPMENT OF THE NEW MODEL

We have an immense wealth of publications and contributions related to the analyses and evaluation of the old model of regional policies. The intellectual equipment of the new model is in the process of statu nascendi²⁰. But we have a long way to go to reach the

²⁰ Compare: D. Christopoulos, Regional Behavior., Ashgate Publishers, 2000. See also the two contributions of S. Boisier quoted in this paper.
goal of intellectual and pragmatic satisfaction in this field. The simple answer that the methodological and conceptual apparatus of the new regionalism21 will do the job – is wrong. The new regionalism is definitely an exciting intellectual venture but it is still weak in pragmatic dimensions. Nevertheless, the new regionalism can be seen as a potential input into the intellectual equipment of the new model of regional policy.

**Conclusion**

Europe must assume the role of the grand global player of the XXI century. This is not an option – this is a necessity22. The European regions are expected to create crucial contributions promoting the global role of our Continent23. In this context the globally minded regional policy is the only rational choice based on long-term strategic and geopolitical considerations.

This should be our final motivation in all activities related to the design and implementation of the model of globally minded regional policies.


Copper corporations and copper regions in the perspective of global change. Towards a new international research and cooperation programme*

Introduction

The dynamic programme of cooperation linking KGHM-Polska Miedź S.A. and the Lower Silesian Foundation for Regional Development has created a favorable climate for a new volume: The copper regions in the perspective of global change.

The Volume

The volume will explore six fields:

One – the construction of a methodological framework for the analysis of copper corporations as propulsive industries and copper regions as propulsive regions. As a starting point we propose the enclosed annex¹ based on the doctrine of Francois Perroux and presenting the concepts of a growth pole, a propulsive industry and a propulsive region. This doctrine can be changed into an efficient

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* A paper sponsored by the Lower Silesian Foundation for Regional Development in Wroclaw. This paper will be published in parallel by the Foundation in a special volume on the Copper Region.

¹ Compare Annex one.
instrument in the interpretation of global experiences of copper industries and copper regions.

**Two** – the comprehensive and multidimensional analysis of the processes which have created the Polish copper corporation and the Polish copper region².

**Three** – the comprehensive and multidimensional processes which have created the Chilean copper corporations and the Chilean copper regions³.

**Four** – the copper industries in the framework of new policies of the European Union⁴.

**Five** – the transformation of KGHM into a global transnational corporation⁵.

**Six** – a new framework for the construction of a research and cooperation Programme “Copper corporations and copper regions in the perspective of global change”.

To prepare the new volume and to outline the new Programme let us consider the following background comments⁶.

**Comment one** – there are four communities of the grand actors of the global scene:

1. At the community of states and nations
2. the community of international organizations
3. the community of transnational corporations
4. the community of regions.

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² Compare the contributions of the Lower Silesian Foundation for Regional Development.

³ Compare J.M Rousseau, *Tarapaca as an example of a copper region in Chile fragile balance among promises and risks*, Brussels 27 December 2011.


⁵ Compare the key paper of H. Wirth, *KGHM going global*.

We can analyze the changing dynamics of the internal power structure of each community; we can also analyze the changing role of each community in the transformation of the global reality. The analysis of the changing structure and power of these four communities is a great challenge for social sciences.

These communities are facing now the biggest transformations of the global scene of the last 500 years\(^7\). The old global scene is replaced by the new global scene. This turning point in the global history is at the same time a turning point in the history of the four communities\(^8\). The concept of the four communities is to our mind a useful methodological instrument in the development of the introductory stage of the design of our new Volume and our New Programme.

Comment two – the strategic partnership of corporations and regions. In the consecutive stage of our reflection let us concentrate our attention on the global interaction of two communities: the community of corporations and the community of regions. In 2005 I formulated a proposal to design the Corpo-Rregio Programme. The management of the future – The strategic partnership of corporations and regions\(^9\). In this proposal we can find four questions:

1. the question to what extent the managerial experience of the transnational corporations is an inspiration for regional governance. This question is leading to the observation that the main perception of the region as a quasi-state is supplemented by the parallel observation that the region can be seen also as a quasi-corporation;

2. the question to what extent the region is an inspiration for the transnational corporation. In the global success of the transnational corporations the ability to explore and apply the concept


of *genius loci* is very important; in this context the concept and reality of the region as an economic social, cultural and political phenomenon is entering into the mind of transnational corporations;

3. the question to what extent the strategic partnership of regions and corporations could be a field of theoretical reflection of managerial and regional sciences;

4. the question of empirical studies – case studies exploring the successes and failures to develop the strategic partnership of clearly defined regions and corporations; in the volume *Europe – the strategic choices*\(^{10}\) the idea of the Corpo-regio Programme found a comprehensive and critical interpretations in the comments prepared by Sergio Boisier, Roman Galar, Anna Gąsior-Niemiec and Dimitros Konstadakopoulos.

The brainstorming idea of the Corpo-Regio Programme has *hinc et nunc* its full theoretical and empirical validity. We should have in mind the global networks of corporations and regions. It is an innovative inspiration to see the case of copper corporations and copper regions in the broad field of large scale studies exploring the two global communities – the community of corporations and the community of regions.

* * *

**THE COPPER WORLD 2010**

The international copper study group has published\(^{11}\) *The World Copper Factbook 2010*. This is a comprehensive system of well-organized information in five fields:

Copper mining

\(^{10}\) *Strategic choices* op.cit.

\(^{11}\) International Copper Study Groups, *The World Copper Factbook 2010* I.C.S.Y. Lisbon. E-mail: mail@iscg.org.
Copper corporations and copper regions...

Copper smelting
Copper refining
Copper trade
Copper usage.

From the point of view of location in the geopolitical space the most important are pages 1, 17 and 22 of the Factbook presenting:
The Top Twenty Copper Mines
The Top Twenty Copper Smelters
The Top Twenty Copper Refineries.

The substantial and cartographical analysis of these sixty locations could be seen as an opening stage in the construction of the geography of copper regions. Maybe we can invite the International Copper Study Group to prepare a contribution to be included in the Volume *The Copper Regions in the perspective of global change*.

* * *

**THE COPPER CORPORATIONS**

The ego of the Copper Industries is expressed in the power and structure of copper corporations integrating a network of technological and economic activities. In the copper Factbook it is impossible to find a list of the Top Twenty Copper Corporations as units of copper “governance”. In our Volume we propose to open the world of copper “governance” by path-breaking contributions focused on:
*Primo* – the KGHM as a propulsive corporation
*Secundo* – the Codelco as a propulsive corporation.

Let us explain the term copper “governance”. In our traditional thinking there were two separate domains: the domain of government and the domain of management. The term copper “governance” is describing the linkage of the managerial activities
with some functions which have a quasi-governmental character. Naturally, this interpretation of the copper “governance” might be rejected. But there is no doubt that in case of grand transnational corporations, the term governance is fully justified\(^{12}\).

It is an open question if the copper corporations are real members of the grand family of transnational corporations.

\* \* \*

In consecutive studies we should outline a comprehensive typology of the copper corporations. This typology will have five dimensions:

1. the dimension of the scale of the corporation
2. the dimension of the dynamics in the development of the corporation
3. the technological structure of the corporation (the relative role of mining, smelting and refinery)
4. the institutional structure of the corporation: copper as the dominating mainstream activity or copper as a supplementing field in the multidimensional activity of the corporation.

The typology of the copper corporations as a new field of studies is outside the present scope of attention as documented by the *World Copper Factbook 2010*\(^{13}\).

**THE COPPER REGIONS**

Let us propose the following definition of the copper region:

**The Copper Region is a spatial unit incorporating the propulsive industry and the associated economic, social,**

\(^{12}\) Compare the paper of A. Zorska in the volume *The turning points of world history.*

\(^{13}\) However *The World Copper Factbook* is indirectly incorporating some information about the copper corporations and copper regions.
cultural and self-governmental structures. The evaluations of the experiences of the copper regions are following two criteria:

Primo – the criterion of well-being of the inhabitants of the copper region

Secundo – the criterion of sectoral efficiency of the copper industry.

There is no doubt that the copper industry could gain direct and indirect advantages if it is able to function in an amicable regional environment.

Following this definition we could develop empirical studies which will create a global inventory and typology of copper regions. The conventional system of the information related to the performance of the copper industry will be enriched by the information related to the performance of the copper regions. In this way the copper industry will be analyzed not only in terms of economy and technology, but also in terms of social, political and cultural development. This is also a new chapter in the analysis of the new sources of the growing efficiency of the copper industry using the power of the genius loci as expressed in the concept of the copper region.

* * *

The global typology of copper regions is a difficult and distant task. The first step along this trajectory will be designed and implemented in our Volume The copper regions in the perspective of global change. In this volume we will find papers analyzing the Polish and Chilean Copper Regions. Let us hope that the Polish and Chilean cases will establish a benchmarking model and an inspiration for the development of copper region studies and publications.
THE COPPER LOCATIONS\textsuperscript{14}

Not all copper mines, copper smelters and copper refineries are located inside copper regions. We find multiple cases when a copper-related activity is located in a framework of a multidimensional and multifunctional metropolitan or non-metropolitan region. Such cases should be analyzed in terms of copper locations. The copper regions and copper locations can be jointly analyzed in the framework of a new field of studies which we may call “the geography of copper”.

THE CORE CONCEPTS OF THE VOLUME AND THE NEW PROGRAMME

The propulsive copper corporation and the propulsive copper regions are the core concepts of our Volume and our Programme\textsuperscript{15}. In the changing archipelago of corporations and regions there are not only propulsive corporations and propulsive regions. In this archipelago we find also stagnating corporations and stagnating regions. We should study not only the optimistic but also the pessimistic scenarios of the future of the Copper World. \textit{Inter alia} we have to consider the dynamic field of technological innovations which may create materials which will be replacing copper (the case of graphene)\textsuperscript{16}.

\textsuperscript{14} Compare the pages 11, 16 and 22 in \textit{The World Copper Factbook}.
\textsuperscript{15} Compare Annex One.
\textsuperscript{16} Compare J.M. Rousseau op.cit.
THE GLOBAL COPPER REALITY

Our new Volume and new Programme are based on an innovative interpretation of the global copper reality seen as a reflection related to a more general theoretical and empirical background created by the global experiences of two powerful communities, the community of corporations and the community of regions. The idea of a strategic partnership\(^\text{17}\) of corporations and regions is an innovative framework for our new Volume and our New Programme.

ANNEX ONE
THE DOCTRINE OF FRANCOIS PERRoux IN THE INTERPRETATION OF TORMOD HERMANSEN\(^\text{18}\)

Perroux developed his theory of development poles in search of an explanation of how the modern process of economic growth deviates from Cassel’s stationary conception of equilibrium growth. In doing this he based his argument heavily on Schumpeter’s (1949) theories of the role of innovations and large scale firms (big business). Also according to Perroux, entrepreneurial innovations are the prime causal factors behind economic progress. He argues, like Schumpeter, that most innovating activities take place in the large economic units, which are able to dominate their environment in the sense of exercising irreversible and partially reversible influence on other economic units by reason of their dimension, negotiating strength, by the nature of their operations, etc. (Perroux, (1969), quoted by Hansen (1967); see also Perroux, 1950a). The close relation between scale of operations, dominance and impulses

\(^\text{17}\) Compare The Corpo-Regio Programme op.cit

to innovate appears to be a most significant feature of Perroux’s theory, which leads him to the concepts of dynamic firms and leading industries.

Although Perroux is far from clear in his conceptualization, and in the application of his theory, it seems evident that the most remarkable characteristics of a dynamic propulsive firm are that it is relatively large, generates significant growth impulses to its environment, has a high ability to innovate, and, finally, belongs to a fast growing sector. The features of a leading propulsive industry are similar; they appear to be relatively new ones, operating at a technically advanced level in markets with high income elasticities of the products. Moreover, such industries exert a considerable influence on their environment through inter-industry linkages.

Inter-industry linkages and the theory of industrial interdependence play a major role in the development pole theory. As a matter of fact this theory together with the Schumpeter theory of development generated by waves of innovations can be said to constitute the two cornerstones upon which Perroux bases his theory. The theory of industrial interdependence is basically a tool to conceptualize and give definite meaning to the rather vague notions of dominance, forward and backward linkages, leading and key industries, industrial complexes and development poles.

The doctrine of Francois Perroux is an inspiration for us to develop the conceptual framework for the Copper Region. Four concepts should be mentioned in this context:

1. the concept of growth pole
2. the concept of propulsive firm – la firm motrice
3. the concept of propulsive industry
4. the concept of propulsive region – la region motrice.

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THE ENIGMA OF THE TRIPLE EUROPEAN MEZZOGIORNO*. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ROME CONFERENCE MARCH 14 2011

INTRODUCTION

The enigma of the Triple European Mezzogiorno is a great challenge for our knowledge, imagination and moral courage to transgress the limits of conventional wisdom and political correctness – to explain the past and the future of Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland as a particularly complicated and controversial field of social sciences. We have called this field „The Triple European Mezzogiorno” (TEM).

The two Warsaw Conferences and the two post-conference volumes¹ have created a methodological, empirical and pragmatic starting point for a new Programme of Research and International cooperation under the heading „The Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme”. Also, the Conferences designed and implemented under the auspices of The Polish Ministry of Regional Development in 2008 and 2009 have created a network of interpersonal contacts

* The Enigma of the Triple European Mezzogiorno. A contribution to the Rome Conference, March 14 2011. A parallel version of this paper was published in Polish by the School of Economics and Innovation in Lublin.

linking eminent members\(^2\) of the Italian, German and Polish academic community in an effort to outline the research field of the Triple European Mezzogiorno.

The present Conference in Rome\(^3\) is opening a new creative stage of this effort. It is a great honor and pleasure to participate in this conference. I hope that this contribution\(^4\) will be a modest, but valid input into the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme (TEMP). I would like to accept in this paper the following thematic sequences:

I. The concept of the Triple European Mezzogiorno  
II. The concept of Gordian Knots and the application of this concept in the TEMP  
III. The essential features of the experiences of the Italian Mezzogiorno  
IV. The essential features of the experiences of the German Mezzogiorno  
V. The essential features of the experiences of the Polish Mezzogiorno  
VI. The role of the European Union in the transformation of the Triple European Mezzogiorno  
VII. The Triple European Mezzogiorno and the reconfiguration of the global scene of the XXI century  
VIII. Towards an International Research Programme “The Triple European Mezzogiorno”  
IX. The enigma of the Triple European Mezzogiorno.

\(^2\) See the list of Authors of the two Volumes indicated in footnote 1.  
\(^3\) Compare the paper of B. Amoroso. A new trajectory of the Regio Futures Programme. The Triple European Mezzogiorno. Towards a common research Programme [in:] A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlicka, P. Żuber (eds) op.cit. see footnote 1.  
\(^4\) This contribution is supported by the Lublin School of Economics and Innovation. This School is promoting the Lublin Project dedicated to analyzing the strategic problems in the development of Eastern Poland. Marian Stefański is the leader of this Project. Compare M. Stefański (ed.) Endogenous factors is the development of Eastern Poland, Lublin 2010. Compare also the comments prepared for the Rome Conference by A. Gąsior-Niemieć and T. Zarycki.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE TRIPLE EUROPEAN MEZZOGIORNO

This set of nine topics can lead to the formulation of a set of fundamental questions organizing the intellectual framework of the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme in the spirit of the Myrdalian methodological triangle theories – questions – empirical materials. We have a strong motivation to look for new approaches in the inquiry into the nature of the dynamic mosaic of the European regions. We are trying to find new objects of comparative studies, which will integrate the cognitive and pragmatic motivations.

In this context the idea has emerged to introduce into a holistic comparative perspective the experiences of Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland. As a common denominator the concept of Triple Mezzogiorno was proposed. Prima facie it is very difficult to prove the validity of this choice. We can find many arguments that each of the three regions is representing a different context of civilization and different shape of long duration.

Nevertheless, these regions have a genus proximum. These regions are examples of the processes of long duration which have created the biggest European regional Gordian Knots. Therefore, we represent the opinion that the concept of Triple European Mezzogiorno is a concept having a pronounced theoretical, empirical and pragmatic validity. The concept can be a foundation of a comprehensive research Programme and lead to some decisions in the field of regional policy of the European Union.

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5 I share the point of view of G. Myrdal that „Theory in this context means nothing more than an logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material”, G. Myrdal, Asian drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 1, Penguin Books p. XII.

6 Compare footnote 1.
II. THE CONCEPT OF GORDIAN KNOTS AND THE APPLICATION OF THIS CONCEPT IN THE TEMP

The concept of the Gordian Knots is not only a scientific concept, but also a metaphor to mobilize our knowledge and imagination in the processes of development of global and regional strategic studies. This motivation was probably the source of the decision of the team led by K. Rybiński\(^7\) to prepare in the framework of RFP a pioneering study titled Gordian Knots of the 21\(^{st}\) century.

This decision has resulted in a study defining the concept of Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions as an instrument to interpret the most important challenges of the XXI century.

The concept of the Gordian Knot can be applied in six spatial scales: global, continental, sub-continental, national, regional and local. In each scale we find specific features of the Gordian Knots.

We have to find a common denominator in the minimum threshold of the scale of institutions as systems involved in the creation of Gordian Knots and the potential responsible for Alexandrian Solutions. There is no doubt that the region as a social, economic, political and cultural community can be an „ego” of the Gordian Knots and Alexandrian Solutions\(^8\).

In order to incorporate the Gordian Knots and Alexandrian solutions into the framework of regional studies and policies I have proposed to following line of thinking:

*Primo – in the process of long duration of a given region, a set of developmental barriers is emerging. The economic,*

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\(^7\) The Gordian knot is a metaphor for an intractable problem that can be resolved by a bold stroke, which is called the Alexandrian Solution. See K. Rybiński, P. Opala, M. Hołda *Gordian Knots of the 21\(^{st}\) century*, Ministry of Regional Development, Warsaw 2008.

social, political and cultural structures of the region are not able to reverse this process, so the barriers are stronger and stronger in the consecutive chapters of the historical experiences of the given region.

Secundo – the conventional decision making reality is not able to outline and implement a set of strategic choices which would create a turning point liquidating the historical barriers.

Tertio – This situation of cumulating of unborn, not formulated and not designed and implemented strategic decisions overcoming the developmental barriers is defined as a Gordian Knot.

Quatro – Following the failure of the conventional decision making process the Alexandrian Solutions are the only way to cut the Gordian Knots of the given Region.

In this framework we can analyze two patterns of long duration:
1. The Finnish pattern
2. The Mezzogiorno pattern.

In the Finnish pattern we find endogenous economic, social and cultural structures which are able to eliminate the developmental barriers and promote a new path of development leading to new pattern of long duration. In the Mezzogiorno pattern the development barriers are transformed into Gordian Knots waiting for Alexandrian Solutions which are impossible in the existing institutional structures. This is the real squared circle of the Triple European Mezzogiorno.

To make this formulation still more dramatic let us present another controversial topic of our Conference: the dilemma, the reality of the Gordian Knots versus the illusion of Alexandrian Solutions. Maybe the bottom up revolution in Egypt could be interpreted as an Alexandrian Solution to the Mubarak Gordian Knot?

III. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ITALIAN MEZZOGIORNO

The Italian Mezzogiorno is the causa celebra of social sciences. There are very few regions in the world, which have a better set of academic contributions representing theoretical, empirical and methodological perspectives. The search to discover the reality and mystery of the Italian Mezzogiorno is visible also in the world of art and literature and especially in the great novel and the magnificent contributions of the Italian film. In the perception of the Italian Mezzogiorno the integration of knowledge and imagination of the world of social sciences and the world of art is a unique phenomenon.

This unique phenomenon should inspire the cooperation of the community of social sciences and the community of artists and novelists to create new charismatic contributions analyzing the reality and mystery of the Italian Mezzogiorno in a language which will open up new perceptions of the Italian, European and global public opinion. This suggestion is introducing a new dimension into the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme (TEMP).

We also need a new interpretation of the Italian Mezzogiorno as a field of policies designed and implemented by the institutions of the Italian state and by the institutions of the European

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The enigma of the triple European Mezzogiorno... The experience of the Italian political system facing the Mezzogiorno Question has found a comprehensive interpretation in a paper by D. Petrosino „A new paradigm for a new Mezzogiorno”. Let us present the following observations of the Author\textsuperscript{12}:

\begin{quote}
Generally speaking we can divide the Italian policies towards the South into three seasons.

1. The first season is that of the policies of extraordinary transfer from the state on behalf of the South.
2. The second is that of incentives to allow the growth of an entrepreneurial southern class and to improve the contextual conditions.
3. The third, that marks the XX century, is that of a progressive deletion of the Southern Question from the national policies.
\end{quote}

Reading this quotation we may formulate a question: to what extent the “three seasons” are describing the Italian trajectory from the Keynesian welfare state to the neoliberal amorfic state. The paper of D. Petrosino is an inducement to see the experiences of the Italian Mezzogiorno as a case study in the global history of regional policies in the long XX century 1914–2010\textsuperscript{13}.

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In the history of the cohesion policies designed and implemented in the framework of the European Union the case of the Italian Mezzogiorno is a very important chapter. There are two visions in the analysis of the cohesion policies:

\textit{Primo} – cohesion policies as a world of procedures

\textit{Secundo} – cohesion policies as a world of realities.

\textsuperscript{12} D. Petrosino, \textit{A new paradigm for a new Mezzogiorno} [in] A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlicka, P. Żuber (eds) op.cit.

The world of procedures is the prevailing vision in the European Commission. The brilliant Report by F. Barca\textsuperscript{14} is an excellent example how to outline innovative approaches improving the clarity and efficiency of cohesion policies seen as a world of procedures. In this spirit we can analyze also the experiences of the Italian Mezzogiorno as a field of cohesion policies of the European Union. This route of increasing perfection of the procedural shape of cohesion policies can function only as a necessary supplement of the decisive route to see the cohesion policies as a world of realities.

In this context I would like to suggest considering the following suggestion for the European Commission in the field of cohesion policies seen as a world of realities. The Commission should design and implement a grand set of empirical studies analyzing the ,,footprint” of cohesion policies in the reality of fifty European regions including the five regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno. The ,,footprint” concept can be seen in material institutional and spiritual dimensions. The footprint will most probably be discovered as an economic, social, cultural and political phenomenon.

We will most probably discover that a large part of the financial flows supporting the cohesion policies was well used to create long-term multiplayer effects. We will also discover that some financial flows have just evaporated leaving no ,,footprint” in the reality of the given region. I think that the concept of the ,,footprint” has some innovative validity as a new way in the evaluation of the cohesion of policies of the European Union.

I would like to propose to test this concept in the reality of the Italian Mezzogiorno. Probably this test will demonstrate that the empirical reality of the absorption of structural support for the Italian Mezzogiorno is a much more multidimensional and complicated pattern than the set of conventional value judgments formulated without a comprehensive empirical documentation.

\textsuperscript{14} F. Barca, \textit{An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy. A place based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations}. Independent Report, Brussels April 2009.
IV. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE GERMAN MEZZOGIORNO

The German Mezzogiro is a controversial topic inside the German academic community. Probably the prevailing opinion represents a point of view that the experiences of Eastern Germany are a case of historical uniqueness and that the concept of the Eastern German Mezzogiro has no empirical or methodological foundations. The question “Does Germany really show characteristics of a Mezzogiro?” was answered in a negative way. Let us quote the following opinion of M. Titze:

Despite extensive government support the gap between East and West Germany has still not been successfully closed nearly 20 years post German unification. Hence, some economists tend to compare East Germany with Mezzogiro – underdeveloped Southern Italy. East Germany is still subject to sever structural problems in comparison to West Germany: lower per capita income, lower productivity, higher unemployment rates, fewer firm headquarters and fewer innovation activities. There are East German regions with less than desirable rates of development. Nevertheless, the new federal states have shown some evidence of a convergence process. Some regions have developed very positively – they have improved their competitiveness and employment levels. As such, the comparison of East Germany with Mezzogiro does not seem applicable today.

However in the German academic community we find also a point of view expressing a strong support for the idea of the

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Two Mezzogiornos. Let us quote the opinion of two eminent authors Hans Werner Sin and Frank Westeman\textsuperscript{16}: 

The analogy between the economic problems of the Mezzogiorno region and East Germany has been initially contested by many authors. This paper argues that there are striking similarities in the two regions, in terms of the causes of their economic predicament. With an aggregate labour productivity of less than 60% relative to the rest of the country, both are true transfer economies, whose consumption exceeds production by far. Beyond locational disadvantages, the present paper identifies overdrawn wages, high social security spending and the Dutch disease problem as core reasons for the poor economic performance and discusses possible cures.

In the design and implementation of the Triple Mezzogiorno Programme we share the opinion of those German Authors who see Southern Italy and Eastern Germany in a firmly comparative perspective. This is a link necessary in the construction of TEMP. From the point of view of our Programme it is interesting to see the experiences of Eastern Germany as a field of two contrasting perspectives of conventional and non-conventional wisdom. The German academic community is presenting outstanding examples of both approaches. The academic perfection and conventional wisdom is represented by a volume sponsored by five best Raumforschung institutions in Germany. This volume analyzes the restructuring of Eastern Germany\textsuperscript{17}. It is a set of 15 papers prepared by a group of very eminent authors.

Each paper is a valuable contribution in the field of Raumforschung. The papers are in most cases assuming that the spatial analysis is a highly autonomous field which can be discussed


\textsuperscript{17} S. Lenz (ed.) German Annual of Spatial Research and policy restructuring Eastern Germany, Springer, Berlin 2007.
outside the grand fundamental problems of the reality. In this case the grand, fundamental problem is the drama of Eastern Germany, the Gordian Knots of Eastern Germany, and the question who is responsible for the creation of the German Mezzogiorno? The analysis of the spatial problems of Eastern Germany without the substantial and methodological reflection related to the deep political, economic and social roots of these spatial problems is reducing the dimensions and validity of such analyses to \textit{de facto Schein Probleme}.

The German non-conventional wisdom is well represented by the paper of J. Röpke\textsuperscript{18} titled „East Germany in the development trap or the Munchhausen chance“. This paper is a contribution in the discussion of the Triple European Mezzogiorno. I will not try to outline the content of the paper in a systematic way. I will try only to present five observations which are based on my interpretations of this paper. They are important for the discussion related to the Triple European Mezzogiorno.

One – The East German drama and the East German Gordian Knots were created by the strategy of the unification of Germany, including the wrong idea of the parity of the Western and Eastern German Mark. This strategy was leading to de-instrumentalization and de-innovation of Eastern Germany. This strategy has \textit{de facto} introduced a passive model of adaptation resulting in a \textit{quasi} south Italian pattern of social transfers.

Two – it is impossible to create development using as the only way an instrument of pumping external resources into the machine of the economy.

Three – the input logic was a wrong approach to the strategies of the development of Eastern Germany. According to J. Röpke this wrong approach was embedded in the mainstream neoclassical model.

Four – the input logic should be replaced by the innovation logic of reconfiguration of the production factors following the approaches of J. Schumpeter.

Five – we should consider the following metaphor related to the adventures of Karl Friedrich Baron von Münchhausen. In a desperate situation the strong arm of Baron von Münchhausen grabbed his hair and pulled himself and his horse out of the bog. Can also the region pull itself out of the economic bog using the move modelled on Baron von Münchhausen?

In the comparative evaluation of the Italian and German Mezzogiorno we may discuss the hypothesis that the East Germany’s Gordian Knot is more complicated than the Gordian Knot of Southern Italy. Let us present three observations:
1. The scale of the intervention of the public domain in financial terms was probably much bigger in Eastern Germany than in Southern Italy.
2. It is not excluded that the scale of misallocation of resources was bigger in Eastern Germany than in Southern Italy.
3. It is not excluded that the deficit of hope is stronger in Eastern Germany than in Southern Italy. I think that the demographic decline in historical and prospective terms is more pronounced in Eastern Germany than in Southern Italy. The demographic decline is the most synthetic indicator of the failures of the policies implemented in the public domain. The demographic decline of Eastern Germany\(^{19}\) is a drama of one of the greatest regional misallocations in global history.

In the years 1990–2010 huge financial resources were allocated to implement a comprehensive programme of rapid modernization of the settlement and communication network. But these infrastructural investments were not able to stop the demographic decline and most probably will not stop the demographic decline in the future. In the next decades some regions and cities of Eastern Germany will enter in the domain of dying regions and cities\(^{20}\).


\(^{20}\) *Deutschland 2020* op.cit.
Could these evaluations of the German Mezzogiorno be challenged by an optimistic vision of the future of Eastern Germany\textsuperscript{21} which forms part of the dynamic German society and economy\textsuperscript{22}? The Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme is an excellent framework to test different styles of both pessimistic and optimistic approaches. Maybe we should reconsider my arguments concerning the comparative evaluation of the Italian and German Mezzogiorno.

**V. The essential features of the Polish Mezzogiorno**

Following the two Warsaw Conferences organized by the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, the Lublin School of Economics and Innovation decided to promote a Research Publication and Conference Programme focused on the strategic problems of Eastern Poland which was called „The Lublin Project”\textsuperscript{23}. The core question of the Project was formulated by M. Stefański\textsuperscript{24} in the following way:

*The problem of Eastern Poland is a grand strategic problem of the past and the future of Poland. The vision to cut the Gordian Knots of Eastern Poland and a vision to overcome the duality of Eastern and Western Poland should be included into the network of crucial strategic problems of Poland of the XXI century. The problem should be not closed*

\textsuperscript{21} W. Krull, *Europes Triple Mezzogiorno. The case of Eastern Germany* \textit{[in:] A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlucka, P. Żuber} op.cit.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Germany’s economy. Angela in Wunderland}, The Economist, February 5 2011.

\textsuperscript{23} Compare footnote 2.

in the framework of conventional wisdom related to sustainable development. It is a problem of the Polish strategic mind which is not accepting the inclusion of Eastern Poland into a network of European regions which are not able to find a new path of developmental cutting of the historical Gordian Knots. We have to notice also the geopolitical location of Eastern Poland as a border region of the European Union, Eastern Poland should not be transformed into a space of depopulation and crisis.

The significance and validity of the Problem of Eastern Poland was recognized by the Polish Government, by the European Union\textsuperscript{25} and OECD\textsuperscript{26}. In institutional and financial terms the Programme of Eastern Poland represents a smaller scale than the Programmes for the German and Italian Mezzogiornos. The institutional dynamics of the three Programmes will be an interesting question in the next decades. This institutional dynamics in the Polish case will be determined by the decisions of the European Commission, by the decisions of the Polish Ministry of Regional Development, and by the decisions of Regional Self-governments representing the individual regions within Eastern Poland. The academic community of Eastern Poland using \textit{inter alia} the instrument of the Lublin Project will create new knowledge related to the experiences of Eastern Poland. According to M. Stefański\textsuperscript{27} The Lublin Project will be organized along nine thematic fields:

1. **The first thematic field is the methodology of the Lublin Project.** It is the interpretation of two strategic triangles:
   a. The Myrdalian cognitive triangle: questions, theories, empirical materials
   b. The pragmatic triangle linking the diagnoses, visions and strategies.

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\textsuperscript{25} Compare A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlicka, P. Źuber (eds) op.cit p. 295–397.

\textsuperscript{26} OECD, Territorial Reviews Poland, OECD Paris 2008 p. 156.

\textsuperscript{27} M. Stefański op.cit, footnote 24.
2. The second thematic field is the globalized and internalized geography of Eastern Poland. The reality of Eastern Poland should be seen in the perspective of new global Economic Geography outlined in the recent Report of the World Bank. The internalized reality of Eastern Poland is a dynamic field of development and stagnation as phenomena of long duration. Using the concept of Eastern Poland we have to remember that Eastern Poland is not a monolithic space of backwardness. It is a dynamic space of development and stagnation.

3. The third thematic field is the hypothetical history of Eastern Poland. This is a field testing different hypotheses of the interpretation of the historical experiences of Eastern Poland, hypotheses testing the emergence of Gordian Knots in different contexts of time and space.

4. The fourth thematic field is the diagnosis of the transformation of Eastern Poland in the years 1990–2010. In the fourth thematic field we see four streams in the interpretation of the experiences of Eastern Poland, such as
   a) The bold evaluation of the glory and misery of the transformation processes in Eastern Poland
   b) The evaluation of the genius of adaptation of Eastern Poland to the new conditions of market economy and parliamentary democracy
   c) The evaluation of the weakness of innovative motivations in the activity of all actors of the scene of Eastern Poland
   d) The evaluation of the weakness of strategic thinking related to the development of Eastern Poland.

5. The fifth thematic field is the futurology of the Eastern Poland. The hypothesis of a leap forward in the civilization of Eastern Poland in the years 2010–2030. This is the crucial problem of the Lublin Project incorporated in the broad stream of studies Polonia quo vadis?

6. The sixth thematic field is the pragmatic sociology of Eastern Poland. This is the challenge of a large scale empirical study analyzing the experiences of a set of communities which have emerged in the experiences of Eastern Poland. We have
in mind regional and local communities, business communities, academic communities, cultural and religious communities.

7. **The seventh thematic field – the system of education** facing the challenges of the XXI century. The system of education – primary, secondary and tertiary – is the most important instrument creating pro-developmental mental attitudes. We can formulate a question to what extent the system of education in the years 1990–2010 has created pro-innovative attitudes in the minds of the young generations in Eastern Poland?

8. **The eighth thematic field is the regional and local self-government of Eastern Poland.** This self-government can perform an important role in the Alexandrian Solutions devised to cut the Gordian Knots of Eastern Poland. We should, however, answer a preliminary retrospective question to what extent the system of local and regional democracy in Eastern Poland has created positive and negative experiences in the years 1990–2010. The local and regional government has a long and rich list of publications available in the global and European scale. For the Lublin Project we have a clear starting point in the publication by R. Putnam.

9. **The ninth thematic field is the enterprise of Eastern Poland** as a trajectory of economic development. The Lublin Project should create a breakthrough in our empirical knowledge related to the successes and failures of the enterprises in Eastern Poland. A proposal was formulated to prepare 100 problem oriented monographic studies of enterprises in Eastern Poland.

* * *

Naturally, the list of thematic fields can be formulated in different ways following different methodological approaches. There is no doubt, however, that the Lublin Project must face the empirical and prospective reality of Eastern Poland. The hypothesis of the Gordian Knots of Eastern Poland must be tested in a broad system of empirical studies which will need a large amount of well coordinated activities supported by financial resources of sufficient scale. This pragmatic conclusion is related not only to the experiences of
Eastern Poland. This conclusion may be fully applied to the experiences of the Italian, German and Polish Mezzogiornos.

The first test of this approach could be implemented in the framework of the Polish – Italian\textsuperscript{28} cooperation. There is an excellent academic and pragmatic climate for this cooperation. There is a full agreement that the experiences of the Italian and Polish Mezzogiorno have strong common denominators opening the way for effective comparative studies. The paper by A. Gąsior-Niemiec prepared for the Rome Conference is a valuable contribution in this field establishing an interesting example of Polish–Italian comparative studies.

VI. The role of the European Union in the transformation of the Triple European Mezzogiorno

The European Union is the greatest institutional innovation of the XX century. It is very difficult to deny unprecedented achievements of the Union evidenced in creating new conditions for peace, prosperity and integration of the European content. The Union has created also a new favorable environment for the European regions. The whole territory of the Union was changed into an integrated institutional space of a new PAX Romana. The free movement of persons, commodities, information, knowledge and capital has opened new opportunities for the majority of European regions which were able to absorb the new dimensions of regional development in Europe.

This process of absorption of new opportunities was a polarized process. The map of Europe was a changing map leading to some modifications in the pattern of strong and weak regions. \textbf{But the fundamental pattern of the European space was not changed by}

\textsuperscript{28} Compare the papers of B. Amoroso and D. Petrosino in the volume edited by A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlicka, P. Żuber (eds) op.cit. [...].
the general streams of European integration. The phenomenon of less developed regions has not evaporated from the map of Europe. In these conditions the European Union has developed the institutions and practices of cohesion policies analyzed in the already quoted Report by F. Barca. To my mind the essence of those policies is to accelerate the processes of structural change in the less developed regions of the European Union. In the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme we have chosen three Regions to test the concept of regional Gordian Knots as a particularly difficult case of a paralyzed structural change.

The regional Gordian Knots of the Italian and German Mezzogiorno were not cut by the intervention of the cohesion policies of the European Union. A solution of this type was just impossible in the framework of limited political power and limited financial resources of the Union.

We are restricting our attention only to the Italian and German Mezzogiorno. The Polish Mezzogiorno is a late-comer in the cohesion policy of the European Union. It is too early to present any value judgment about the beginnings of the impact of cohesion policies in Eastern Poland. This is the evaluation of the experiences of the past. We have, however, to answer the crucial question how to envisage the future of cohesion policies in the years 2010–2030. The discussions about the future of cohesion policies have two dimensions:

1. a formal dimension how to shape the institutions responsible for cohesion policies in the framework of the European Union.
2. A substantial dimension how to face the dilemma of a strong or weak European Union.

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30 F. Barca op.cit footnote 14.
Only a strong European Union will continue to support rational foundations of cohesion policies. A weak European Union, dominated by a vanishing spirit of solidarity, will just drop from the agenda the concept and practice of its cohesion policies. So hinc et nunc it is very difficult to outline the role of the European Union in the transformation of the Triple European Mezzogiorno. Even in the conditions of a strong European Union implementing strong cohesion policies in the Triple Mezzogiorno has to face two trends:
1. The growing role of endogenous factors
2. The growing role of the global environment.

VII. The Triple European Mezzogiorno and the reconfiguration of the global scene of the XXI century

The great crisis of the years 2008–2011 is accelerating the reconfiguration of the geopolitical, geo-economic and geostrategic global scene. This is the deepest change of this scene in the last 500 years. The center of gravity of the global economy, global society and global governance is in a shifting process from America and Europe to Asia and especially to China and India. This great macro-historical and macro-geographical shifting process is well outlined in the brilliant Reports of the World Bank\(^{32}\) and OECD\(^{33}\). In this context we might consider also the volume published recently in Poland\(^{34}\).

In the next decades we will find the answer how to define the consequences of this shifting process for the European megaspace.

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Will this megaspace continue its existence as an element of the global centre or will the European megaspace change itself into an element of a new global periphery, located between the dynamic American and Chinese megaspaces.

The Triple Mezzogiorno is a significant element of the European megaspace and also an element of the changing global space.

The reconfigurations and the dynamics of these spaces will create new challenges and new opportunities for the Triple Mezzogiorno seen in the context of the new global map of the XXI century. The changing perception of the new global realities of the XXI century will create a strong inducement for a new perception of the role of the Triple Mezzogiorno. Maybe in these new conditions it will be easier to find Alexandrian Solutions to the Gordian Knots of the Triple Mezzogiorno.

Naturally these solutions will most probably follow different patterns in each of the three Mezzogiornos. It is impossible to envisage in the present state of our knowledge and imagination an answer to the question how the Triple Mezzogiorno will face the challenges of the enigma of the XXI century. However, we can anticipate that the changing global scene will create an unprecedented pressure for the Triple Mezzogiorno to overcome the legacy of the Gordian Knots and to discover new paths of development.

VIII. TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PROGRAMME THE TRIPLE EUROPEAN MEZZOGIORNO

The Warsaw and Lublin volumes have brought forward cognitive and pragmatic observations, reflections and suggestions which are leading to an analysis of the Italian, German and Polish

\[35\] Compare A. Kukliński [in:] A. Kukliński, E. Malak-Pętlicka, P. Żuber (eds) op.cit.

\[36\] Compare footnote 1.

\[37\] Compare footnote 4 and 24.
experiences in the framework of the emerging Triple Mezzogiorno Programme. This Programme is a venture *in statu nascendi* open to new approaches in methodological and empirical perspectives.

In this paper I am presenting various observations which could enrich the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme in the future. The preliminary version of the Programme presented in this paper is an invitation to continue this brainstorming discussion. In this spirit I would like to present a vision of ten Research priorities of the Programme:

1. The global environment of regional development and regional policies in Europe.
2. The dualities of the European space and the Italian, German and Polish dualities.
4. The futurology of the Triple Mezzogiorno.
5. The deficit of hope and the social psychology of the Triple Mezzogiorno.
6. The demographic drama of the Triple Mezzogiorno.
7. The multidimensional analysis of the enterprise as a dynamic factor in the transformation of the Triple Mezzogiorno.
9. The system of education and the transformation of the Triple Mezzogiorno.
10. The concept of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the realities of the XXI century.

**ONE**

The reconfiguration of the global scene will create an unprecedented pressure to change the perceptions of the strength and

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38 Compare footnote 3.

39 Compare footnote 34.
weakness of the European regions, including the regions of the
Triple Mezzogiorno.

This unprecedented pressure will transform the “mentality” of
the European regions. This new “mentality” will not destroy the
perception of regional identity in Europe; it will however change
the substance of this identity by absorbing the consequences of the
“shifting processes”\textsuperscript{40}.

Two

In the TEMP we should analyze the changing nature of the
grand centre-periphery duality in Europe. This is a persistent
duality, existing in the consecutive agrarian, industrial and infor-
mation societies.

In the broad framework of the Centre-Periphery relations in
Europe we should analyze the Italian, German and Polish duali-
ities. We have an excellent contribution by D. Petrosino\textsuperscript{41}
analyzing the Italian duality as a dynamic multidimensional phenomenon
of long duration. Especially important is the inquiry into the eco-
nomic, social and political dimension of this duality and the rela-
tive dynamics of these three dimensions. An expanded version of
D. Petrosino’s paper will create some inducement how to analyze
the cases of the German and Polish dualities.

The German duality is analyzed in two already quoted papers\textsuperscript{42}.
The German duality has deep historical roots. We should, however,
mention two chapters in the emergence of this duality. The first chap-
ter is the separate existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic in the years 1950–1990.

These two Republics have represented quite different politi-
cal, economic and social systems establishing firm patterns of the
German duality. The second chapter is the strategy of Unification
of Germany, which contrary to the expectations of Chancellor

\textsuperscript{40} Compare footnote 33.
\textsuperscript{41} Compare footnote 12.
\textsuperscript{42} Compare footnote 16 and 18.
Helmut Kohl, has not created blossoming landscapes but a new German Mezzogiorno. The case of the German duality is an inquiry into the historical processes as an objective reality and as a grand process shaped by crucial political decisions.

The Polish East-West duality is probably less pronounced than the Italian and German dualities. It is also a multidimensional phenomenon of long duration. Most probably the fundamental pattern of this duality was established in the early stages of the capitalistic development in the XIX century when the present territory of Eastern Poland was part of the territories incorporated into the Russian, German and Austrian Empires.

The Polish duality is a strategic problem in the history and the future of Poland. The case of the Polish duality has some individual characteristic features which are comparable to the individual features of the Italian and German duality.

Three

In the TEMP we should not try to outline a general history of the Triple Mezzogiorno. It is much better to concentrate our attention on discovering the historical roots of the Gordian Knots emerging in the reality of the Triple Mezzogiorno. In the earlier part of this paper we have suggested considering the trajectory of thinking: long duration – barriers for development – the inertia of the decision making process – Gordian Knots. In the TEMP we should try to build up a framework for a comparative analysis of the emergence of the Gordian Knots. The patterns of institutional systems in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland represent quite different historical experiences and structures embedded in different cultural contexts. And yet these different institutional systems have created similar results – a set of Gordian Knots. This paradox should be explained in the TEMP.

43 Compare footnote 4 and 24.
44 Compare footnote 7.
Four

Futurology is a system of knowledge and imagination organizing our thinking about the future – in our case, the future of the Triple Mezzogiorno. This is a particularly difficult and maybe impossible, challenge Anno Domini 2011. We are overwhelmed by the great pentagonal crisis\(^{45}\) closing the 500-year chapter in the history of global civilizations. We are living in a time of clearly visible vanishing trends and a time when the new emerging trends are hidden in the fog of uncertainty.

In these circumstances we have to outline well documented scenarios\(^{46}\) for the development of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the two decades 2011–2030. Especially, we have to answer the crucial question if it is possible to envisage any chance that the Gordian Knots of the Triple Mezzogiorno will find proper Alexandrian Solutions.

Five

The deficit of hope is probably the greatest problem of the Triple Mezzogiorno\(^{47}\). In *La Divina Commedia* we find a paradoxically realistic definition of hell – as a place of no hope.

The TEMP should discover some light of hope in the Triple Mezzogiorno. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure the phenomenon of hope, but it is possible to discover and measure the phenomenon of success as a source of hope. The TEMP should develop a dynamic field of studies in the domain of social psychology, the psychology of hope and success. The glorification of success


\(^{47}\) Compare footnote 45 p. 37 and 38.
in economic, social, political, cultural, scientific and educational terms could be seen as an important instrument to reduce and then eliminate the deficit of hope in the societies of the Triple Mezzogiorno.

Six

The demographic drama of stagnating and declining populations is an essential feature of the Triple Mezzogiorno. The strong streams of out-migration are embedded in the deficit of hope. The demographic studies promoted in the framework of the TEMP should be not restricted to the conventional „narrow” demographic approaches. These studies should be designed and implemented in a broad transdisciplinary perspective, including the domain of motivation of migratory decisions. Such decisions must be analyzed through an integrated field of demography, sociology and social psychology.

Seven

The enterprise is one of the most important actors in the transformation of the Triple Mezzogiorno. The TEMP should promote a large set of problem oriented monographic studies exploring the trajectories of the success and failure of the different types of enterprise which are creating the economic and social reality of the Triple Mezzogiorno. The enterprise should be seen not only as an object of TEMP but also as a co-author and promoter of the TEMP. The entrepreneurial input into the TEMP will change the essential features of the TEMP incorporating not only academic dimension of TEMP but also the role of the TEMP as an activity supported directly by the business community.

48 Compare footnote 19.
49 Compare footnote 3.
Eight

The potential role of Regional Self-Governments in the Triple Mezzogiorno is very great. However, the models of regional self-government in Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland are quite different, reflecting the institutions of the federal State in Germany and the institutions of the unitary State in Poland. The Italian case is in a shifting process from the unitary to a federal State.

The heterogeneity of the experiences of the Regional Government in the Triple Mezzogiorno is creating a challenging field for comparative studies following the methodology of R. Putnam. These studies will analyze not only the historical experiences. These studies will try to formulate a question to what extent the regional self-government in the Triple Mezzogiorno may try to cut the Gordian Knots of the institutional reality of the Triple Mezzogiorno.

In a pessimistic scenario the regional government will function as a set of paralyzed structures. We have to remember that the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios can take the shape of different experiences in each of the three Mezzogiornos: the Italian, the German and the Polish Mezzogiorno.

Nine

In the long run, the system of education is the most important trajectory for transformation of the Triple Mezzogiorno. The diagnostic and prospective analysis of the system of education will answer the question if there is any hope that the system of education will create new generations able to face the challenges of the Gordian Knots in the Triple Mezzogiorno. It is a great challenge for the TEMP to answer this question.
Ten

The Myrdalian cognitive triangle, and especially results of empirical studies, will probably lead to a new incarnation of the TEMP\textsuperscript{50}.

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This map of ten research priorities is only a next approximation of the TEMP which is open to critical observations, suggestions and value judgments to propose alternative visions of the TEMP\textsuperscript{51}.

IX. THE ENIGMA OF THE TRIPLE EUROPEAN MEZZOGIORNO

The unprecedented accumulation of uncertainties is creating an unprecedented challenge to face the Enigma of the Triple Mezzogiorno\textsuperscript{52}. The futurology of the Triple Mezzogiorno may go beyond the limits of our knowledge and imagination. But we have to try to outline the scenarios for the Triple Mezzogiorno of the XXI century. These scenarios must, however, find firm underpinnings in the results of comprehensive and honest diagnostic studies analyzing the experiences of the Triple Mezzogiorno in the years 1990–2010. We are directly responsible for the state of our diagnostic knowledge. We have to mobilize our knowledge, imagination and moral courage to close this cognitive and pragmatic gap.

* * *

We should try to increase the European visibility of the Triple European Mezzogiorno Programme. To increase its visibility

\textsuperscript{50} Compare footnote 5.

\textsuperscript{51} Compare footnote 3.

\textsuperscript{52} Compare the papers of A. Kukliński published in two volumes listed in footnote 1.
we need to establish a network of cooperation linking four communities: the Academic Community, the Self-governmental and Governmental Community, the Business and Banking Community and the Journalist Community.

Warszawa–Lublin, February 16 2011
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   A shortened version of a paper first published in:  

2. *Knowledge based economy versus wisdom based economy. The dilemma of the XXI century*  
   The Polish version of this paper was published in the “Biuletyn” of the Polish Economic Society, Warsaw April 2011.

3. *Globalization in the XXI century in quest of a new paradigm (a discussion paper)*  

4. *PAX Kantiana and the eternal reality of power. A contribution to non-conventional wisdom*  

5. *The creation and the destruction of the global order*  

6. The Future of Europe. Four dilemmas and five scenarios. A challenge for prospective thinking


8. The Second Lower Silesian Conference “Europa Quo Vadis? The renaissance of European strategic thinking”

9. Europa Quo Vadis reconsidered

10. The dilemma – innovation vs imitation in historical and future oriented perspective. The case of Poland

12. *Polish Association for the Club of Rome*
   An unpublished paper.

13. *Regio Futures Programme (RFP) Experiences and prospects*

14. *Towards a new model of regional policy*

15. *Copper regions and copper corporations*
    A paper sponsored by the Lower Silesian Foundation for Regional Development in Wrocław. This paper is published in parallel by the Foundation in a special volume on the Copper Region.

    A parallel version of this paper was published in Polish by the School of Economics and Innovation in Lublin.
REFERENCES


A biographical note

I. Present status

Professor Emeritus of the University of Warsaw
Honorary Member of the Club of Rome
Honorary Member of the Future Studies Committee “Poland 2000+” Polish Academy of Sciences
Honorary Member of the Academie fuer Raumforschung und Landesplannung in Hannover
Full Member of the International Academy of Regional Development and Cooperation – Moscow
Programme Director – Forum of Strategic Thinking – Polish Economic Society
Chairman of the Editorial Council “Studia Regionalne i Lokalne” – a quarterly of the Polish Section of the Regional Studies Association

II. Education and scientific degrees

1. MA – political economy, University of Poznań 1950
2. MA – law, University of Poznań 1951
3. PhD – Economic Geography, University of Warsaw, 1958
4. Informal Post – graduate studies at Harvard University, 1959
6. Extraordinary Professor of Geographic Sciences, University of Warsaw, 1977
7. Ordinary Professor of Geographic Sciences, University of Warsaw, 1982
III. Selected Functions in Poland

Executive Secretary – Committee for Space Economy and Regional Planning, Polish Academy of Sciences 1958–1967

Director – European Institute for Regional and Local Development, University of Warsaw, 1976–1996

Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990–1991


Chairman – Polish Association for the Club of Rome – 2002–2011

IV. International Experience. Selected examples

Economic Commission for Europe, United Nations, Geneva Switzerland, Consultant to prepare a study on criteria for Location of Industrial Plants, November 1965–April 1966

United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, August 1967 – August 1971, Programme Director for Regional Development

University of Minnesota, Department of Geography, USA, Visiting Professor, Summer School, 1963

University of Washington, Department of Geography, Seattle, Visiting Professor, January–June 1963

Harvard University, Graduate School for Education, Visiting Scholar, March–May 1982

Carleton University, The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, Visiting Professor, January–April 1974

University of Tampere – Tampere Finland Visiting Professor May–June, 1977
V. Editorial Activity – Selected Examples

Editor UNRISD – Mouton Regional Planning Series – 12 volumes in years 1971–1983 – Geneva the Hague

Editor of the – Science and Government Series, Committee for Scientific Research – 5 volumes in the years 1991–2000

Coeditor of the Eurofutures Publication Series – WSB-NLU, Nowy Sącz – 7 volumes in the years 2004–2012

Coeditor of the Series – Regional Development Forum – 7 volumes in the years 2007–2012, Ministry of Regional Development


In the last decade we should indicate also my participation in the editorial activities and publications of four institutions:

1. The Polish Economic Society – The publications in the field of strategic thinking
2. The Lower Silesian Foundation of Regional Development in Wroclaw – the publications following the Conferences “Europa Quo Vadis?”
3. The School of Economics and Innovation in Lublin – the publications in the framework of Eastern Poland Programme

VI. Participation in research and reconstruction programmes in Poland (selected examples)

1. The participation in the reconstruction of Polish Economic Geography, in the years 1953–1967
2. The participation in the pioneering stages in the development of the Committee of Space Economy and Regional Planning in the years 1958–1967, Polish Academy of Sciences
3. The strategic role in the establishment and promotion of the interdisciplinary programme – Local Poland, in the years 1976–1980, University of Warsaw EUROREG

4. The leading role in the Programme – The Knowledge Based Economy sponsored by KBN and the World Bank, in the years 2001–2003

5. The role in the Establishment and Development of the International Research Programme “Regio Futures” sponsored by the Ministry of Regional Development, in the years 2007–2012

VII. Opera Omnia – eight fields

An overview of my research activities in the years 1953–2012 could be an inducement to outline eight fields in my opera omnia:

1. Industrial location, industrial geography industrialization (1953–1967)


5. Regional development, regional policies and regional studies (from 1965)

6. Science policy and the knowledge based economy (from 1991)

7. Global and strategic studies (from 1984)

8. European studies (from 1965)

VIII. The harvest of 400 publications in the years 1953–2012

My research, editorial and conference activities, embracing 8 fields outlined above have created a harvest of about 400 contributions including studies, papers and short notes published in Polish, English, French, Spanish, Italian, German and Russian. In a self-critical reflection, I see in the body of those 400 contributions
not only examples of innovative, dynamic thinking but also samples demonstrating the weaknesses of my scholarship.

I hope, however, that these weaknesses are not eliminating the *grosso modo* positive evaluation of the long, rich and differentiated trajectory of my academic life. The two volumes – *The Individuality of a Scholar* and *In Search of New Paradigms* provide some analytical background for this evaluation.

**IX. De amicitia**

We remember the well known sentence written by Marcus Tullius Cicero: “*Itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia*”.

We need Friendship more than water and fire. The Invisible College of my Friends in Poland, in Europe, in North and Latin America and in Asia has been a special blessing and a source of support for my activities and especially for Conferences and Publications which were born following my initiatives.

Therefore, the last sentence of the volume *In Search of New Paradigms* is a thank you note to the Invisible College of my Friends.

Warsaw, June 2 2012
The 85th Birthday of Antoni Kukliński
POST SCRIPTUM
Prof.dr hab. Józef Niżnik

ON ANTONI KUKLIŃSKI’S WORK
IN SEARCH OF NEW PARADIGMS
(SELECTED PAPERS 2001–2011)

This collection of essays by Antoni Kukliński appears to be altogether different from publications of its kind. For it is a lively presentation of the thinking patterns, mental associations, and sympathies for certain ideas and solutions which Kukliński offers in regard to the crucial economic, social, and political dilemmas of both the world in general and Poland in particular. The essays have been left in their original form, no matter whether they originally served as introductions to various publications or as conference papers. Most of the texts were written in response to dramatic events in the world, such as 9/11, 2001 – but they also rely on the insight of great authors of the past, including Kant and his treatise on Perpetual Peace. Assembling these wide-ranging texts into one volume creates a spectacular panorama of Antoni Kukliński’s insight into the fundamental problems of our time. The author’s enormous knowledge, experience, and engagement have yielded a deep wisdom he devotes to reflection on humanity’s future. The scope of Kukliński’s reflection embraces both the global perspective and the issues before Poland, all the way down to her regions.

The title of the volume stresses that the author has attempted to find new approaches to issues for which we have yet to find satisfactory solutions. Kukliński uses the term “paradigm” in the plural, which is intended to reflect new conceptual frameworks,
new questions, and new methods. Although Kukliński refers to Thomas Kuhn, who introduced this term to the philosophy of science, he offers his own definition. Therefore, although Kuhn’s “paradigm“ was applied to the problems of the development of science, Kukliński’s extension of its applicability to radical turns in human thinking in diverse areas seems to be eminently practical. In this way the term “paradigm” has become a part of Antoni Kukliński’s idiosyncratic language, one which is characterized by a number of other terms which together offer a set of reference points in his discourse. Among them are “megaspace”, “turning points”, “wisdom”, “globalization”, “Gordian knots” and “Alexandrian solutions”, along with the metaphor of the Titanic disaster. Of course, the uniqueness of Kukliński’s discourse does not stem only from his use of key terms – after all, they also appear in the works of other authors. Rather, his discourse is defined by the use of these terms in a *sui generis* network of concepts, in an individual style of writing which demonstrates a unique dramaturgy amplified by the use of Latin phrases. Nor does the author avoid hyperbole or strikingly bold metaphors like the above “Gordian knots” to name ostensibly unsolvable problems and “Alexandrian solutions”, which describe radical decisions for untying, indeed severing such knots. Kukliński uses the concept of Mezzogiorno, particularly in the variant of “Triple Mezzogiorno”, to compare the south of Italy, eastern Germany, and eastern Poland.

It is quite clear what kind of facts provide the main stimulus for Kukliński’s writing. They include: rapid geopolitical changes with the rise of Asian powers; the progressive marginalization of Europe in the new global situation; the threats of global terrorism; the new demographic structure of the world population; and the new driving forces in the world economy, above all knowledge and innovation. Moreover, the author does not hide his sympathies. Antoni Kukliński is in favor of a strong Europe, a strong Atlantic Community, long-term strategic thinking, and moral engagement in world matters. He also supports Louis Emmerij’s idea of the global social contract and advocates a “wisdom-based economy”. This idea is a reaction to indicators suggesting the failure of the
idea of the knowledge-based economy. What is needed, Professor Kukliński argues, is the inclusion of moral factors that would turn knowledge into wisdom. In fact, using the word “wisdom”, which is as rich in significance as it is vague, the author proposes an alternative and new practical response to the doctrine of scientism. Here, wisdom may also mean an intellectual space that allows greater freedom in accepting views and solutions which might be rejected when the starting point of our thinking is limited merely to conventional knowledge. I am not sure if the author is aware of this fact, but his idea seems to be congruent with the epistemological anarchism of Feyerabend. However, at the same time it offers an escape from anarchism’s moral vacuum through its pro-active engagement in favor of chosen objectives.

Indeed, committed engagement is the next feature of Antoni Kukliński’s writing. In identifying the reasons for decline and crisis in the various contexts he writes about, the author always advocates certain goals for the future, as well as the most favorable solutions. His diagnoses of the current situation are always solidly based on a range of leading studies and reports by international organizations and think tanks, for example, the OECD, the World Bank, and the UNDP. Thus, the book offers us an excellent selection of quotations from the most innovative thinkers, and this ushers the reader right into the heart of the global debate on crucial world problems. Throughout the whole book the author also demonstrates a strong awareness of the importance of history for reflection on both the present and the future. This helps to explain the presence in the book of reports from debates which now have only historical significance (like the Polish presidency in the EU). Nonetheless, their example may also be instrumental for grasping certain future developments.

Most of the texts included in this book could be read as research projects to be developed by others. Very often the reader will find tables which only indicate problem areas and provide long lists of questions to be answered. This style of writing may reflect Antoni Kukliński’s actual role as a leader in the social sciences, one which has allowed him over the years to gather a large international,
interdisciplinary group of scholars who have contributed to the vast number of publications and conferences he has organized.

There is probably only one element which is missing in Professor Kukliński’s analysis, and that is optimism. The author evinces a deep pessimism regarding the current situation of the world, Europe, and Poland. Reading between the lines one can see that Professor Kukliński does not believe his recommendations will be followed by decision-makers. Unfortunately, I myself have much the same view on the current situation – though perhaps with one exception: the opportunities before Poland. The great asset of Poles and Poland is that of exceptional adaptability, something which may help us to avoid disaster in the future. Yet this attribute has somehow escaped the author’s attention.

However, this does not affect the overall value of the book, one that is an extremely important work in that it offers a picture of the unique scholarship of one of today’s most distinguished social scientists in Poland, and one whose impact on young generations should last for many decades.
By Way of an Afterword In Search of New Paradigms

Introduction

The decade 2001–2011, indicated as a time-frame for the selected papers by Professor Antoni Kukliński collected in this Volume, proved to be extremely dynamic in many respects. It witnessed rapid and often unexpected shifts in almost all areas of social life – from the local to the global scale. One, especially interesting for the Readers of this Volume, area of change was the field of broadly understood territorial development. Among others, a few ideas were voiced in the period that appeared perfect candidates for new paradigms or models of territorial development, which were widely discussed, professionally promoted and selectively studied across the globe. In turn, some novelties were introduced in the realm of public policies oriented to socio-economic objectives, especially in the European Union and including Poland. As a result, the first decade

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3 Richard’s Florida concept of creative class is a perfect case in point, for the promotion of which worldwide a special business organization was created by Florida – see http://www.creativeclass.com/.
of the XXI century may be characterized as a period in which many issues especially related to models of growth and conceptions of development policies in an era of globalization were hotly debated.

Some of the ideas, models and conceptions, which were articulated and implemented during those years, turned out to be just scientific, ideological or political fads, others reflected culmination of or at least substantial continuities with ideas known from the past, still others appeared to respond to on-going transformations within this or that area of social life, whereas some others themselves clearly advocated, pressed for, promoted and finally triggered modifications and changes in the ways territorial development was thought of and practiced in the period and beyond. As I see it, in many respects, these theoretical and pragmatic dynamics were testifying to continuous preoccupation – evidenced in all social science disciplines as well as in the field of public administration – with issues related to three fundamental problems that proved to be notorious in an era which has hosted the second phase of globalization (which, not quite unexpectedly, came to be associated with globally spreading *Risikogesellschaft*).

The first of these three fundamental problems concerned the place of/for territory in processes of socio-economic development. The second of the problems concerned modes to govern political, economic and social processes, including the management of public policies. The third of the problems concerned the nature and status of knowledge about territorial development, public policies as well as the modes of government/governance.

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4 The last case, which seems especially interesting, may be aptly exemplified by the careers made by the notions of „social capital” and „new modes of governance” in theory and practice of territorial development.


By Way of an Afterword In Search of New Paradigms

THE LEGACIES OF THE LONG XX CENTURY

Despite all those much publicized permutations and novelties, I fully agree with Antoni Kukliński, who claims that “conventional wisdom comparing the «long» XIX century of 1814–1914 and the «short» century of 1914–1990 is wrong. The XX century is also a «long» century covering the period between 1914 and 2012 (?). The two decades 1990–2010 are a logical conclusion of the XX century and not an opening of the XXI century”.7 Except for tremendous technological progress – which has produced very ambivalent consequences in all dimensions and scales of social life8 – no real breakthrough was achieved during the first calendar years of the XXI century as far as territorial development and its governance are concerned. In other words, caught amidst “[t]he present pentagonal crisis [which] was created by the historical mistakes of the global governance in the blossoming time of the neoliberal miracle of the years 1990–2008”9, we must still continue to search for new paradigms in order to overcome in the XXI century the mounting political turmoil, economic disequilibria, social drifts, cleavages and cultural wars that are the legacies of the “long” XX century in all spatial scales.10

9 Ibid.
10 Compare for instance C. Thomas, Globalizacja a rozwój Południa, [in:] J. Ravenhill (ed.). Globalna ekonomia polityczna ... R.H. Wade, Globalizacja, wzrost gospodarczy, ubóstwo, nierówność, resentment i imperialism, [in:] J. Ravenhill (ed.). Globalna ekonomia polityczna ... I should perhaps explain in this place that, contrary to Professor A. Kukliński, I am very skeptical about the current „real” end of the “long” XX century and the final birth of the “new” XXI century. I am mainly doubtful about it because I do not see much evidence (at least in Europe and especially
Naturally, with respect to territorial development, it should be stated clearly in this context that the “long” XX century has overshadowed the early XXI century by means of its both negative and positive legacies. Those legacies are multiple and they simply cannot be discussed in one short paper, such as this one. Yet, for the purpose of this Afterword I am going to single out their four instances, which seem to me to have the most bearing on the current debates concerning new paradigms on which to premise “the future of regions in the perspective of global change” as well as the future shape of regional policies, especially in Europe. Moreover, I find these four types of dilemmas clearly reflected in Antoni Kukliński’s papers collected in this Volume – obviously, alongside multiple other intellectual, scientific, political and moral questions which he has touched upon in his writings during the decade of 2001–2011.

These four types of dilemmas – which are, to a significant degree, mutually related – could be described in the following manner:

a) the dilemmas inherent in a contradiction between visions of steered and spontaneous – in Kukliński’s words this could be put as “dirigiste” vs. “leseferistic” – developmental processes;

b) the dilemmas inherent in a contrast between “globally-minded” and “locally-minded” – in Kukliński’s words this could be put as “globally-minded” vs. “socially-minded” – approaches to regional policies;

c) at the regional level) that the global crisis that erupted in 2008, which openly compromised the fallacies and myths of neoliberalism, has led to any substantial revision of the conceptions (paradigms) of socio-economic development on which public policies are still based and implemented, let alone new visions thereof. What is worse, no social force might be discerned so far that could propose and push for an alternative to the neoliberal thinking.


Compare for example A. Kukliński, Globalization in the XXI century. In quest of a new paradigm (A discussion paper), [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms...

Compare for example A. Kukliński, Towards a new model of regional policy, [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms...
c) the dilemmas inherent in widely publicized differences associated with the vision of a world of places as contrasted with the vision of a world of flows\textsuperscript{14} – in Kukliński’s words this could be put as “static” vs. “dynamic” picture of the world\textsuperscript{15};

d) the dilemmas inherent in seemingly mutually exclusive methodological approaches to the study of human and territorial development, that is clashes between “neutral” (“objective”) knowledge production and “value-laden” (“subjective”) knowledge production – in Kukliński’s words this could be put as insights derived from “conventional wisdom” (or “business as usual”) vs. “imaginative” (or “bold”) knowledge.\textsuperscript{16}

I also happen to believe that these are the dilemmas which need to be especially thoroughly (re)considered before the many strategic issues, which are also posed in Kukliński’s writings from the period, could be successfully tackled and resolved.\textsuperscript{17}

**NEW CONTROVERSES AND OLD PARADIGMS**

The four types of dilemmas pertaining territorial development, which I have singled out in the previous section, should not just be treated in terms of narrow and specialized scientific knowledge problems. This is because they are all firmly rooted in larger

\textsuperscript{14} Compare M. Castells, *The Information Age* ....

\textsuperscript{15} Compare for example A. Kukliński, *Regio Futures programme (RFP)*, [in:] A. Kukliński, *In Search of New Paradigms* ....


political and eventually ethical issues\textsuperscript{18} which grew to their mature shape during the “long” XX century. In other words, in their basic forms those dilemmas – even though I have restricted them above to the field of territorial development – might be deduced from a series of “old paradigms” which together added up to competing holistic visions of social life that were articulated in the XX century.

Notably, as rightly noticed by Antoni Kukliński, especially in Europe and the USA an opportunity to re-examine those old visions, paradigms and dilemmas in order to create some new principles on which to base new concepts of human and territorial development after the Cold War had ended and the Iron Curtain had collapsed was lost.\textsuperscript{19} By contrast, many of those unresolved dilemmas finally turned into Gordian Knots\textsuperscript{20} in the conditions created by the neoliberal order which reached its recent traumatic peak in the year 2008.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} Compare the writings by Michel Foucault on the intricate linkages between power and knowledge – e.g. M. Foucault, \textit{Trzeba bronić społeczeństwa, Wykłady w College de France, 1976}, tłum. M. Kowalska, Wydawnictwo KR, Warszawa 1998.

\textsuperscript{19} Compare A. Kukliński, \textit{Globalization in the XXI Century. In quest of a new paradigm (A discussion paper)}, [in:] A. Kukliński, \textit{In Search of New Paradigms ....}. Personally, I happen to believe that this kind of opportunity was lost in the XX-XXI century thrice: 1) in the aftermath of the oil shocks in the 1970s when the logic of Keynesism was not re-examined and improved but abandoned and a logic of the neoliberal monetarists gained the upper hand instead which, basically, pushed the societies back down the path of unequal development already tried (with disastrous consequences for societies, governments and international relations) during the first phase of globalization in the period 1870-1914 (see for example J. Ravenhill (ed.), \textit{Globalna ekonomia polityczna ...}); 2) as explained by Kukliński – in the early 1990s; and 3) in the aftermath of the 2008 financial and economic crises – see for example J. Bogle, \textit{Dość. Prawdziwe miary bogactwa, biznesu i życia}, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2009; J. Stiglitz, \textit{Freefall: Jazda bez trzymanki. Ameryka, wolne rynki i tonięcie gospodarki światowej}, Polskie Towarzystwo Ekonomiczne, Warszawa 2010.


Therefore, those old-new problems that I have listed so far with a reference to territorial development could also be formulated in a more general manner. As such they would represent: 1) an opposition between “modernist” and “postmodernist” visions of development; 2) a battle between “competition” and “welfare” oriented visions of state, society and economy; 3) a tug-of-war between “place-based” and “spatially blind” public policies; and 4) a virtual chasm dividing “realists” from “constructivists” in science, respectively. It is worth stressing that each side of each of those oppositions has found numerous ardent supporters – both among scholars and practitioners. Also from this point of view, the papers by Professor Kukliński collected in this Volume make for interesting reading since they often aptly summarize and sharpen the conflicting stances and claims.

The opposition between “modernist” and “postmodernist” visions of development might be ultimately reduced to the question whether there is just one road or many roads to development. Dilemmas underlying this opposition are many and serious. Curiously enough, thinking in terms of paradigms does not seem to facilitate the resolution of this particular opposition unless one concedes that there could be formulated several paradigms of developmental processes – of which at least some can be simultaneously “true”. Hopefully, the recent turn in European regional policies to more reliance on endogenous factors of development, including social and cultural ones, could be interpreted as evidence of an attempt to overcome the opposition between “modernist” and “postmodernist” visions of development. However, the fact that this new generation of regional policies is nested within (and tightly constrained by) the homogenizing national-European-global institutional, legal and political frameworks – which are still, to a large extent,

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22 Compare A. Kukliński, Regio Futures Programme (RFP), [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms ....

imbued with the logics of the neoliberal order – might, in my view, undermine the promises inherent in this turn.

The battle between “competition” and “welfare” oriented visions of state, society and economy is less easy to reduce to a single opposition between just two terms or approaches. Nevertheless, it could be presented through the lenses provided by political economy, focusing on two opposing paradigms and value hierarchies that underpin these paradigms. Simplifying, these opposing – economic-cum-political – fundamental standpoints are represented respectively by 1) the doctrine of monetarism which is coupled with the neoliberal model of polity and society and 2) the doctrine of Keynesism which is embedded in the social-democratic model of polity and society. Even though both of these paradigms claim to be oriented to providing for human happiness, each of them sees both the provision and the happiness differently. Hence the neoliberal privileging of individual interests in the conditions of unrestrained market and minimal state seems difficult to reconcile with the social democratic tendency for the state to control (or at least regulate) the market in the interest of a community. Unfortunately, no proposal of a paradigm going beyond these two poles has been successfully articulated so far, while in the debate over the new generation of European regional policies, in my view, the neoliberal wing still seems to have prevailed recently.

The tug-of-war between “place-based” and “spatially blind” public policies has several assumptions and dimensions behind it as well. Its complexity has a lot to do with the present globalization

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24 Compare A. Kukliński, Towards a new model of regional policy, [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms ....
25 Compare M. Watson, Teoretyczne tradycje globalnej ekonomii politycznej, [in:] J. Ravenhill (ed.), Globalna ekonomia polityczna ....
27 Compare for example A. Kukliński, 2013, Megaspaces of the XX Century. A Problem oriented study, [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms ...
context in which the dilemma “place-based” versus “spatially blind” public policies is deeply rooted.\textsuperscript{28} However, as a matter of fact, the appearance of this dilemma could be presented as a reaction to the infamous “death of the territory” thesis inscribed in the discourse promoted by one-sided enthusiasts of neoliberal globalization, the world of flows and network society. Namely, the supposed irrelevance of place and territory in an era of supposedly borderless instantaneous world which was supposedly fully explained and justified by the supposed merits of universal mobility has turned out both false and harmful in many respects.\textsuperscript{29} Partly for these reasons, in the new generation of regional policies the so called territorial cohesion has been inscribed, which evidences an important change (even if it would be an exaggeration to call it a change of paradigm) in the way developmental processes on the local and regional level were conceptualized until very recently.

Finally, the chasm dividing “realists” from “constructivists” in science is, to an extent, possible to exemplify by a qualitative difference separating “good experts” from “great thinkers”. This kind of difference seems to be implied by Kukliński’s favourite exemplar of Albert Einstein with the latter’s dictum “Imagination is more important than knowledge”.\textsuperscript{30} However, from my point of view, what is at stake in this opposition is first of all the degree to which scientific discourses – and paradigms – might be implicated (intentionally or unwittingly) in creating, implementing, sustaining and justifying ideological visions and political doctrines of development under the guise of “objective” knowledge and expertise.


\textsuperscript{29} Compare ibid. See also R.H. Wade, \textit{Globalizacja, wzrost gospodarczy, ubóstwo, nierówność, resentymment i imperializm}, [in:] J. Ravenhill (ed.). \textit{Globalna ekonomia polityczna ...}; C. Hay, \textit{Wpływ globalizacji na państwo}, [in:] ibid.

The field of regional policy is an especially fruitful object of study in this respect.\textsuperscript{31}

While, following Foucault, one may hardly imagine a new paradigm that could fully overcome the opposition between the two stances in scientific knowledge production, a middle ground might be found in a recommendation that encourages an inclusion of discourse analysis in the toolbox used by researchers dedicated to the study of human and territorial development.\textsuperscript{32} I tend to believe that an approach currently favoured in the realm of public policies, i.e. the model of so called evidence-based policy, could fruitfully take advantage of insights generated by discourse analysis alongside other, more conventional methodologies.

**Conclusion**

In this short paper I have tried to look at the papers by Professor Antoni Kukliński, which are collected in this Volume, through the lenses of the term featuring in the Volume’s title – i.e. the paradigm. I have used the term paradigm in its broader sense that has been defined by Antoni Kukliński basing on his interpretation of Gunnar Myrdal’s scholarship. According to this interpretation, a paradigm is “a set of questions exploring the empirical and prospective reality and a set of methodologies creating the philosophical and instrumental framework how to answer those questions”.\textsuperscript{33} Informed by this definition, I have come to the conclusion that in the chosen decade (2001–2011) the search for new paradigms was focused on ways to overcome a limited number of controversies,


\textsuperscript{32} See also B. Rončević, *Strategic discourse: A path creation tool for development latecomers* [in:] P. Jakubowska A. Kukliński, P. Żuber (eds), *The Future of European Regions* ....

dilemmas and oppositions that were for the most part inherited by the early XXI century from its “long” predecessor.

Basing on the papers included in this Volume, I have decided to select and briefly analyze four such dilemmas, all of which are related to some aspects of territorial development. My analysis covered an opposition between “modernist” and “postmodernist” visions of development; a battle between “competition” and “welfare” oriented visions of state, society and economy; a tug-of-war between “place-based” and “spatially blind” public policies; as well as differences dividing “realists” from “constructivists” in knowledge production processes.

However, the Reader may, naturally, learn a lot more about various ways to approach these and many other dilemmas from Professor Antoni Kukliński’s papers included in this Volume. As a matter of fact, nowhere is His dedication to the search of new paradigms more visible than in two papers which are titled, respectively, Regio Futures programme (RFP)34 and Megaspaces of the XXI century. A problem oriented study35.

In brief, the first of these papers includes an outline of a research programme which is premised on an innovative idea that the regions should become seriously engaged in prospective thinking, thereby gaining an opportunity to influence (or even “invent”) the shape of their future trajectories. In other words, this is a programme which urges for “future ready regions”. It does so using both vivid metaphorical expressions such as “the ego” and “the mind” of the region and drawing attention to the importance of analyzing carefully at the regional level phenomena such as long duration, path dependency, path creation etc. Also, the regional elites and regional societies are encouraged to practice the art of scenario-building, including in long-time horizons.

In turn, the concept of global megaspace, introduced in the other of the above quoted papers, is an element that may link the

34 A. Kukliński, Regio Futures programme (RFP), [in:] A. Kukliński, In Search of New Paradigms ....

conception of the Regio Futures Programme with larger issues which are related to the present reconfiguration of the global scene. Premised on a definition of the global megaspace as a “grand geographical area representing a big demographic, political, economic, scientific, cultural and military potential recognized very clearly in the global scale [...] [which] is a regionally differentiated area [...]”\(^{36}\), the comparative research programme on global megaspaces proposed by Antoni Kukliński may open up a new perspective in thinking about territories, development and governance at the turn of the XX and XXI century.

**Bibliography**


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\(^{36}\) Ibid., p. 184-185, emphasis mine.


Wade R.H., 2011, Globalizacja, wzrost gospodarczy, ubóstwo, nierówność, resentyment i imperializm, [in:] J. Ravenhill (ed.), Globalna


Roman Galar

IN SEARCH FOR A WORKING PARADIGM

The volume presents a selection of sixteen papers published by Antony Kukliński since 2001. These papers are but a small retrospective sample of his about 400 publications, brought together to celebrate his 85th anniversary. They reflect impressive bulk of accumulated academic knowledge and rich personal experiences gained in diplomacy and administration. In effect, as majority of these papers were written in the last five years, we are given the rare opportunity to savor the thoughts of an old wise man in the best Western traditions.

The volume is divided in four parts concerned roughly with the global, European, Polish and regional perspectives. What bonds the particular papers together is premonition of the approaching paradigmatic changes. With his characteristic mixture of erudition and emotion Kukliński adds substance to the seemingly funny observation that the “future is not longer what it used to be”.

It is a challenge to present the rich content of these contributions in a few words. It would be a bigger challenge to do it more elaborately. Messages of Kukliński are clear enough not to demand elaborate exegesis. More detailed exposition of some of his ideas would inadvertently downplay the others. The reader is best advised to save his time to study the original text. I will limit myself to just one sentence for each contribution in an attempt to grasp a main message:

1. Emergence of six megaspaces, which are forming in the World, to fill the void left after the retreat of the West, is the key
phenomenon of the global scene of our times (*Megaspaces of the 21st century...*, 2011).

2. Pragmatic approach offered by the concept of economy based on knowledge is not enough, as the critical events demonstrate that the real base must be wisdom (*Knowledge based economy versus wisdom based economy*, 2011).

3. Making the world global for business will misfire, if the inclusion of the deprived is not made the prime concern of this process (*Globalization in the 21st century*, 2002).

4. Humanization of international relations and replacing power games with sustainable peace has to remain on the top of global agenda (an elegant essay: *Pax Kantiana and the eternal reality of power*, 2003).

5. Civilization as we know it comes under pressure of a triangle of democratic, autocratic and anarchistic power systems (*The creation and destruction of the global order*, 2008).

6. Converging tensions between equality and efficiency, freedom and cooperation, spiritual and material, present and future values create uncertainty, which might result in a very divergent scenarios for Europe. (*The future of Europe, four dilemmas and five scenarios...*, 2003).

7. Rapidly declining standing of Europe in innovating, demography, enterprising and cultural identity brings forward the urgent necessity of a new European renaissance — the alternative is a slide toward obscurity (*Europa Quo Vadis?*, 2010).

8. Deficit of strategic thinking is the “Achilles Heel” of Europe, which is facing the greatest reconfiguration of the global scene in history. (*The renaissance of European strategic thinking...*, 2011).

9. European Union is jeopardized by the rapidly growing split between procedures and reality, to save it both conventional wisdom and political correctness must be challenged (*Europa Quo Vadis reconsidered...*, 2011).

10. Innovation is the main driving force of development, and the climate of passive imitation can destroy its endogenous sources, in this context Poland is losing ground (*The dilemma – imitation versus imitation...*, 2007).
11. Past two decades of Polonia Restituta call for the honest and comprehensive diagnosis that should provide the knowledge base to engineer a turning point in Polish politics — it is necessary to confront the accumulating long term challenges (Polonia Quo Vadis?..., 2007).

12. Ideology and contributions of the Club of Rome might be helpful for Polish strategic thinking, therefore it is well advised to promote achievements and to contribute to the works of this organization. (Earlier unpublished personal observations and suggestions: The Polish Association for the Club of Rome..., 2008).

13. Pentagonal crisis of global finance, economy, global order, leadership and the Atlantic Community itself, is reshaping toponography of development in an unpredictable way — regions must prepare to face up the enigma of the 21st century (Report on the past and the proposed outline of the future research: Regio Futures Programme..., 2011).

14. A new organic cohesion policy is needed to eliminate some of growing pathologies, i.a. the demoralizing policy of “lagging behind” to gain a priority access to the EU cohesion funds (Towards a new model of regional policy, 2007).

15. Strategic partnership of global corporations such, as KGHM and its regional base, might create a strong developmental pole on the lines described by F. Perroux (Copper corporations and copper regions..., 2013).

16. Unsatisfactory development of Southern Italy, Eastern Germany and Eastern Poland share common characteristics — they all present a “Gordian Knot” of problems that demand a decisive “Alexandrian solution” (The enigma of the triple European Mezzogiorno..., 2011).

All papers in the volume seem to share some common traits that reflect the Author’s original and indomitable personality, his life’s passions and his unique ability to pressure people into action. I will try to point on three of them:

- None of these papers keeps reiterating the “truths of the day”. Kukliński either introduces concepts little known at the moment
or demystifies concepts that were fossilized into mindless procedures. My favorite example is his approach to the Knowledge Based Economy — Kuklíński was the first to propagate it in Poland and one of the first to despair over its implementation.

- All papers are future oriented and all contest the idea of linear future. In mapping of future events Kuklíński thinks in terms of a variety of trajectories of development (or decline), tipping points and shifts of tectonic plates of the underlying global order. His main message might be that paradigmatic changes are unavoidable and we should be better mentally prepared.

- As a true academician Kuklíński is a person motivated by curiosity. He keeps asking questions and pointing situations that cannot be managed on the base of existing experience. In difference to prevailing practices he focuses on problems rather than theories and sketches spaces of possible answers rather than peddling some readymade solutions. Practically all of his papers end with same proposition of a research program that could elucidate the matter in question.

Not only particular papers but also the Volume itself contains a suggestion of a research program, this time addressed to the Polish Economic Society. In his Introduction, Kuklíński proposes to integrate “the grand intellectual traditions of Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith and Thomas Khun” in an international research on “The role of paradigmatic thinking in the development of social sciences”.

This seems to be an intriguing idea. Kuklíński defines paradigm as “a set of questions exploring the empirical and prospective reality”. Kuklíński argues that the current paradigms have burned away and the new paradigms for 21st century are necessary. The impact of all three thinkers on formation the current paradigm was very substantial. This might lead to the research hint that the reason for the present limbo is hidden in questions that Myrdal, Galbraith and Khun failed to ask. In terms of control theory it might be said that reality overreacted to the corrective input applied some two generations ago...
Kukliński consistently proved his ability to grasp the “large picture” earlier than the others. Not once he raised issues that seemed to be marginal and which with time proved to be central. Yet his ability to influence decision makers was rather limited. This is quite usual story in the times of decline, otherwise the present crisis would not came to the seemingly unaware people. So what is the use of “throwing peas against the wall”? I strongly believe in drops that hollow out rock.

Wrocław, 1.03.2013
Professor Antoni Kukliński points to the necessity to seek a new paradigm, or pattern of thinking, that would be well-suited to the requirements of the new civilization. He refers to three theoretical and methodological inspirations that he has found in the works of three authors: Gunnar Myrdal, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Thomas Kuhn. Drawing on the intellectual legacy of these eminent thinkers and economists, Antoni Kukliński formulates an innovative proposal to the effect that that legacy should be integrated by the economic community and used for developing new patterns of thinking about the future. He emphasizes Myrdal's conclusion that “theory in this context means nothing more than a logically correlated system of questions addressed to the material.” This corresponds both to Galbraith’s critique of conventional wisdom and to Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions.

Professor Elżbieta Maczyńska

The careful selection of recent works of unfatigued Professor Antoni Kukliński provides a precious opportunity to get acquainted with his research accomplishments in analysing the present against the background of the past for the sake of generating – and sharing with us – his insight into future. It deserves careful reading and reflexion by students, academia, statesmen and all interested in the fate of Poland, Europe - and the world.

A paradigmatic approach adopted by the Author makes the lecture punctuated and intellectually revealing. It offers an enviable cognitive value insolar as key challenges of the XXI century that will affect our destinies are concerned.

Professor Jan Woroniecki

The title of the volume stresses that the author has attempted to find new approaches to issues for which we have yet to find satisfactory solutions. Kukliński uses the term “paradigm” in the plural, which is intended to reflect new conceptual frameworks, new questions, and new methods. Although Kukliński refers to Thomas Kuhn, who introduced this term to the philosophy of science, he offers his own definition. Therefore, although Kuhn’s “paradigm” was applied to the problems of the development of science, Kukliński’s extension of its applicability to radical turns in human thinking in diverse areas seems to be eminently practical. In this way the term “paradigm” has become a part of Antoni Kukliński’s idiosyncratic language, one which is characterized by a number of other terms which together offer a set of reference points in his discourse. Among them are “megaspace”, “turning points”, “wisdom”, “globalization”, “Gordian knots” and “Alexandrian solutions”, along with the metaphor of the Titanic disaster. Of course, the uniqueness of Kukliński’s discourse does not stem only from his use of key terms – after all, they also appear in the works of other authors. Rather, his discourse is defined by the use of these terms in a sui generis network of concepts, in an individual style of writing which demonstrates a unique dramaturgy amplified by the use of Latin phrases. Nor does the author avoid hyperbole or strikingly bold metaphors like the above “Gordian knots” to name ostensibly unsolvable problems and “Alexandrian solutions”, which describe radical decisions for untying, indeed severing such knots. Kukliński uses the concept of Mezzogiorno, particularly in the variant of “Triple Mezzogiorno”, to compare the south of Italy, eastern Germany, and eastern Poland.